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Abstract 
 
How do dynamic capabilities develop in small firms? More specifically, what 
mechanisms account for the emergence of dynamic capabilities in SMEs? The 
dynamic capabilities perspective synthesises evolutionary theory, the resource based 
view of the firm and organisational learning to explain how firms sustain competitive 
advantage.  However, the literature tends to focus on larger firms and assumes the 
existence of routines and processes, particularly those needed to assimilate new 
knowledge. The manner in which dynamic capabilities evolve may be different in the 
small firm context as routines and processes associated with seeking out and 
assimilating new knowledge will differ from those of large firms. 
This research draws on a single case study using a critical realism perspective to study 
the emergence of dynamic capabilities. The case firm is a small Irish owned print firm 
that has evolved into an international brand and artwork management business. The 
study draws on interviews, company records and documents, and notes from 186 
meetings between the author and the CEO over a seven year period.  The case data is 
analysed using the framework of critical realism’s ontological strata of the Empirical, 
the Actual and the Real to interpret the data captured and to explore the underlying 
mechanisms present in order to provide defensible explanations for the phenomenon 
observed.  
Analysis of the case data suggests that dynamic capabilities developed as a 
consequence of (i) the focus on firm performance, (ii) capacity building (people and 
technology), (iii) the evolution of higher order learning, (iv) managerial 
purposefulness, and (v) the use of third parties.  Adopting a critical realist perspective  
suggests that dynamic capabilities emerged as a result of the interaction of the CEO’s 
capacity to engage in higher order learning and the CEO’s knowledge and networks as 
they relate to the business that allow the CEO identify, assimilate and exploit new 
knowledge. Contributions include a description and explanation of how dynamic 
capabilities emerged in an SME; the application of the dynamic capabilities 
perspective to the small firm context; and the use of the critical realist perspective to 
study dynamic capabilities in the context of small firms.  
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1. Introduction 
The management capability of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) is the 
subject of constant discussion in the literature.  In particular, the means by which such 
capability can be increased is of keen interest to policy makers, academics and 
business professionals alike.  Despite this, the literature on dynamic capability, which 
has attracted increasing attention over recent years for its potential to contribute to the 
strategic management literature, has failed to empirically examine the SME context in 
any detail.  In addition, this literature has focused more on nuances of definition and 
debates on whether dynamic capabilities might directly or indirectly influence firm 
performance rather than considering how such dynamic capabilities might emerge in 
practice and thereby providing some useful advice to practitioners. 
 
This thesis examines the emergence of dynamic capabilities in an Irish SME in the 
print and packaging industry.  The context is of an industry segment in turmoil as a 
result of technological and market changes.  The transition in the firm and in 
particular in the strategic perspective of the owner-manager over the nine years from 
2002 to 2010 is considered in the light of the literature. The data demonstrates the 
emergence of a dynamic capability in the firm during this period.  Using a critical 
realist perspective, and the ontological framework of the strata of reality of the 
Empirical, the Actual and the Real, this emergence is considered in relation to the 
empirical data which was observed but more fundamentally in terms of the underlying 
mechanisms, which were not empirically observable but which gave rise to the 
emergence of the dynamic capability. 
 
Having identified these underlying mechanisms a theoretical explanation for the 
emergence of the dynamic capability identified in the firm is developed.  The 
explanation posits a critical interaction between learning (including aspects of tacit 
knowledge), social capital and absorptive capacity to support the emergence of 
dynamic capabilities in SMEs. 
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1.1 SMEs in Ireland 
SMEs are a central element of most developed economies.  Small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) are defined as enterprises with less than 250 employees and with 
sales of less than € 50 million p.a. or with balance sheets valued at less than € 43 
million (Enterprise Ireland  2008).  Small businesses are defined as those with less 
than 50 employees (Small Business Forum 2006).  The OECD (2003), in considering 
the issue of management development in SMEs, reported that in 1994 in Germany, 
SMEs accounted for 99% of enterprises and 50% of sales and that in Japan 78% of 
employment was in SMEs which accounted for 99.1% of all enterprises.  By 2009, 
SMEs accounted for 53% of employment in 99% of UK enterprises (Department for 
Business Innovation and Skills 2010). 
 
SMEs are a critical element of the national economic framework in Ireland.  Small 
businesses in Ireland employ 54% of the non-agricultural workforce in 97% of the 
businesses registered in the state (Small Business Forum 2006). 92% of businesses 
employ less than ten people and yet account for 36% of industrial employment (DKM 
Consultants 2006).  They contribute almost € 25 billion in gross value added in 
construction, services and manufacturing in Ireland, along with 50% of VAT on 
services, € 530 million in corporation taxes and 37% of income taxes (Small Business 
Forum 2006).  In addition to the empirically evident economic contribution, small 
firms also form an essential element of the supply chain for larger organisations and 
are a key element of the local infrastructure required to attract and retain foreign 
investment in Ireland. 
 
Small businesses have a higher rate of failure than their larger counterparts (OECD 
2003, Storey 2004). Whilst there are a number of explanations for this higher failure 
rate, research has indicated that management development, or lack of management 
development to be more precise, is an explanatory factor (Betcherman, Leckie and 
McMullen 1997, Baldwin et al. 1997, Fuller-Love 2006).  The report of the 
Management Development Council in Ireland, a body charged with advising 
Government on supporting the development of world class management skills within 
Irish SMEs found “... that improving management capability within SMEs through 
management development can lead to significant returns to the State in terms of 
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increased Gross Value Added, increased employment, better business survival rates, 
and a more skilled workforce” (The Management Development Council 2010 p. 5). 
 
1.2 The literature gap 
The concept of dynamic capability(Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997, Eisenhardt and 
Martin 2000, Helfat et al. 2007) is founded on the resource based view of the firm 
(Penrose 1959, Barney 1991, Peteraf 1993)and evolutionary theory(Nelson and 
Winter 1982).  The focus on routines and capabilities of the latter and the focus on 
how resources may be configured for better competitive impact of the former lead to 
the consideration of how firms develop the capacity to “purposefully create, extend or 
modify its resource base”  (Helfat et al. 2007 p. 4) which is the definition of dynamic 
capability used herein. 
 
The literature on dynamic capability is generally focused on larger firms(Teece 2007, 
Wang and Ahmed 2007, Barreto 2010). The literature is also generally focused on 
describing and debating what dynamic capabilities are, rather than describing how 
they may emerge.  Consideration of this emergence tends to focus on organization 
learning (Zollo and Winter 2002), knowledge management (Verona and Ravasi 2003), 
leadership (Rosenbloom 2000) and sensing and seizing opportunities for change 
(Teece 2007). 
 
SMEs are not smaller versions of larger firms(Penrose 1959, Gibb 2000).  There are 
significant differences in their structure, their systems and their need for coordination. 
Smaller firms are less likely to have the routines and procedures of larger firms in 
relation to the identification and integration of new knowledge(Jones and Macpherson 
2006), yet the literature is effectively silent on how dynamic capabilities may emerge 
in SMEs.  This is the gap which this research seeks to address. 
 
The research question which this research addresses is: how do dynamic capabilities 
emerge in small firms? This question is addressed by examining a single case firm, the 
Perigord Group.  Specifically, the study asks the following questions: 
 
1) Did dynamic capabilities emerge in the Perigord Group? 
2) If so, what caused that emergence? 
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3) Are there underlying mechanisms which were not empirically observable 
which facilitated that emergence? 
 
To explain the emergence of dynamic capabilities the analysis draws on three 
concepts, organisational learning(Huber 1991, Crossan, Lane and White 1999, Fiol 
and Lyles 1985), absorptive capacity(Cohen and Levinthal 1990) and social 
capital(Bourdieu 1986, Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998).  Extant literature explores 
theories related to these concepts in considerable depth.  That there is a relationship 
between learning and absorptive capacity is understood and the subject of on-going 
research.  However, extant literature has not explored the interaction of these three 
factors in the emergence of dynamic capability.   
 
1.3 Philosophical perspective and rationale for methodology 
This research has been conducted using a critical realism perspective. Critical realism 
uses a layered ontology (Bhaskar 1975, Lawson 1997)which holds that researchers 
should attempt to incorporate the hidden mechanisms, powers and tendencies at play 
into plausible causal explanations for the phenomena studied.  Critical realism does 
not conflate ontology and epistemology as it recognises that what may be known goes 
beyond what can be measured(Sayer 1984, Fleetwood 2004).  The researcher should 
not consider what cannot be measured in a speculative vacuum, rather he must be 
informed by the literature and by the data in constructing plausible explanations.  It is 
a basic tenet of critical realism that the causal explanations developed are not offered 
as universal laws but are causal tendencies which are open to change and development 
as context and circumstances change over time(Tsoukas 1989, Reed 2005a). 
 
The methodology chosen was an in-depth case study of one firm over the nine year 
period from 2002 to 2010.  The philosophical perspective requires a methodology 
which allows a thick description of the context to be developed(Yin 2003, Easton 
2010).  It requires a methodology which allows a deep level of understanding of the 
firm and its development to be gained so that the researcher may begin to understand 
the underlying mechanisms at play(Bhaskar 1975, Ackroyd 2004). 
 
The case data draws on interviews with four senior executives, firm data on 
investment in training and development and most centrally on records of 186 meetings 
 5 
 
with which I was involved over the nine year period.  These meetings related to my 
business relationship with the firm and were not conducted for the purposes of this 
research. The majority of these meetings included the Chief Executive of the firm.  
The information gathered allowed a detailed description of the firm’s evolution during 
the period and the changing strategic priorities of the Chief Executive. 
 
I have been actively engaged with this firm as a business consultant since 2002.  I 
address the issue of my effective insider researcher (Brannick and Coghlan 
2007)status in Chapter 2.  From a critical realist perspective, once I am careful to 
recognise and challenge my own assumptions about the firm, my close relationship is 
an aid to understanding the depth of context in which it operates.   
 
1.4 Contributions 
This thesis makes a number of contributions to the literature: 
 
The emergence of Dynamic Capabilities in SMES 
This research extends the concept of dynamic capability into the context of small 
firms.  Extant literature on dynamic capability tends to be based on empirical studies 
of very large firms.  The small firm represents a different context, in that typically the 
routines and processes that might explain the emergence of dynamic capabilities in 
larger firms, will not apply to the smaller firm.   
 
Specifically, this research suggests that the emergence of a dynamic capability in the 
Perigord case is explained by (i) the focus on firm performance, (ii) capacity building 
(people and technology), (iii) the evolution of higher order learning, (iv) managerial 
purposefulness, and (v) the use of third parties. This explanation is consistent with the 
limited extant literature on the emergence of dynamic capability which posits four 
factors which enable the emergence of dynamic capabilities.  These are (i) 
developments in organisational learning, (ii) developments in the firm’s capacity to 
identify, assimilate and exploit new knowledge, (iii) the role of the leader and (iv) the 
influence of the owner-manager’s network of social contacts.     
 
The research, following a critical realist methodology, suggests, that in addition to the 
existence of the five themes identified, that dynamic capabilities in SMEs emerge as a 
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result of the interaction of three factors; the interaction of the CEO’s capacity to 
engage in higher order learning, the CEO’s knowledge and networks, and the ability 
of the CEO to identify, assimilate and exploit new knowledge.  The emphasis is on 
this interaction as it is argued that developments in any one factor in isolation from the 
others may not result in the emergence of dynamic capabilities.  
 
The critical realist perspective  
This research applies the framework of the critical realist strata of reality to the case 
data.  This is a contribution to critical realist methodology as the literature contains 
few empirical studies which explicitly follow a critical realist ontology or which apply 
the ontological strata to the data. The practical problems as how best to present the 
research in terms of the evolving research question, the multiple analysis of the data, 
and the constant engagement with the literature is also highlighted.  The use of critical 
realism in this research and the manner in which the research is presented is a 
contribution to knowledge as it reveals the process by which the research evolved and 
provides insight to the iterative and reflexive nature of that process. Specifically, by 
presenting the case data in the context of the initial literature and subsequently re-
interpreting the data in the light of the second literature chapter the reality of the 
research process followed is revealed. 
 
The use of the critical realist perspective is also a contribution to the entrepreneurship 
and small business literature, in that it outlines how a critical realist perspective might 
offer an alternative way of studying aspects of small firms. 
 
The triggers of higher order learning 
The transition to higher order learning is an important determinant of the emergence 
of dynamic capabilities in SMEs. Extant research on learning suggests that this 
transition is often triggered by a crisis. This research suggests that the trigger for the 
transition from lower to higher order learning may not occur in the context of a time 
compressed, single event.  A triggering crisis, like the transition, may emerge over an 
extended period of time.  The addition of this temporal perspective provides a more 
detailed specification of how the transition to higher order learning might be triggered 
in the context of an SME.  It is also suggested that it might be possible for firms to 
avoid crisis-induced triggers.  This might be achieved in the context of an explicit 
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effort by a CEO to develop new knowledge through enhancing and leveraging his 
network of contacts. 
 
The training debate 
This research suggests that attempts to establish direct causal links between training 
and developing capabilities and outcomes, such as firm performance, will not produce 
conclusive evidence either in favour, or against, the case for supporting training and 
management development in smaller firms.  This study suggests that such approaches 
fail to capture either (i) some important outcomes of training, e.g. the possible gradual 
transition towards higher order learning in an owner-manager, and (ii) the temporal 
and path dependent nature of how resources and capabilities emerge in smaller firms. 
 
1.5 Format of the thesis 
This thesis is organised to provide the reader with the philosophical context initially.  
This context is important as the remainder of the thesis is structured in a manner to 
reveal the approach which was followed in the research which led to the contributions 
to method claimed.  The format of the remainder of the thesis is as follows. 
 
Chapter 2 discusses critical realism as a philosophical perspective and describes its 
basic tenets and its ontological and epistemological stance.  As positivism is the more 
mainstream choice in entrepreneurship research, the chapter also explores this 
perspective and outlines some of its drawbacks in the context of this research.  The 
methodology followed in the research is explained in detail, including the sources of 
the data used. 
 
The initial question which informed this study was “how to increase the level of 
planned investment in training by SMEs?”  The relevant literature was identified as 
relating to training and learning.  Chapter 3 is a review of the literature on learning.  It 
considers the policy background to investment in training and differences between 
training and learning and the range of definitions which are in use.  A model for 
organisational learning is explored, before discussing the distinction between orders of 
learning and their potential impact on the organisation. Chapter 3 also explores the 
literature in relation to the appropriate level of investment in training in small and 
medium sized enterprises. 
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The empirical element of this research is based on a single case study of the Perigord 
Group.  Chapter 4 discusses the data in the context of the industry within which this 
firm was operating and then in relation to the development of the firm and its 
investment in learning. Three themes emerged from the analysis of the data; (i) the 
focus of the CEO on the firm’s performance, (ii) capacity building in terms of people 
and technology and (iii) the evolution of higher order learning in the firm.  These 
outcomes partially explained the developments which occurred in the business during 
the period under review (2002-2010).  However this explanation was incomplete, 
requiring farther exploration and analysis.  As the data had revealed some issues 
relating to resource and capability development, it was necessary to re-visit the 
literature. 
 
Chapter 5 discusses the literature on dynamic capability and a number of associated 
theoretical elements.  Tracing the antecedents of dynamic capability through the 
resource based view of the firm and the area of evolutionary theory allows a 
comprehensive understanding of capabilities and dynamic capabilities to be 
developed.  A review of the dynamic capability literature suggests that four factors 
might be important in understanding how dynamic capabilities emerge in SMEs. 
These factors are (i) developments in organisational learning, (ii) developments in the 
firm’s capacity to identify, assimilate and exploit new knowledge, (iii) the role of the 
leader and (iv) the influence of the owner-manager’s network of social contacts.     
 
Chapter 6 is a re-examination of the case data in the light of the literature discussed in 
the previous chapter.  The changing strategic priorities of the CEO are examined to 
reveal the transition from an operational to a more strategic focus. The themes of 
Chapter 4 are re-visited and expanded in the context of the literature in Chapter 5.  
Two additional themes are added (iv) managerial purposefulness and (v) the use of 
third parties in the firm’s development.  In analysing the data, the first research 
question is answered in establishing that dynamic capabilities exist in the firm and 
emerged during the period of this research. 
 
Chapter 7 is divided into two parts.  Firstly, it builds on the analysis of the data in 
Chapter 6 and reveals the underlying mechanisms of the tacit knowledge of the CEO, 
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the capacity to identify, assimilate and exploit new knowledge and the use of the 
CEO’s network of contacts which caused the emergence of the dynamic capability 
observed.   Secondly, it considers the data and literature at a more abstract level and 
develops a theoretical explanation for the emergence of the dynamic capabilities in the 
Perigord Group.  It is argued that it is in the interaction of the factors of organisational 
learning, absorptive capacity and social capital that dynamic capabilities will emerge.  
 
Finally, Chapter 8 draws out the contributions of the research to both the literature and 
to methodology.  The limitations to this research are explored and some suggestions 
for future research made.  Finally, the implications for public policy and practice are 
considered. 
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2. Philosophy and Methodology 
Critical realism is a philosophical perspective which holds that reality is made up of a 
number of strata.  What we can see may only be a portion of what is happening. What 
is happening may be a result of underlying mechanisms.  Critical realist researchers 
seek to uncover such underlying mechanisms to provide context rich theoretical 
explanations of the phenomenon being studied.  This research began with my interest 
in exploring the reasons why some SMEs might invest more in training initiatives.  
My engagement with the philosophical issues led me to the conclusion that my 
perspective was most closely aligned to critical realism.  This was particularly 
influenced by my desire to seek explanation over correlation. Much of the research 
into training levels in SMEs has tended to be in relation to return on investment issues 
or on the desirability of introducing management development programmes.  This has 
been predicated on applying the same perspective applied to larger firms to SMEs 
rather than the research making more of an effort to genuinely understand the SME 
perspective on training issues. My experience of business and in particular my 
experience at a senior management level since 1995 also encouraged me to seek a 
philosophical and methodological approach which would allow me to examine issues 
both in depth and in context.  I believe that firms do not always consciously choose 
the courses of actions they follow and that even where deliberate decisions to act or 
not to act are taken, that these decisions frequently involved many interacting and 
potentially competing factors.  Consequently, I sought an approach which would 
allow me explore this depth in a meaningful manner. 
 
The following sections give a brief overview of critical realism and then discuss in 
detail the ontological, epistemological and methodological issues relating to critical 
realist research. Ontology is the study or theory of being.  It relates to our perspectives 
or beliefs about reality and the nature of reality.  Epistemology is the enquiry into the 
nature of reality.  It relates to our knowledge of reality. Methodology refers to the 
processes and methods used to uncover that knowledge.   Critical realism may also be 
considered from a social theory perspective which is subsequently explored.  
However, critical realism is not a commonly used perspective in research into 
entrepreneurship or organisational studies in general.  The subsequent sections discuss 
alternative philosophical perspectives and explore why the mainstream approach of 
positivism would not have been an appropriate choice for this research. 
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2.1 The critical realist perspective 
Critical realists begin from an ontological foundation which holds that there is a 
reality to be discovered which exists independently of our knowledge of it (Sayer 
2004).  Critical realists regard “the surface appearance of things as potentially 
misleading as to their true character” (Benton and Craib 2001 p. 120). Critical realists 
seek to explore phenomena that can be observed and to explain the factors which may 
have given rise to those phenomena.  Critical realists believe that the underlying 
factors cause the phenomena to occur.  In addition, critical realists hold that our 
knowledge is always open to correction in the light of further research.  The principle 
reason for this is that critical realists argue that our knowledge is informed by our own 
experiences and perspectives which means that we cannot separate ourselves from 
these events.  In contrast, positivism holds that a researcher must strive to isolate 
oneself from the research process and thus strive to identify the true nature of 
universal laws.  This distinction between critical realists and positivists is not related 
to the appropriateness of measures or techniques, it is to recognise that the researcher 
is entwined with the world being studied.  That is not to say that the critical realist 
researcher can ignore his prejudices or assumptions.  On the contrary, the approach 
calls for the researcher to consider them fully in a deliberate reflexive process to 
ensure that assumptions and relevant experiences are surfaced and stated and thus 
included transparently in the theorising which follows.  The critical realist perspective 
is described in detail in the following sections. 
 
2.1.1 Central tenets of Critical Realism 
Bhaskar (1975) is credited with the development of many of the core tenets of critical 
realism.  Whilst accepting that there is an objective reality which can be identified, he 
describes three strata of that reality.  At the foundation is the “Real” which are the 
mechanisms which exist which a researcher seeks to discover.  The “Actual” describes 
the events to which the “Real” mechanisms give rise.  Finally, the “Empirical” is the 
set of events which are actually observed.  The following diagram depicts the layered 
nature of reality.  
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Figure 1.Strata of reality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This conceptualisation of stratified reality is central to critical realism where 
mechanisms may operate at different levels and need to be considered at these levels 
(Benton and Craib 2001, Miller and Tsang 2010).  Under a stratified reality it is 
possible for an observed event to be only a subset of a broader range of phenomena 
resulting from an underlying mechanism which may not itself be directly observed. 
Following Bhaskar, Lawson (1997 p. 21) described mechanisms as being “a way of 
acting or working of a structured thing”.  Easton (2010) cautions that the term 
“mechanism” is problematic as it implies a sense of clear structure and invariance in 
its operation.  He posits that this might imply an inevitability of outcome, which 
would suggest no scope for individual agency, which is not the perspective of critical 
realists. 
 
2.1.2 Ontology and epistemology of critical realism 
Critical realism’s ontology reflects the depth implied in Bhaskar’s (1975) strata of the 
Real, Actual and Empirical.  Critical realism rejects the conflation of epistemology 
and ontology (Sayer 1984, Miller and Tsang 2010, Fleetwood and Ackroyd 2004).  
This is because critical realists have a theory of being which recognises a complexity 
and depth where things may exist independently of our ability to identify them 
Empirical 
•Observable events and captured data 
Actual 
•Events or occurences which were not captured in the data 
•This may include non-occurences (decisions not to act or behave in a certain 
manner which cannot be observed emprically) 
•This could include the potential to act in certain ways 
Real 
•The underlying mechanisms which give rise to the actual and the empirical 
•These may be contextually dependent and may change over time 
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(Fleetwood 2004). Fleetwood’s terminology is useful in that he refers to our ability to 
identify something as opposed to something existing independently of our knowledge 
of it.  This distinction allows us differentiate critical realism from the perspective of 
both social constructionists and positivists.  Social constructionists rely heavily on the 
interpretations of events or objects by respondents which requires the respondent to 
have identified the object or event in some manner.  Positivists seek to answer 
questions about known events or objects, narrowing the field of enquiry and 
explanation to that which can be identified.  In contrast, critical realism allows the 
researcher to consider what may exist which we have not been able to identify.  
Easton (2010 p. 3) posits that critical realism directs our attention to the “fundamental 
nature and capabilities of the things we research rather than simply their measurable 
properties” and that as a result we must focus more on ontology than epistemology 
and methodology. Therefore, the epistemology chosen must recognise the depth of the 
knowledge being sought, and the potential implications of the epistemological 
approach on the matter being explored.   
 
Critical realism also recognises that “this concept-dependence of social phenomena 
means there is therefore a ‘double hermeneutic’ rather than merely a single one as in 
natural science” (Sayer 2004 p. 12).  Giddens (1984 p. 374) described double 
hermeneutic as “the intersection of two frames of meaning”, namely the meaning 
constituted by lay actors in their social world and the frameworks derived by social 
scientists and used in describing the social world studied. In effect, it is an 
interpretation by the social scientist of the interpretation of the respondents of their 
world which is involved. This concept recognises that social science research has the 
capacity to change the views, knowledge or actions of those involved in the research, 
as a direct result of their being involved with the research itself (Giddens 1990).  
Asking questions about a respondent’s view of an issue may cause them to reflect on 
the issue and to change or develop their perspective in some way.  Alvesson and 
Skodberg (2000) describe a triple hermeneutic which calls on researchers to consider 
the ideologies and underlying structures at play in the situation being researched.  By 
reflecting on and highlighting these ideologies in the context studied, researchers may 
influence change in those ideologies or in the acceptance of those ideologies which 
would not have occurred without the research.  This is discussed below in the context 
of critical realism as a social theory.  Recognising this dimension of critical realism 
 14 
 
research requires the researcher to be cognisant that the research itself can have an 
impact on the mechanisms being studied to the extent that those mechanisms or their 
impact may change or be caused to change.  
 
Critical realism also recognises the fallibility of theories which may be developed and 
that our knowledge is always open to revision and reformulation (Reed 2005b).  This 
fallibility is grounded in our approach to research which necessarily brings our 
experiences and world-view to bear.  Critical realist researchers recognise that the 
explanations developed should be defensible and plausible in the context of the 
process followed, but that the findings should not claim to be infallibly true.  Rather 
than this fallibility being seen as any weakening of the realist ontology of critical 
realism “it is the experience of the fallibility of our knowledge, of mistaking things 
and being taken by surprise, that gives us the realist conviction that the world is not 
merely the product of thought, whether privately or socially ‘constructed’” (Sayer 
2004 p. 6).  There is a significant degree of agreement between critical realists and 
what might be termed “mild” social constructionists in this regard, where these 
constructionists do not deny the existence of an independent reality, but stress that it 
may be interpreted in different ways (Newton, Deetz and Reed 2011 p. 10).   
 
Hodgkinson and Rousseau stated that “adopting critical realism means that scientific 
knowledge, although general, is also conditional, lacking a true/false 
dichotomy”(Hodgkinson and Rousseau 2009 p. 540).  Whilst this position is 
consistent with the fallibility argument above, it has more to do with the nature of 
demi-regularities as opposed to universal laws.  This fallibility also reflects the 
potentially non-regular effects of causal powers due to temporal or contextual factors 
(Sayer 2004) which give rise to concept of demi-regularities (Lawson 1997).  Lawson 
(1997) in describing events which occur spontaneously in social interactions 
recognised that similar situations tend to evoke similar patterns of interactions.  
However, in the social sciences, in contrast to the natural sciences, both external 
influences and the influences of the actors can change the interactions.  As a result, 
Lawson termed these events as demi-regularities in recognition that the regular 
tendency could be disrupted over time. In effect, we can only identify processes and 
relationships which hold for a specific context and temporal space.  Changes in 
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circumstances and time may change the tendency of that which might otherwise have 
been considered a universal law. 
 
The double hermeneutic referred to above may also cause a change in the nature or 
impact of the causal mechanisms. Tsoukas (1989 p. 557) described “countervailing 
mechanisms” which may impede other mechanisms from delivering the result which 
might have been expected.  An example might be where a productivity bonus system 
fails to provide the expected increase in output as a result of a prevailing employee 
attitude to acceptable output levels and a reluctance to enhance that level for fear of 
exploitation or for some underlying view of an employee’s role in contributing to 
increased output levels.  In this instance, the lack of result has less to do with the 
productivity improvement system and more to do with perhaps the employees self-
perception, or their past experiences and prejudices.  By drawing attention to these 
countervailing mechanisms, in effect, opposing forces, there is the potential to address 
them in a meaningful manner.  In this way, it is also possible to understand that the 
process of researching an issue may cause the participants to reflect on the 
mechanisms revealed to the extent that those mechanisms may be subject to change or 
to the instigation of new countervailing mechanisms such that the result initially 
observed may no longer exist.  Indeed, it is possible that the process of illuminating 
the mechanisms involved may have the result of participants deciding to completely 
amend the related processes to the extent that the mechanism disappears altogether.   
 
Critical realism makes no universal truth claims in the manner of several other 
philosophical approaches.  Critical realism explicitly recognises that the explanations 
it makes are fallible (can be disproved or amended by subsequent research) and that 
causal mechanisms can be impacted by other factors which may adjust the tendencies 
to which the conjunction of the mechanisms would more normally give rise.  These 
“countervailing mechanisms” (Tsoukas 1989 p. 557) may override that which might 
have been expected or predicted by the theory developed.  This would not necessarily 
disprove the theory. Indeed, the exploration and explanation of the countervailing 
mechanisms might add even greater depth to the proposed theory.  The objective of 
critical realism is to provide robust, defensible explanations which “supports modesty 
in regarding verification and falsification alike” (Miller and Tsang 2010). 
 
 16 
 
Given the ontological depth of critical realism and the non-conflation therein of 
epistemology and ontology, it is critical that the methodology chosen is compatible 
with the philosophical perspective.  The following section discusses methodological 
approaches which are consistent with this ontological and epistemological perspective.  
 
2.1.3 Methodology 
Critical realism can validly draw on a wide range of methods for data collection.  
Sayer (2000) stated that critical realism is compatible with a wide range of research 
methods, in contrast to positivism and interpretivism, but that it is the nature of the 
object of study and that which the researcher seeks to learn which should influence the 
choice of methods. 
 
A central methodological component in critical realism research is retroduction.  
Retroduction is an inferential process whereby one can start with an observed 
phenomenon and ask a Kantian, transcendental question “what, if it existed, would 
account for this phenomenon” (Reed 2005b p. 1631).   While the answer to this 
question is not necessarily logical, it “provides a rational process for candidate 
explanations” (Benton and Craib 2001 p. 185).  Retroduction is a core tool of the 
critical realist.  It “implies that social research should place much more emphasis on 
conceptualisation and description than positivism assumes” (Sayer 2004 p. 11).   
Clarke and Blundel (2007 p. 48) posit that retroduction “involves a type of scientific 
generalization that is concerned with the isolation of fundamental structures whose 
powers can be said to act ‘transfactually’ (i.e. continuing to exist, even though their 
operations may not be manifested at the level of events or observations)”.  Lawson 
(1997 p. 236) describes retroduction as the movement from “a conception of some 
phenomenon of interest to a conception of a different kind of thing (power, 
mechanism) that could have generated the given phenomenon”.  The researcher is free 
to consider alternative explanations which might have given rise to the observed 
phenomenon, and is free to include mechanisms for which there were no observed 
events in the possible explanations generated.  Therefore, the researcher can draw on 
the literature to suggest possible explanations.  In contrast, Grounded Theory (Glaser 
and Strauss 1967)suggests that the researcher should develop theory without reference 
to the extant literature.  
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Critical realists can comfortably make use of both quantitative data for descriptive 
purposes as well as more qualitative data which might be expected to add meaning, 
context and perspective (Fleetwood and Ackroyd 2004).  The critical realist is not 
bound by the limits of data observed. The data gathered through quantitative or 
qualitative methods is useful to the extent that it is suggestive of underlying 
mechanisms which give rise to the observed event.  Olsen (2005) holds that it is not 
the method used but the manner in which it is used and the resulting data interpreted 
which matters.  She proposes that it is methodologically acceptable for critical realists 
to use the most complex of statistical techniques as long as the basis for interpreting 
the results is consistent with the philosophical perspective.  There is a role for the use 
of quantitative data in the description of the Empirical stratum of reality.  In the 
Perigord case study, quantitative data was used to identify and describe the level of 
investment in training in the company.  Analysis at the strata of the Actual and the 
Real will more likely be qualitative in nature as they involve teasing out unobserved 
phenomena. 
 
Critical realist methodology is concerned with identifying the underlying mechanisms 
which cause the phenomenon observed.  It goes beyond measuring the observable and 
seeks to understand and explain the causal processes at play through an intensive 
exploration of the context and issues.  Quantitative and qualitative data can provide 
empirical evidence of a phenomenon. Qualitative approaches are then required to 
illicit a greater depth of knowledge of the context and of underlying factors which 
may be at play.  This qualitative data feeds the process of retroduction which allows 
the researcher to develop the theoretical explanations offered. The specific 
methodology followed in this thesis is described in detail in section 2.4. 
 
2.1.4Critical realism as social theory 
So far, I have considered critical realism predominantly through a philosophical lens. 
However, critical realism can also be examined through a social theory lens. Social 
theory considers interactions in the social world and how, perhaps unseen, factors 
influence the choices and behaviours of individuals and organisations.  The interaction 
between structure and agency are key concepts in the literature which considers the 
extent to which structure determines the actions of individuals or the extent to which 
individuals may exercise agency (choice) in the light of the prevailing structures or 
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indeed the extent to which they may change or form new structures as a result of their 
agency. 
 
Critical realism can be classified as a “middle ground” theory. It sees structure and 
agency as separate, independent concepts, which are interrelated but which do not 
conflate either into individualism or into structuralism (Archer 1995). Social 
structures are not independent of the activities which relate or give rise to them, nor do 
structures exist independently of agents’ conceptions of their actions (Mingers 2004).  
Social structures also exist in specific contexts and in specific temporal spaces.  Some 
structures will be more universal than others and may indeed be sustained for long 
periods of time.  For example, the capitalist economic system has been sustained in 
western countries for many years and facilitates or determines a series of economic 
choices for individuals.  Yet this economic system is not the only possibility.  The 
economic events which led to the worldwide economic crisis of 2008-2010 led many 
commentators to question the validity of some of the capitalist system’s practices. 
 
Critical realism does not conflate agency and structure but seeks to examine the 
interaction between the two.  Archer (1995) holds that there are three types of 
conflation which must be avoided.  Upwards conflation which suggests that structures 
are the outcomes of the actions, or combined actions, of individuals and any point in 
time.  Downwards conflation suggests that structures determine the actions of people.  
Central conflation is where there is equal weight given to structure and agency. 
Critical realists hold that some aspects of structure may pre-exist either the agent’s 
awareness of or conceptualisation of the structure.  This allows agents to act and cause 
changes to structures inadvertently.  It also allows for agents to be unconsciously 
limited in the range of perceived choices as a result of a structure of which they are 
either unaware or of which they are aware but which they unconditionally accept.  A 
social example relates to the institution of marriage as it exists in Ireland.  The 
accepted cultural norm for many years was that a couple in love would marry and then 
live together. This structure was reinforced by a sense of public morality which 
discouraged breaches.  Over the past thirty years, this cultural norm has changed to the 
point where marriage is still perceived as perhaps the conventional choice for couples 
in long term relationships, yet the actions of many individuals over that period has 
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meant that the structure of the institution of marriage has changed to the point where it 
is only one of the culturally acceptable options available to couples. 
 
The critical realist perspective recognises that mechanisms may change over time or 
as contexts change.  Managerial agency (the ability of managers to make choices) is of 
central importance to this debate in the context of entrepreneurship research.  The 
review of the literature on dynamic capability and also on leadership below, explores 
the potential impact which individual actors can have.  It also discusses the 
constraining nature of the structure within which individual actors operate.  It 
considers the myopia of organisations in relation to learning and how assumptions 
may be made in a structural sense which effectively limit the perceived choices of the 
individual manager. The literature and case data are also considered in relation to the 
image which individuals may hold either of themselves or their firms which limit the 
options which they can perceive.  Critical realism allows an in-depth study and 
explanation of such phenomenon where it can also be shown that other organisations 
or individuals faced similar issues, yet seemed to choose different paths. 
 
Critical realism is a philosophical approach which has as one of its underlying aims 
the improvement of social conditions in some way (Bhaskar 1986). Bhaskar argues 
that if we identify some of society’s understandings as being false, it follows that 
actions which are informed by those understandings are falsely based.  Other things 
being equal, the beliefs, actions and conditions which tended to encourage them 
should be changed (Sayer 2004).  This approach means that critical realism can and 
should be normative in its judgments.  The research and conclusions are not value free 
as with some other philosophical traditions.  
 
As discussed above, research in the social sciences involves a double hermeneutic 
where the process of engaging in research can cause changes in the beliefs, intentions 
and actions of social actors.  All critically founded approaches seek to cause change or 
at least to deliver some element of emancipation.  Habermas (1986) proposed that for 
humans to achieve autonomy that we “need to know about objects in our world, we 
need to be able to understand the people around us, and we need to be able to 
understand what we ourselves are doing” (Benton and Craib 2001 p. 114).  Critical 
realism is a philosophical approach which is entirely consistent with this concept of 
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identifying objects and understanding the mechanisms at play around us. By adding to 
the understanding of issues in this manner, research can lead to emancipation of this 
nature. 
 
Ackroyd (2004 p. 159) posits that the “realist view of research suggests that much 
knowledge (and data derived from research) is flawed because it is under-theorised or 
otherwise ill-founded and inadequate, often coming to conclusions that serve the 
interests of the powerful”.  If entrepreneurship research is positivist in the main as a 
result of the requirements of those funding the research (discussed below), it raises the 
possibility that research which is contrarian to the accepted policy norms will be 
restrained or prevented altogether. Any such restriction is unlikely to be in the best 
interest of the field or society in general.  One objective of critical realist research can 
be to seek more in-depth explanations which reveal the mechanisms and demi-
regularities involved in a phenomenon and thus expose them to the potential for 
change. 
 
In summary, critical realism examines the relationship between structure and agency.  
It considers them as separate but related factors.  Critical realism exhorts the 
researcher to consider the structural context within which the individuals act, whether 
the individuals are aware of the structure or not.  Critical realism holds that individual 
actors may cause changes to structures, consciously or unconsciously.  Research must 
examine the relationship between the two factors and must also consider the 
awareness and perception of the structure which the individual holds.  One of critical 
realisms contributions can be to reveal the structural mechanisms at play to involved 
parties which may allow a greater range of choices to the individuals. 
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2.2 Alternatives to critical realism 
Although critical realism has been chosen as the most appropriate underlying 
approach for my research, it is by no means dominant in the field of entrepreneurship 
research. On the contrary, this field has been dominated hitherto by positivism. The 
following section presents a brief overview of the nature of this positivist 
entrepreneurship research. The aim is to reinforce the argument for critical realism as 
a more comprehensive approach with which to explore entrepreneurship processes. 
 
A number of authors have claimed that entrepreneurship research remains pre-
paradigmatic (Grant and Perren 2002, Watkins-Mathys and Lowe 2005, Ireland, 
Reutzel and Webb 2005).  Their use of the term “paradigm” is more in keeping with 
the definition of Burrell and Morgan (1979 p. 23) of a “commonality of perspective 
which binds the work of a group of theorists together” than with that of Kuhn (1970 p. 
viii) who defined a paradigm as “universally recognized scientific achievements that 
for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners”.  
Crook et al(2010) in their study of ten years of entrepreneurship research examined 
238 published articles in six journals considered to be leaders in the field of 
entrepreneurship research.  Their analytic purpose was to establish if previous 
criticisms of the quality of entrepreneurship research remained valid.  Although, their 
findings suggest that quality had indeed improved, the basis for this assessment was 
predicated in a fundamentally positivist framework.  Their measures of the quality of 
research included reliability, validity, use of correlation matrices and a considerable 
discussion of construct measurement.  These findings were based on a broad sample 
of articles published in peer reviewed journals.  The unstated but obvious conclusion 
to be drawn from the research is that research from a positivist perspective dominates 
entrepreneurship research. There are many examples of attempts in entrepreneurship 
research on training to identify generalisable cause and effect relationships between 
various inputs and outputs (Storey 2004, Jones and Goss 1990, Goss and Jones 1992, 
Sadler-Smith, Down and Lean 2000, Henry, Hill and Leitch 2004, Martin and 
Halstead 2004, Gray and Mabey 2005, van Gelderen, van der Sluis and Jansen 2005, 
Clarke, et al. 2006). 
 
 
 22 
 
It is not clear why positivism has become the norm in entrepreneurship research.   
Many published papers do not address the philosophical stance adopted therein at all.  
This is not unusual when a “common perspective” as described by Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) has been adopted by a group of researchers.  The approach is 
understood within the community and does not require elaboration.  Schultz and 
Hatch (1996) and Grant and Perren (2002) suggest that the reason for this dominance 
of approach has little to do with philosophy and is largely directed by the nature of the 
funding of most entrepreneurial research.  Their argument is simply that if 
Government (or quasi governmental) agencies are funding research into 
entrepreneurship, that they do so with the intention of identifying causal relationships 
which will inform and propose suitable policy interventions.   
 
The positivist approach of seeking universal laws which will assist in predicting the 
likely outcomes of known inputs is attractive in concept but has significant limitations 
(see below). Positivism is fundamentally seeking to answer questions of a “what” 
nature in an effort to advance knowledge through the description of law like 
correlations which will have universal application.  Positivism entails a realist 
ontology which seeks to reveal an objective reality through the discovery of laws and 
relationships which are universal and which exist separately from the language, 
theories and frameworks used to describe it (Benton and Craib 2001).  There is an 
assumption that reality is objectively identifiable and that the researcher can 
independently access this reality through appropriately controlled research. Positivism 
strives to identify universal laws which describe cause-effect relationships which will 
persist over time and in different contexts.  The nature of the cause and effect 
relationships sought are such that the universal law will have a predicative capacity 
for the positivist such that a similar combination of causes will yield the same result 
consistently over a protracted period of time and in differing contexts. 
 
In positivist research the focus is on the description of phenomena for the purpose of 
describing a generalisable cause and effect relationship which can then be used in 
some fashion to predict future outcomes. The process followed is to develop a number 
of hypotheses which are subsequently tested in the empirical element of the research. 
These hypotheses are generally developed from a review of the literature identified as 
being relevant to the area being investigated.  The data gathered is then interrogated to 
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prove or disprove the hypotheses previously developed.  One difficulty with this 
approach is that hypotheses are normally developed to test causation.  In developing 
hypothesis a theoretical explanation is typically presented.  Explanations tend to be 
specified as correlations between factors and are then tested as such.  However the 
resultant data will frequently not reveal an explanation of how the cause generated the 
effect identified.   Ackroyd
1
(2004) holds that this failure to include a theoretical 
explanation of the complex mechanisms that connect the inputs and outputs is 
problematic. Theories often utilise a black box element to their explanation to 
describe, or indeed to avoid explaining, the causal processes at play.  Easton (2010 
p.1) summarises the positivist approach as being “simply an atheoretical statement 
about the world. It doesn’t answer the question why?” 
 
Positivism has a number of well-defined criteria by which it judges the value and 
accuracy of research.  Reliability in positivist research considers the extent to which 
another researcher would make the same deductions from the same data, whereas 
replicability considers the extent to which the same results would be found if the study 
were to be repeated over time or in different contexts.  Validity can refer to issues of 
measurement where the researcher must demonstrate that the terminology used in 
questions has a shared understanding between the respondents and between the 
respondents and the researcher.  Validity also refers to the extent that the proposed 
cause and effect relationship was in fact the cause of the result identified and that 
some other factor had not influenced the result. Validity may also refer to the external 
consistency of the hypothesis which is in effect a test of its generalisability beyond the 
particular setting researched (Seale 1999).    All of these measures of the quality of 
positivist research emanate from the fundamental perspective that research is scientific 
and that more rigorous research will bring us closer to discovering the universal laws 
which apply.  In positivism the researcher strives to be independent from the research 
and must ensure that the research is designed in a manner which does not allow 
personal prejudices or experiences to influence the data gathering or analysis. This is a 
significant point of departure from critical realists who hold that the researcher can 
and should use their experiences and knowledge in a rigorous manner to advance the 
explanations offered of the phenomenon studied. 
                                                 
1
Ackroyd (2004) was discussing positivism in Human Resources, but the criticisms apply equally in 
other business disciplines.  
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However, there are a number of philosophical criticisms which can be made of the 
positivist approach.  A fundamental difficulty with the positivist approach is the 
Humean dilemma.  Named after the Scottish philosopher, Hume, from the eighteenth 
century, the dilemma arises because the search for universal laws is based on the 
process of identifying causal statements from theorizing and the testing of those 
statements.  What are actually being tested are the cause and effect relationships 
postulated in the specific instances chosen.  The Humean dilemma is that while testing 
for cause and effect relationships, we are actually testing for the co-presence of these 
variables.  Hume held that because we cannot see causality in action, then we have no 
empirical basis upon which to assume that a correlation which is found to hold now 
will continue to hold into the future. 
 
The positivist approach is fundamentally empiricist in nature.  What is measured is 
that which can be observed (Benton and Craib 2001).  The researcher is believed to be 
able to be completely objective in relation to the data gathered.  In its purest form, 
empiricism would also require that any hypothesis be capable of being tested 
empirically if it is to contribute to knowledge.  While this may seem to be rational, it 
requires the identification of units for measurement which could reasonably be argued 
to be evidence of the phenomenon to be studied.  In certain cases, this may be easy.  
For example, testing for the level of structured training conducted by an organisation 
could be achieved by measuring the financial and time resources invested in formal, 
structured training programmes.  However, in other cases the development of suitable 
measures is less simple.  For example, testing the efficacy of training programmes 
would require a more subtle range of measures, some of which might need to be proxy 
measures for factors such as the change in attitude of participants.  The introduction of 
these proxy measures introduces judgements which the researcher must make. This 
introduces a level of subjectivity which starts to erode the requirement for the 
complete objectivity of the researcher. Whilst a positivist might argue that some 
testable differences are required to assist in choosing between competing theories, the 
difficulty with this is that in practice, this tends to mean that potentially valuable and 
relevant information is excluded due to its relative inaccessibility.  That which can be 
measured more easily may be given an unwarranted precedence over that which is 
either difficult or impossible to measure.  
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The need for the researcher to be objective presents other problems.  Social science is 
not the same as the natural sciences in this regard.   It is possible in the natural 
sciences for a researcher to conduct an experiment which will not in itself influence 
the phenomenon being studied.  For example, a chemist studying the nature of 
chemical interactions will not change the nature of those interactions as a result of his 
study.  A social scientist must be more sensitive to the fact that the research itself may 
in fact change the phenomenon being studied as the actors may become more 
conscious of the issues involved and may choose to alter their behaviours (the double 
hermeneutic referred to above).  For a positivist, seeking to establish generalisable 
cause and effect relationships, this has the potential to be a significant problem as the 
relationships may be altered as a direct result of the research. This may mean that the 
empirical results of the research and the hypotheses established may cease to be valid 
as the participants reflect on the process and potentially change their behaviour or 
beliefs in some way. 
 
Another significant criticism of positivism is that the nature of any causality is not 
always clear.  It may be possible to establish that there is a correlation between two 
variables, but correlation is not the same as causality. Explaining causality can be 
made more problematic by the presence of multiple variables. Statistical techniques 
like multivariate analysis have been developed to assist in the explanation and to 
identify the interaction between variables as the causal factors may not be independent 
of each other. Multivariate analysis either requires the researcher to theorise in 
advance of what the explanation may be and how the variables may interact (most 
commonly practised as structured equation modelling) or to engage in data mining to 
ascertain what correlations exist between variables and how they might interact.  Data 
mining can be a time consuming process and is ultimately a more inductive form of 
research as the researcher attempts to develop a theoretical explanation from the data 
rather than the espoused positivist approach of having the data verify or nullify a 
previously developed hypothesis.  The difficulty with the positivist tradition in this 
regard is the assumption that more and more sophisticated tools applied more and 
more rigorously will yield better measures.  Measures will always be limited to that 
which can be observed empirically and therefore this limits the potential to explain.  
This does not completely negate the power and usefulness of positivism to 
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hypothesise and to test those hypotheses.  The difficulty relates to its exclusion of 
non-observable events and its assumptions that better methods and more sophisticated 
measures will yield what positivists would see as better results. 
 
A related difficulty with the positivist approach to seeking cause and effect 
relationships is that its inability to identify a causal relationship does not in fact 
establish that no such relationship exists (Hesketh and Fleetwood 2006). A positivist 
approach seeks to measure that which is observable.  Whilst it is methodologically 
acceptable for positivist research to include qualitative as well as quantitative work 
(Mason 2002), it is recognised that the dominant approach in entrepreneurship 
research is the use of surveys and questionnaires to develop quantitative data (Grant 
and Perren 2002, Watkins-Mathys and Lowe 2005, Clarke, et al. 2006, Hesketh and 
Fleetwood 2006, Chell and Allman 2003, Bygrave 2007).  The data which this 
methodological approach can elicit is limited in nature.  The structural requirements of 
the data gathering process to allow consistent analysis across usually large, data sets 
means that there is little scope to seek out alternative explanations.  The positivist 
researcher is generally seeking to test pre-developed hypothesis.  The fact that the 
researcher fails to find data which supports the hypothesis developed does not 
establish anything beyond the fact that the hypothesis were not supported by the data.  
For example, in the return on investment debate in the training literature, the fact that 
no linkage is found in a piece of positivist research between the investments made and 
the performance of the firm leaves open the question as to whether there is in fact any 
link.  All that has been established is that the specific hypotheses developed have not 
been proven.  Whilst this is clearly the theoretical understanding of the positivist 
approach, in practice, the assumption is frequently made that a failure to prove the 
hypothesis actually proves that there is no link.  The difficulty inherent in this 
unfounded deduction is that potentially worthwhile investments might be terminated 
to the detriment of the firm. 
 
Positivism marginalises “accounts of humanity that begin from and feature what is 
unique and distinctive about human capabilities” (Ackroyd 2004 p. 142).  Positivism 
by definition seeks to generalise.  To achieve this it makes assumptions that human 
behaviour and agency can be reduced to measurable variables.  Positivism makes no 
allowance for the individual’s ability to choose to act in one manner or another.  
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Sandberg and Tsoukas (2011 p. 10) hold that such approaches “disconnect knowledge 
from its social context and reduces human existence into cognitive knowledge”.  
Ackroyd (2004) describes scenarios where research might seek correlations between 
employee satisfaction and levels of absence from work. He suggests a scenario that 
employees in what might be considered mundane roles might consider the opportunity 
to be absent from work to be a positive thing which would lead them to be satisfied 
with their roles.  In this case, high levels of job satisfaction could be correlated with 
absence!  Similarly, positivist researchers often argue that insecurity is an outcome 
rather than a cause of unemployment and so seek to distinguish between voluntary and 
involuntary unemployment.  However, it is possible that an employee may feel very 
insecure in his or her employment and as a result seek unemployment as a route to 
something better.  In both of these scenarios, Ackroyd (2004) argues that positivist 
research lacks the tools and sensitivity to consider such human tendencies. 
Consequently, the outcomes of such research could be seriously misleading.  
Similarly, Fleetwood (2001) proposes in his review of unemployment measures that 
greater cognisance is required of the nature of employment to really understand the 
concept of unemployment.  For example, he cites the range of types of employment 
which exist today compared to fifty years ago.  Part time work, contracts with 
minimum hours, people who routinely hold two jobs simultaneously are all different 
types of employment which may have differing values placed on them by the 
employee.  Therefore any measure which simply attributes them all the same status of 
employment, misses considerable depth and may lead to misrepresentation of the 
value of increasing employment levels in an economy. 
 
There are also some difficulties with the methodological approaches often adopted by 
positivists in relation to studies in the area of entrepreneurship in small firms in 
particular. Such studies are often subject to response bias as larger firms are more 
likely to respond than smaller ones (Goffee and Scase 1995).  Additionally, Curran 
(2000) states that, as small firms are more sensitive to external influences, many 
studies are flawed as the intervention being measured may only be one of many 
factors influencing firms’ performance.  While it is common for positivist studies to 
recognise their limitations in relation to demonstrating causality or indeed to fully 
explain any relationships identified (Sadler-Smith, Down and Lean 2000, Henry, Hill 
and Leitch 2004, van Gelderen, van der Sluis and Jansen 2005), positivism itself 
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cannot elaborate on causality beyond correlations.  For explanations which will 
provide a rich context and a detailed, plausible explanation of a phenomenon an 
approach like critical realism is required. 
 
Weber (2004) suggests that the criticisms directed at positivists often include a level 
of rhetoric and attributions of meta-theoretical positions which many positivists would 
find ludicrous as they reflect a “naïve, archaic view of positivism” (p. xi).  It is clear 
that establishing how general something is or being able to show how frequently 
different acts are related could have a value (Ackroyd 2004).  Such research can 
identify phenomena or issues which may warrant greater research or theoretical 
explanation.  A robust piece of positivist research can be useful to correct popular 
perceptions about the frequency of certain events.  However, the limitations of 
positivism outlined above are significant for research which seeks to provide 
theoretical explanations for the phenomenon studied. 
 
Even though positivism is the norm in entrepreneurship research, there are a growing 
number of non-positivist research papers being published.  There are a number of 
reasons why some researchers have moved away from positivism. These reasons are 
related to some of positivisms significant limitations but also relate to fundamental 
differences in ontological positions.  Many researchers do not accept one basic tenet 
of positivism, namely the existence of a reality which is independently identifiable.  
Some researchers also feel that the exclusion of the experience of the researcher in its 
entirety, which is espoused in positivism’s subjective-objective divide, is neither 
possible nor desirable for quality in-depth research.  Finding a mechanism to allow 
this experience to be an integral part of the process in a robust manner, rather than 
attempting to bracket it off as in positivism, is another general reason for seeking non-
positivist approaches. 
 
There have been relatively few non-positivist studies in the field of entrepreneurship.   
Work by Cope and Watts (2000), Kisfalvi (2002) and Macpherson et al (2010) are 
studies related to the topic of this research, which adopted a research approach that 
could be considered outside of the norm in the entrepreneurship domain.  Some 
advantages of the approaches adopted, for example, are:  Macpherson et al 
deliberately provided feedback to respondents to enrich data collection; Kisfalvi 
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privileged the entrepreneur’s world view over that of the academic in her discussion 
of strategy in terms of the entrepreneur’s life experience; Cope and Watts selected a 
sample for its potential to yield interesting data and could draw on the respondents’ 
emotional state. 
 
The purpose of the research in this thesis is to explore a phenomenon within the 
chosen firm where it was known, a priori, that the firm invested in training to a greater 
extent than its peers.  I was interested in explaining why this might be so.  My 
explanation would be based on the exploration of this firm and would not seek to 
establish widely generalisable, prescriptive statements for practice. The research 
needed a philosophical approach which would allow an in-depth exploration of the 
firm and its circumstances in a manner which looked beyond the superficial, 
observable data for explanation.   
 
Critical realism has an ontological depth which allows the researcher to look beyond 
the empirical to seek understanding of what has been observed.  Critical realism 
exhorts the researcher to seek out the underlying mechanisms which are at play.  The 
researcher is encouraged to consider the interplay between structure and agency in the 
context studied, whether the respondents are aware of the structures or not.  Indeed, a 
central contribution of critical realism research can be the revelation of the structures 
which are influencing or potentially constraining the actions of agents, thereby 
enlarging the range of perceived options available to the individuals involved. 
 
Critical realism also encourages the researcher to make use of their own experiences 
and knowledge in the research process.  This must be done in a careful manner to 
ensure that the researcher’s personal perspectives are properly and robustly 
challenged.  For a practitioner engaged in research, it provides the potential to 
incorporate personal knowledge and experience to enhance the descriptions and 
explanations offered.  
 
As a result of all of these factors critical realism is considered an appropriate 
perspective to adopt for this research. The following section describes the 
methodological approach taken in this research and provides detail on the nature and 
sources of data gathered for use in the analysis subsequently presented. 
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2.3 Methodology: 
2.3.1 Introduction 
This section describes the methodological approach used in this research and the 
theoretical support which exists for that approach.  The data gathered is from a single 
case study of the Perigord Group with the primary focus on its CEO Alan Leamy.  
The appropriateness of using a case study approach is considered in general and 
specifically in the context of critical realism research.  The application of critical 
realism to the context of this case study is discussed.  The issue of my effective insider 
research status is examined and how this integrates into the critical realism perspective 
is considered. 
2.3.2 Case study approach 
The research strategy adopted in this research is that of a single case study to explore 
the phenomenon under review.  Easton (2010) holds that a case study approach is 
entirely consistent with critical realism where the intention is to examine complex 
phenomenon like organisations and organisational relationships.  Tsoukas (1989) 
concurs in stating that in-depth realist case studies are epistemologically valid as they 
focus on describing the structures and the associated mechanisms which were capable 
of giving rise to the observed event.  Siggelkow (2007 p. 23) proposes that case 
research can usually get much closer to the “causal forces than broad empirical 
research”.   
 
Case study research is a well-established research strategy in the social sciences which 
focuses on “the dynamics present within single settings” (Eisenhardt 1989 p. 534).  
Yin (2003) holds that case studies are the preferred strategy when questions of a how 
or why nature are being addressed. Yin (2003 p. 13) defines a case study as being an 
empirical inquiry that “investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident”. This definition expresses the importance of the contextual conditions 
to the case.  In addition, Yin describes the case study as incorporating an all-
encompassing method which includes the design logic, the data collection techniques 
and also how the data may be analysed.  Because the case study seeks to deal with the 
phenomenon and its contextual conditions, the data sources are likely to be multiple 
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and may include material such as archives, interviews, questionnaires and observation 
(Eisenhardt 1989).   Harrison and Easton (2004 p. 195) posit that the use of the case 
study method allows the researcher to “tease out ever-deepening layers of reality in 
the search for generative mechanisms and influential contingencies”.  The 
philosophical approach of the critical realist is that any phenomenon being studied 
does not exist independently of the contextual conditions and that many types of data 
may yield insight into the phenomenon. In this context, the case study approach sits 
comfortably within critical realism research.   
 
This research is based on a single case study.   Intuitively, one might consider that a 
multiple case study strategy would provide more robust findings for the research.  
Eisenhardt (1989) does not state exactly how many cases are required to build good 
theory, but there is a recommendation for between four and ten cases.  This 
proposition is inherently positivist in approach as Eisenhardt (1989 p. 545) proclaims 
that research with less will find it “difficult to generate theory with much complexity 
and its empirical grounding is likely to be unconvincing”.  Eisenhardt and Graebner 
(2007) repeat this exertion suggesting that research from multiple cases will be more 
robust and generalisable. These assertions are valid in a positivist piece of research, 
but are sweeping in their claims for what might be developed in terms of complex and 
useful theory. Mintzberg (1979) suggests that much of value can be lost through the 
unnecessary addition of volume without purpose.  He proposes that samples of one are 
acceptable if they yield in-depth, interesting findings.  
 
Yin (2003) proposes a number of rationales where a single case study is an 
appropriate choice including the scenarios where the case to be studied is an extreme 
case or where the case to be studied is longitudinal and the situation is to be studied 
over a protracted period of time.  Critical realist research requires the researcher to 
achieve a significant level of depth in the description of the context and the analysis of 
the data.  This depth of analysis is required to explore the contextual conditions and 
their interaction with the causal mechanisms at play. The primary benefit of multiple 
case studies is that the researcher can compare across cases and draw inference from 
similarities and differences to develop the theoretical explanation or to test pre-
developed hypothesis.  The depth of description and analysis in critical realist case 
studies, in addition to the interaction of the contextual conditions and the causal 
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mechanisms, is likely to reduce the value of cross case comparisons.  In addition, the 
purpose of critical realist research is not to produce a set of prescriptive 
recommendations based on cause and effect relationships.  Its objective is to describe 
a situation in sufficient detail and with sufficient sensitivity to explain what might be 
the underlying causal mechanisms involved.  This proposition may be of a general 
benefit to other firms but not in the manner which positivist research would attempt to 
develop a generalisable rule for firms to follow.  The limitations of single case studies 
are outweighed by the value of the in-depth analysis (Macpherson, Jones and Zhang 
2004).  The longitudinal aspect of many case studies means that the approach is 
consistent with critical realism.  The study of the development of a process over time 
can be a “crucial advantage in being able to assign causality, a central tenet of the 
critical realist approach” (Harrison and Easton 2004 p. 195).  The passage of time can 
also allow greater analysis of observed events and mechanisms which might underpin 
them.   
 
Case study designs can be flexible and may require adjustment during the course of 
the research (Yin 2003, Eisenhardt 1989).  This flexibility is not an indication of a 
lack of planning or casualness in research design.  Both Eisenhardt and Yin concur 
that the data which can be uncovered during the data collection phase may yield 
critically important insights which require an amendment to the original research 
design.  Equally, both authors admonish the researcher not to use such flexibility 
lightly and to consider the implications of any proposed amendments in the context of 
the entire piece of research.  Eisenhardt (1989 p. 539) proposes that this flexibility is 
“controlled opportunism in which researchers take advantage of a specific case and 
the emergence of new themes to improve resultant theory”.  This emergence is a 
central element of critical realist research as the goal is to explain what underlying 
causal mechanisms might explain the phenomenon being investigated. 
2.3.3 Critical realism in practice 
Having decided on a philosophical approach to adopt, I proceeded with the research 
on the following basis.  The literature on training was reviewed to establish the object 
surface knowledge related to the subject.  The purpose of this was to inform myself of 
the issues and debates in that literature and to provide some basis for the interviews to 
be conducted (Yin 2003) as I moved towards gathering the subjective knowledge.  
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The review of this literature revealed data on the average level of investment in 
training for manufacturing firms in Ireland.  It also revealed similar information on the 
printing industry in Ireland and overseas.  This provided the context for recognising 
whether the level of investment in training by firms was noteworthy.  This literature 
also explored the orders of learning which can exist.  This opened a field of enquiry in 
relation to the nature of learning within the firm and the possible outcomes from 
different types of learning. 
 
The section on Data Collection below describes the process by which the data was 
gathered. It also reveals the process by which this research evolved.  The process 
began by examining the levels of investment in training by the firm.  Through the 
process of engaging with the literature and the data gathered in the early stages of the 
research, it became apparent that other mechanisms were at play in the firm.  This led 
to an engagement with the literatures discussed in Chapter 5 on dynamic capabilities.  
The retroductive process of moving from the literature to the expanding firm data set 
allowed the formulation of my core research question as - How do dynamic 
capabilities emerge in small firms? 
 
To address this research question the study asks the following questions in the context 
of the Perigord Group: 
 
1) Did dynamic capabilities emerge in the Perigord Group? 
2) If so, what caused that emergence? 
3) Are there underlying mechanisms which were not empirically observable 
which facilitated that emergence? 
 
The first question posed could be addressed by a number of research approaches.  It 
would have been possible to formulate some construct or model which could have 
been used as a valid measure of the existence or otherwise of dynamic capabilities. 
Such a construct would also have been capable of describing when such capabilities 
emerged if sufficient longitudinal data were available. Where critical realism has 
added to the richness of the explanations offered is through the examination of the 
data and the views of the respondents and comparing that to the extant literature or to 
gaps in that literature.  In addition, the critical realist approach allowed me to both 
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recognise and include my own experiences of the firm and the industry in my 
explanation of the firm’s development.  The use of an interpretivist approach might 
not have yielded the same insight as the research would have privileged the 
perspective and interpretation of the respondents without being able to incorporate the 
structures within which the firm operated to the same extent. 
 
2.3.4 Insider researcher issues 
I have worked as a consultant to the Perigord Group for over nine years, working 
closely with the CEO. In addition, I have worked for twenty years in the printing 
industry where I have a position of relative prominence and influence as President of 
the Irish Printing Federation; as the Network Manager of the Design, Print and 
Packaging Skillnet, the leading facilitating agency for training initiatives in the sector; 
as a founding member of the Print and Packaging Forum, which is the industry 
representative body charged with developing the sector in conjunction with the social 
partners and state agencies; and as a Director of the National Print Museum.  Brannick 
and Coghlan (2007) discuss the issue of insider research and the hurdles to be 
overcome.  These authors define inside research as “research by complete members of 
organizational systems and communities in and on their own organizations,” 
(Brannick and Coghlan 2007 p. 59).  Using this definition suggests that while I am not 
strictly an insider researcher, there are sufficient similarities in relation to matters 
which these authors referred to as preunderstanding, role duality and organisational 
politics for their approach to be useful in properly recognising and addressing 
potential biases and influences.  
 
Preunderstanding refers to the knowledge, insights and experiences of a researcher 
before they engage with a research programme.  These factors relate to the researchers 
general life experience but also more particularly to his experience of the organisation 
or situation to be researched. Nielsen and Repstad (1993), referenced in Brannick and 
Coghlan (2007), hold that using one’s preunderstanding is a matter of moving from 
closeness to distance and back again. In my research, it was clear that there was a 
significant advantage in knowing the terminology of the company and the industry.  
My understanding of the general development of the organisation and the industry 
over twenty years allowed me an insight into issues which might have been difficult to 
achieve otherwise.  This was very consistent with Nielsen and Repstad’s (1993) 
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experience. The difficulty with preunderstanding is that the researcher can be too 
close to the data and may not challenge the assumptions inherent in the situation.  
“They may think they know the answer and not expose their current thinking to 
alternative reframing” (Brannick and Coghlan 2007 p. 69). 
 
Role duality refers to the reality that the researcher has both organisational and 
researcher roles. This can be an issue as the researcher may have conflicts between 
these roles and may also have to consider the post-research implications of actions 
taken during the research or the potential consequences of the findings of the research 
being unwelcome. Bell (1999) warned that the researcher is often watched as much as 
watching.  In the context of role duality, this can have implications for both roles of 
the researcher.  In my research, the role duality took on a different emphasis. I am not 
an employee of the organisation.  However, I provide a range of services to the 
organisation on a contractual basis which gives rise to similar potential conflicts of 
interest. 
 
Organisational politics refers to the need for the researcher to consider the political 
implications of the research involved.  This is closely aligned to the role duality issue 
and may require the researcher to “work the political system” through balancing the 
organisation’s interest in the research project and the researchers own research 
objectives and priorities (Brannick and Coghlan 2007 p. 71).  In my research this issue 
was generally not very relevant.  Access to the business was established through the 
Chief Executive and owner of the business, Alan Leamy.  The organisation had no 
specific interest in the research project and was not expecting any particular outcome 
from it.  The main political dimension to the process arose when other key managers 
were being interviewed about the organisation.  These conversations inevitably 
involved comment on the development of the organisation and the role played by its 
senior management and owners.  To address this political reality, all contributors were 
assured that their comments were being sought to inform the research and would not 
be reported back to the owner or to other managers. As the research developed, the 
importance of these interviews with the second tier managers as a data source reduced. 
It was apparent that the insider researcher issue was not a negative factor in relation to 
data collection.  None of the respondents had any hesitation in agreeing to be 
interviewed and none appeared to have any reservations in answering the questions 
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posed. Rather than presenting a difficulty, having a thorough knowledge of the 
industry, its historical development and its terminology meant that interviews flowed 
easily with few interruptions for clarity of terminology or technology.  
 
Brannick and Coghlan (2007) recommend an approach to dealing with the conflicts 
which arise for the insider researcher. The initial recommendation is for the researcher 
to recognise the reality which exists and to consider the implications of it.  This is the 
starting point for a reflexive process which requires the researcher to consider his or 
her insider status at various stages of both the data capture and data analysis process. 
The researcher is urged to engage in “rigorous introspection, integration and reflection 
on experience to expose underlying assumptions and unreflected action to continuous 
testing” (Brannick and Coghlan 2007 p. 69).  This process of continuous reflection 
and the exhortation to examine underlying assumptions fits well with the approach of 
critical realism.  In the context of my research, the research dangers inherent in the 
insider researcher’s existence are managed in the approach taken and the 
philosophical underpinnings applied.  The advantages of the access provided both 
before and throughout the research period and the data which this access provided 
were unlikely to have been available to a non-insider. In addition, my knowledge and 
experience of the firm and sector were a positive factor in my ability to reflect on the 
data gathered in the context of the literature and the market developments encountered 
by the firm. 
 
The review of the literature on methodology allowed me considerable confidence in 
the use of the case study method for this research.  The method is consistent with my 
philosophical perspective.  I can make use of my experience of the firm and the 
industry to develop the depth of explanation and context required in a critical realist 
case study. Having established the usefulness and appropriateness of the case study 
method the following section describes, in detail, the methodology followed in the 
case study of the Perigord Group. 
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2.4 The Perigord case study methodology 
2.4.1 Choice of company 
This research was conducted in the printing industry in Ireland as I am a practicing 
business consultant with twenty year’s experience in the sector.  The initial general 
objective of the research was to examine investment levels in training in SMEs with a 
view to finding ways to encourage owner-managers of those SMEs to increase their 
level of investment in training.  A number of companies were identified where 
research access might be possible.  These companies included companies who were 
known, a priori, to have higher than average levels of investment in training and some 
who appeared to have lower levels of training.  As the research strategy was to 
develop an in-depth case study, a high level of access would be critical.  In addition, I 
decided that an organisation with a higher than average level of training would be 
more appropriate as there would be an observable action to investigate rather than the 
absence of action (although not necessarily the absence of a decision on training 
investments) in the firms with lower than average investment in training. This is 
consistent with Siggelkow (2007 p. 20) who holds that it is often desirable to “choose 
a particular organisation precisely because it is very special in the sense of allowing 
one to gain certain insights that other organisations would not be able to provide”. 
 
Specifically, the Perigord Group was chosen for a number of reasons.  First, the 
company was known to have an above average investment in training relative to its 
peers. Second, I had access to the organisation as a result of an on-going business 
relationship with the owner.  I have acted as a consultant to the company since 2002 
and have been actively involved in the development of a number of projects within the 
group including the sourcing of funds for investment in training.  Third, I have a 
strong and open relationship with the owner and felt confident that access would be 
granted on the basis of the trust which had been established.  This basis for selecting 
this case is entirely consistent with Yin (2003). 
 
2.4.2 Document analysis 
The data analysis makes considerable use of secondary data which fits with Webb and 
Weick’s (1979) description of unobtrusive data (measures which do not require the 
intrusion of the researcher).  It is well established that the use of well planned 
interviews and questionnaires are valid forms of data capture in the social sciences.  
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Such methods must be used with care as there is the danger of reporting bias on the 
part of the respondent.  In addition, there is the danger that the presence of the 
interviewer in interview situations affects the truthfulness of the respondent in some 
way which might lead to unconscious or entirely conscious misrepresentations.  Webb 
and Weick (1979 p. 651) state that although investigators regularly detail “the limits 
of self-report they also regularly say that despite these limits, the methods are good 
enough”.  The use of more unobtrusive measures reduces the risk of self-reporting 
techniques and can provide robust complementary data (Webb and Weick 1979, Lee 
2000, Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2003, Myers 2009).  Webb and Weick (1979) 
describe unobtrusive data quite broadly and basically in terms of alternatives to self-
reported data.   
 
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2003) posit that secondary data can be used to reveal 
the espoused reasons for managers’ decisions and/or to allow a longitudinal study with 
comparable data being examined for a protracted time period.  Such data can also be 
used to add depth to the context being examined.  Like any data collection method, the 
use of secondary data is not without difficulty.  Saunders et al (2003) caution that the 
researcher must allow for the fact that the data may not have been gathered for the 
purpose of the research in hand.  Consequently, the researcher must consider whether 
this has implications for the quality of the data in relation to its intended use. 
 
Webb and Weick (1979) explore a number of aspects of unobtrusive data which sit 
comfortably with the critical realist approach to research.  They propose the utility of 
such data to encourage researchers to consider unexpected findings, to be more 
sensitive to what might be considered noise in the field and for researchers to be at 
least as interested in variances as the mean.  The concept of an unexpected finding 
was exemplified by the authors in relation to the Cuban Missile Crisis.  One would 
normally expect a Chairman to be appointed to any meeting where decisions of 
consequence were likely.  Yet President Kennedy did not appoint a Chair of the 
deliberations on this crisis.  This unexpected finding can only be of interest if one has 
an initial expectation of a certain nature.  The unexpected is, in effect, the absence or 
contrary of what was expected.  This is worthy of investigation to assist in the 
understanding of what happened.  Similarly, an overly defined measurement tool 
might miss important data.  Webb and Weick (1979) describe the aftermath of an 
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aircraft accident at a major airport.  A measure of increased anxiety which took sales 
at an airport bar as a proxy measure might have considered all non-alcoholic sales as 
noise in the data.  However, the authors suggest that increased sales of soft drinks, 
snacks, cigarettes and aspirin might just as likely be measures of increased anxiety on 
the part of those present. 
 
Some types of secondary data are easily accessed by researchers.  Such sources 
include government reports, industry reviews and the publicly available data on 
companies.  Whilst such data can be useful in terms of overall context or in terms of 
describing a policy context within which a firm operates, it is unlikely to provide the 
depth and detail for use in a detailed case study.  The secondary data which is of use 
in this context might include internal company documentation such as minutes of 
meetings, plans for expenditure, strategic business plans, proposals to external parties 
and a variety of company records which reveal expenditure on different categories of 
items (Lee 2000, Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2003, Myers 2009).  The issue for 
most researchers is how to negotiate sufficient access to the data for it to be of use in 
the analysis. 
 
My research has taken the form of a single in-depth case study of the Perigord Group.  
The negotiation of access for secondary sources of data was simple. As described 
above, I have a long established business relationship with the CEO of Perigord. This 
relationship began in 2002 but became more substantial from 2004.   I have worked 
closely with him on matters related to training initiatives and the sourcing of funding 
from Enterprise Ireland
2
 in particular.  The documents which formed this set of 
secondary data included detailed training plans over a number of years, applications to 
Enterprise Ireland for funding related to training, capital investment and research and 
development.  In addition, another principle source of data for my research was notes 
of meetings between the author and the CEO over the period 2004 to 2010. Initially 
this involved working directly with the CEO on training issues and accessing finance 
for training. This role then developed into what might be described as a more general 
business advisor and ‘sounding board’. The projects included activities such as a plan 
to install print equipment on a client site, a strategic business plan for the firm and a 
                                                 
2
Enterprise Ireland is the government organisation in Ireland responsible for the development and 
growth of Irish enterprises in world markets. It can provide a range of supports to firms including 
funding of various types. 
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management team development plan. Over this seven year period 186 such meetings 
took place.  These meetings occurred on average every two weeks and lasted for an 
average of two hours each. I kept notes of these meetings for the purposes of the 
business relationship rather than any plan to use them as a data source for research 
purposes.  These notes were able to reveal the development in the priorities of the firm 
over the period.  They revealed the areas in which the owner was focused.  As I 
played a central role in the development of various submission and proposals, the data 
was considered both valid and robust enough for use.  The following section provides 
more detail on the extent of these meetings and the evidence of their occurrence. 
2.4.3 Data collection 
The literature on case studies concludes that a number of sources of data are both 
acceptable in case studies and indeed to be expected if the complexity of the situation 
being researched is to be understood (Yin 2003, Eisenhardt 1989, Harrison and Easton 
2004).  There were a number of sources of data used in this research.  These were: 
 
1) Company records on training, training plans and submissions made for training 
grants  
2) Interviews with key executives 
3) Notes from 186 business meetings over the period 2004-2010 
4) Business plans produced in the period 2004-2010 
5) Applications for grant assistance (other than training) produced between 2004-
2010 
 
1) Company records on training, training plans and submissions made for training 
grants: 
The company developed a number of detailed training plans which were related to 
grant submissions made to Enterprise Ireland in the period 2004-2007.  Specifically, 
the company applied for and received funding for a range of training programmes 
which were designed to increase the skill level of production operators as well as to 
address some management training needs.  The company had entered a period of 
transition and needed to migrate the skills of the workforce from more traditional 
skills towards a range of skills which were more digitally based and software related.   
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The plan submitted to Enterprise Ireland in 2005 detailed a range of training which 
was planned for the period 2005-6.  At the operator level, the plan specified a series of 
training programmes which needed to be undertaken and the employees who should 
participate in each programme.  The training mostly involved production software 
(Artpro, Nexus, Preps), which were being increasingly used in the industry, as well as 
some workflow software (ApogeeX, Webworks) which facilitated the flow of work to 
and from clients.  From a more management perspective, this plan required the 
delivery of training in a wide variety of programmes.  Some of these programmes 
were quite market focused in that they focused on pharmaceutical industry knowledge 
and some related to attendance at conferences.  Much of the management training was 
around core people management skills such as team building, presentation skills and 
project management skills.  The majority of this training was indeed carried out in the 
2005-6 period.  The plan had also proposed some management development training 
for Alan Leamy, but this did not happen at this time for a number of reasons. 
 
A second training plan was submitted to Enterprise Ireland in 2006 as part of a 
successful application to the Productivity Improvement Fund.  This fund was designed 
to assist companies in generating significant improvements to their operational 
productivity.  As a consequence, this plan focused exclusively on production operators 
and contained broadly similar elements to the first plan.  The funding allowed the 
company to accelerate the process by which operators were retrained in order to use 
new technologies.  A key feature of this funding mechanism was that training by 
internal trainers was considered a valid form of expenditure.  This facilitated the 
company in designating a small number of key operators as trainers to ensure that the 
skills being developed were not only theoretically robust but that they also were 
firmly focused on the company’s clients’ needs. 
 
In addition to these company training plans, the company also engaged with the Print 
and Packaging Skillnet over the period 2006-2010.  The Print and Packaging Skillnet 
is an enterprise led learning network which is funded by the Irish government through 
the Department of Education and Skills.  Data from the company’s engagement with 
the network was made available to me with the permission of Alan Leamy.  This data 
revealed participation in a range of programmes which included cost reduction 
workshops, employment law updates, project management and sales skills training.  
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The data also revealed participation in more strategic skills development through 
participation in a pilot lean programme, the diploma in packaging technology and an 
internal human resources management competency development programme which 
was undertaken in Fine Print. 
 
The company’s financial data in relation to training also revealed the participation of 
Alan Leamy and Anne Cooke
3
 in the Enterprise Ireland sponsored Transform 
programme in 2006-7.  This programme involved the two key managers in a series of 
workshops over a ten month period.  This facilitated their review of the business 
model and allowed them to consider some alternative ways of developing 
opportunities.  Finally, this data also revealed the decision of Alan Leamy to 
participate on the Leadership for Growth programme with Enterprise Ireland in late 
2010. This programme is Enterprise Ireland’s premier management development 
programme which utilises an internationally recognised faculty to deliver it.  The 
programme also involves several week long programmes in Stanford University in 
California which were to take place in 2011. 
 
The quantitative data was reviewed and summarised into a table which showed the 
investment level in training initiatives in Perigord in comparison to their sales, labour 
cost and added value. No case is made in relation to the adequacy of this level of 
investment as there are significant philosophical assumptions underpinning the 
appropriateness (or otherwise) of these measures. However, they are useful in the 
context that they demonstrate a trend in the company’s investment level and also offer 
some comparison with national data. This data made it clear that this company had an 
investment level in training which was significantly in excess of the industry norm 
and considerably more than the national average for manufacturing firms.  This 
confirmed the a priori impression that the company had a noteworthy level of 
investment in training on these measures. 
 
This data also showed a clear evolution from a focus on largely technical, production 
operator focused training and managerial training which was task specific towards a 
focus which was more holistic in terms of continuing to include technical operator 
                                                 
3
 Anne Cooke is the Managing Director of Fine Print Ltd which is a wholly owned subsidiary of the 
Perigord Group.  Anne reports to Alan in his role as the CEO of the Perigord Group.   
 43 
 
training as well as engaging with more comprehensive and strategic learning 
opportunities. 
 
2) Interviews with key executives 
The interviews were conducted during the summer of 2008 in the offices of the 
company.  Interviews were conducted with Alan Leamy, the CEO of the Perigord 
Group on the 15
th
 July 2008; with Paul Leamy who is a brother to Alan Leamy and 
who fills the role of Chief Technology Officer with the Perigord Group and is a co-
owner in the business on the 6
th
 October 2008; with Anne Cooke, Managing Director 
of Fine Print Ltd a wholly owned subsidiary of Perigord Group on the 2
nd
 September 
2008 and finally with Michael Fleming, General Manager of Perigord Premedia Ltd 
which is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Perigord Group on the 8
th
 September 2008.  
The sequence of the interviews was not significant and reflected the availability of the 
respondents rather than any purposeful scheduling for the purposes of the research. 
 
Each interviewee was provided with a letter informing them of the broad purpose of 
my research and assuring them of the confidentiality of the process and of their 
complete freedom to participate or not without any concern for repercussions 
internally.  All four of those invited to participate agreed to do so and signed letters of 
consent to participate. The interviews generally lasted approximately forty five 
minutes and were recorded with a digital voice recorder with the full consent of the 
participant.  The interviews were then transcribed verbatim. Notations were added to 
the text to capture obvious emphasis or humour.  This written text became the source 
data for the analysis.  The interviews were very informal in nature.  The participants 
seemed very relaxed and comfortable.  All have known me for a considerable period 
of time and have worked with me in various professional and voluntary capacities 
related to the company and the industry at large. The interviews were intended to be 
exploratory in nature and were designed to establish the lifeworld of the participants 
as they interpret it.  Unstructured interviews allow the greatest flexibility to the 
participant in this regard. There were five core questions asked of each participant to 
introduce various discussion topics.   
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These questions were: 
a) Can you tell me a little about the company’s history? 
b) How did you get into the business yourself? 
c) How does the company learn about new developments in the sector? 
d) How do you get new ideas yourself? 
e) How does the organisation encourage people to learn new skills? 
These questions were deliberately phrased in an open manner to allow the participants 
to follow whatever line of thought occurred to them.  In general, participants answered 
the questions freely.  In many instances the discussion around a topic covered more 
than one of the question areas.  I was conscious of my insider status with this 
organisation and made efforts to ensure that the participants did not assume my 
knowledge of particular instances or decisions.   
 
The purpose of these questions was to initiate a conversation about the company, the 
individuals involvement with the company and what their impression of how the 
process of learning worked within the firm.  The fact that I was effectively an insider 
researcher in the context of this research was positive for the purposes of the flow of 
dialogue in the interviews.  The respondents were aware of my industry and company 
knowledge.  This allowed references to specific technological developments and 
trends within the industry that did not require considerable elaboration for 
understanding.  I was careful to seek clarification on any issue where I felt that the 
respondent was assuming a level of knowledge on my part on a matter which was not 
more objectively verifiable.  For example, the change in the use of digital technology 
is clearly established in the sector and has been the subject of many reports and 
industry debates.  Knowledge of these developments did not require any privileged 
access in the context of Perigord. 
 
Once the interviews had been transcribed verbatim, I commenced a thematic analysis 
of the data.  The interview transcripts had line numbers added for ease of reference to 
specific passages of text.  Initially, I read the interviews several times to re-familiarise 
myself with the content in detail.  This allowed me to see commonality in topics raised 
across the interviews and the comparative regularity with which some issues were 
raised.  My objective was to identify themes which might emerge from the responses. 
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I would then consider those themes in the context of the literature reviewed to that 
point (the literature on training and organisational learning).   As I read through the 
interviews I coded sections of text which seemed to represent discrete codes.  I noted 
in the margin what I felt such a comment might relate to in a thematic sense.  Entries 
at this stage included themes such as change, people and people development, training 
(formal and informal), technology, research and development, leadership and vision, 
clients, firm performance, intermediaries, educational experience (particularly regret) 
and entrepreneurial experience.  Many of these initial codes were common to all 
respondents although the codes of educational regret and entrepreneurial experience 
were generally confined to two respondents. 
 
These twelvecodes were then groupedinto five core themes of performance focus, 
capacity building (people and technology), the evolution of higher order learning, 
managerial purposefulness and the use of third parties.  The first three are expanded 
upon in Chapter 4 with the final two being introduced in Chapter 6.  A spreadsheet 
was constructed which showed the specific interview references for each theme from 
each respondent. The following is an excerpt which shows some comments on firm 
performance from each respondent. 
 
Themes: Performance: 
Alan 58 "we were very successful in the 1980s" 
Anne 46 "a Mir Day was a miracle day!" 
Michael 
110 "if we hadn't, I suspect that we might not still be around 
today" on leading technological change 
Paul 
648 "I would have an idea and to see how it worked and how we 
could do it and then Alan would kind of see - he'd twig how we 
could make a living out of this" 
The number reference in each quotation is the line number in the interview transcript referred to. 
 
Performance was referenced by all respondents and included reference to the 
profitability and growth of the firm. The emphasis on performance was most 
noticeable from two respondents in particular who could be considered the most 
entrepreneurial in terms of their revealed experiences.  Organisational change was 
generally discussed in the use the firm made of technological developments to drive 
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the business in addition to leveraging key individuals at various times.  Upper 
echelons factors arose in the comments made on senior management’s or indeed Alan 
Leamy’s central role in decision making.  Capacity building recognised the conscious 
efforts which were made to build and add skills to the organisation over time.  This 
has been a core attribute of the organisation over most of its life.  The use of 
intermediaries by the company arose in the context of the benefits of working with 
third parties in the development of business plans and applications for funding.  
Personal learning was discussed by all respondents and described both the structured 
and unstructured manner in which they had gained useful knowledge over time. There 
was also an element of regret in some responses where the respondent lamented 
missed educational opportunity. Two respondents in particular raised issues of an 
entrepreneurial nature which revealed their own experience of and approach to 
entrepreneurial activity.  Both revealed a number of examples of previous ventures 
prior to their involvement with the Perigord Group. 
 
It was the case that the numbers of responses on the various themes differed between 
the respondents.  Yet each theme identified had responses from each respondent, with 
the exception of entrepreneurial experience.  One respondent was considerably more 
reflective than the others and as a result had more entries in the personal learning and 
entrepreneurial experiences section. These themes were then carried into the initial 
data chapter with the emphasis on the organisational change which had been 
experienced from 2002, the emphasis on the development of people’s skills and 
capabilities and the focus on company performance.  The interview data also 
facilitated the description of the industry context in which the firm was operating and 
the internal developments which had taken place. 
 
However, it also became clear at this stage in the research that the data did not yield 
any particular insights of theoretical value in the context of the literature reviewed at 
that stage.  The focus at this point had been on the training and organisational learning 
literature and it became obvious that something else must be involved if a theoretical 
explanation of the developments in Perigord was to be developed.  Having reviewed 
the literature on dynamic capability, intermediaries, the role of leadership, absorptive 
capacity and social capital, I re-visited the data from the interviews and was able to 
interpret some of the comments made in that context.  Indeed, having gathered, 
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assimilated and interrogated the data to the extent I had prior to reading this new 
literature, my reading of it was effectively in the context of the data already to hand.  
This allowed the re-interpretation of the data presented in Chapter 6. 
 
3) Notes from 186 business meetings over the period 2004-2010 
As described above I have acted as a business consultant to the Perigord Group since 
2002 initially, but in earnest since 2004.  My role with the company has been to work 
with Alan Leamy, the CEO, on a range of matters.  In particular, I have managed the 
company’s relationship with Enterprise Ireland and have prepared almost all grant 
applications made by the company since 2004.  As will be described in more detail 
below, many of these applications were of a strategic nature and central to the 
development of the company at that time.  In the course of this relationship, I made 
notes of my meetings with or on behalf of the company (I would occasionally meet 
with third parties on Alan Leamy’s behalf).  These notes were made for the purposes 
of my business relationship rather than for any research purpose.  All meeting notes 
were made contemporaneously and generally at the meeting concerned.  In some cases 
I made formal notes of the meetings or sent follow up emails as an aid to action. 
 
In the seven year period up to and including 2010, I have a record of 186 such 
meetings.  I created a table which listed each meeting between me and Alan Leamy or 
between me and others on his behalf.  Initially, this list of meetings was constructed 
from a review of my business diaries.  I record all meetings held in these diaries as a 
record of activity which has occurred.  I maintain a separate diary for planning 
activities and actions.  These diaries were reviewed for meetings held in each week of 
the seven year period.  Entries were made to the list for the date and where possible 
the names of those in attendance.  I then consulted my notes of the meetings for this 
period which amount to six lever arch files of documentation.  These meeting notes 
are interspersed with the documentation relevant to the projects underway at any given 
time.  The table was then updated for more accurate information of those who 
attended the meetings and a brief note was added to describe the purpose of each 
meeting.  Examples of the entries are shown in the following extract: 
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Date  Duration (hrs) Present (in addition to  Lorcan) Purpose
30/01/04                       1.00 
Alan + John Shaughnessy 
Enterprise Ireland
Re Training plans across Litho, Precision Multimedia and 
Precise Data Solutions
18/05/09                       1.50 Alan Discussion of management structure and responsibilities.
 
Although it was not possible to provide a note of every meeting recorded in my diary, 
there were only 19 such gaps in the data.  In these cases it was possible to review 
emails to and from Alan Leamy which show the nature of the business between us at 
that time.  In effect, I was able to produce evidence on 90% of the meetings in the 
period.  No claim is being made in relation to the notes of the meetings other than 
their ability to document the key issues which were being worked on at the time.  The 
reality is that major projects such as the application for an Enterprise Stabilisation 
Fund grant dominated the agenda for the twelve months to July 2010. The meeting 
notes show constant references to this issue over many meetings.  As a result, the very 
minor gaps which exist in the meeting documentation is not considered significant in 
terms of the analysis of the key strategic issues facing the business as Alan Leamy 
perceived them. 
 
Over the seven year period there were 186 meetings.  This means that there was 
slightly more than one meeting every two weeks over the entire period. There was a 
remarkable level of consistency in the number of meetings in each year.  The number 
of meetings ranged from as few as 23 in 2004 to as many as 30 in 2009. The 
remaining five years had a much narrower range of between 25 and 28 meetings per 
annum.  This demonstrates the consistent engagement which I had with the company 
in that period.  While there was considerable fluctuation in the length of individual 
meetings which ranged from one hour to four hours, the average length of the 
meetings over the entire period was slightly more than two hours.  In effect, this 
means that I spent an average of one hour per week for seven years in the company of 
the CEO of the Perigord Group reviewing the business, considering strategic options 
and preparing submissions for grant applications. It should also be noted that these 
meetings, whilst central to the business relationship and a core element of my data, 
were only the beginning.  After each such meeting either Alan Leamy or I would have 
taken away a series of tasks to be undertaken prior to our next meeting.  I have no 
basis for claiming a specific time for this aspect of our work as I did not maintain a 
record of this time in a sufficient condition for inclusion in this research.  It is 
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however, reasonable to assume that the time involved was at least equal to the time 
involved in the meetings when one considers the time required to research various 
possibilities, draft reports, seek information from Alan Leamy’s colleagues within the 
business etc.  Even such a conservative estimate suggests that the total time 
commitment over the seven year period approached two hours per week. 
 
Having created the table of meetings with the associated notes of the general theme of 
each meeting, I reviewed the data to summarise the activity in each year of the period 
under review.  This analysis resulted in Table 10 in Chapter 6 which listed the 
changing strategic priorities of Alan Leamy in the period under review.  The division 
of some priorities between periods is more for ease of presentation purposes than any 
precise reflection of the time spans involved.  By their nature some issues span more 
than one calendar year.  However, the table shows each issue in the year in which it 
was the primary focus of the agenda.  The detailed discussion of the evolving 
priorities is contained in Chapter 6. 
 
4) Business plans produced in the period 2004-2010 
A number of business plans were produced for the Perigord Group of companies in 
the period 2004 to 2010.  In summary, detailed plans were prepared for Precise Data 
Solutions as part of its application for significant funding from Enterprise Ireland 
under the High Potential Start Up scheme.  A similar plan was produced for the 
Perigord Group as part of its application for funding under the Enterprise Stabilisation 
Fund.  I was heavily involved in the production of these plans from a number of 
perspectives.  In my capacity as a business consultant I met with Alan Leamy and 
other key executives as required to tease out the issues underlying the company’s 
performance.  Standard tools like SWOT analysis were used to generate discussion on 
the different perspectives which existed in relation to the business and it’s potential.  
The business plans included detailed sections on the market, on operations, on staff 
requirements and developments, on research and development capability and on 
financials.  As well as being actively involved in the generation of the data and 
concepts to be included in the plans, I was the person charged with writing the 
documents.  I would draft a section or chapter of the plan.  Alan Leamy would then 
review it and either make changes to the draft directly or discuss with me changes 
which he would like to see made.  I met with the company’s financial director on 
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many occasions to discuss the financial projections required and to agree the base data 
which were consistent with the sales and operational projections being made. I liaised 
with the company’s auditors on aspects which they had to produce in relation to 
consolidated accounts for the Perigord Groups businesses. Each document went 
through at least ten iterations prior to being submitted as part of the funding 
applications.  As well as the role they played in securing funding for the company, the 
value in the documents was their contribution to clarity of purpose for the company’s 
executives. 
 
5) Applications for grant assistance (other than training) produced between 2004-2010 
As has been described above, a large number of applications were made and secured 
for grant assistance for the Perigord Group of companies between 2004-2010.  As well 
as the major projects described above a number of smaller proposals were also made 
and secured.  Chronologically, the applications were: 
• Consultancy grant proposal  in 2004 
• Training grants in May 2005 
• Productivity Improvement Fund for Litho Studios (subsequently re-
branded as Perigord Premedia) - early 2006  
• Productivity Improvement Fund for Fine Print - April 2006  
• R&D stimulation grant for Litho Studios - February 2008  
• HPSU application for Precise Data Solutions - 2007-2008 concluded 
March 2008  
• Business Accelerator Programme for Precise Data Solutions for the USA 
market - March 2008  
• Key Person Recruitment grant for Precise Data Solutions - October 2008 
• Employment Subsidy Scheme for Perigord Premedia (formerly Litho 
Studios) - December 2009 
• Employment Subsidy Scheme for Fine Print - December 2009 
• Enterprise Stabilisation Fund for Perigord Group - 2009-2010 concluded 
July 2010  
• R&D grant proposal - late 2010 on going 
 
All of these applications required a combination of application forms and explanatory 
documents to be completed and submitted.  In some cases, the process was relatively 
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simple in terms of a short application form with a supporting one or two page 
explanatory note. In others, as has been described above, full scale business plans with 
full financial projections for the following three years were required. With the 
exception of the Business Accelerator Programme for the USA office, I completed all 
of the applications and supporting documentation on behalf of the company.  I 
managed the process of interaction between Enterprise Ireland and the company and 
attended all meetings between the agency and the company’s executives.  
2.4.4 Review and use of data 
Methodologically, it was clear that the themes which emerged from the interview 
process did not yield very much in the context of the themes in the literature reviewed 
to that point. The data confirmed that the general technological and market trends 
which had been reported for the printing industry. The data confirmed that the 
company had a higher than average investment level in training. The data revealed 
some issues of interest in relation to the types of learning which had taken place.  The 
data showed considerable fit with the upper echelons theory in the sense of the 
centrality of the senior management or of the senior executive in relation to firm 
decision making.  However, the data did not reveal much in terms of any useful 
explanation of what might be underpinning the behaviour of the firm. This led me to 
re-visit the literature and to explore the capability theme which had emerged in more 
detail.  This led to the substantive review of the literature on dynamic capability 
presented in Chapter 5. 
 
The data from the interviews was then re-analysed in the context of this literature. It 
was at this point that the data gathered from the notes of meetings between me and 
Alan Leamy was included for analysis. In re-analysing the data I drew on core themes 
from the literature, explored in Chapter 5, of resources, routines and competencies, 
core competencies, dynamic capabilities, and literature related to managerial agency. 
This allowed me to focus on the data in a more theoretically robust manner and to link 
what was emerging from the data to a strong theoretical base. 
 
The core purpose of critical realism is to answer the question of “what, if it existed, 
would account for this phenomenon” (Reed 2005b p. 1631).  Having re-presented the 
data in the context of the literature on dynamic capability, absorptive capacity and 
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social and intellectual capital I considered the explanations which might have 
underpinned the phenomenon being studied.  This research seeks to establish if 
dynamic capabilities emerged in the Perigord Group.  If so, as a critical realist, I wish 
to explain the emergence of any such dynamic capability in a defensible theoretical 
manner.  Chapter 7 discusses these issues in detail and addresses the questions posed 
herein. 
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3.  Literature Review: Learning 
Why don’t SMEs invest more in training?  This question dominates the literature on 
training in SMEs.  The reasons for the perceived under-investment in training by 
SMEs, particularly in relation to management development, are the subject of constant 
discussion by policymakers and academics alike. However, this literature also raises 
other questions - what is training or more specifically, what is learning in an 
organisational context?  How do organisations learn and how do SMEs in particular 
learn?  This chapter addresses these questions in the following manner.  The training 
debate is discussed from a policy context and an academic perspective on learning.   A 
model of organisational learning is discussed before exploring the orders of learning 
which exist.   Finally, the specific context of learning in small firms is examined. 
 
3.1 The training debate 
There has been substantial investment by national governments in training in SMEs. 
The Bolton Report (1971), in recognising the importance of SMEs to the UK 
economy, began a public policy era which encouraged training in smaller companies.  
The underlying assumption in public policy on training is that investment in training is 
positively related to improved business performance. In Ireland, Government funding 
of training initiatives in 2003 amounted to € 173 million for those in employment and 
almost € 270 million for the unemployed (Expert Group on Future Skills Needs 
2005a).  The investment of almost € 442 million is a clear demonstration of 
importance of training in Irish public policy. 
 
The Expert Group on Future Skills Needs (EGFSN) was established by the Irish 
government in 1997 to advise on the current and future skills needs of the economy 
and on other labour market issues that impact on Ireland’s enterprise and employment 
growth.  The government of Ireland adopted the recommendations of the EGFSN 
report “Towards a National Skills Strategy” (Expert Group on Future Skills Needs 
2007).  This report recommended that the projected requirements of Ireland’s 
economy by the year 2020 necessitated a substantial continuing investment in training 
to increase the level of educational attainment of 500,000 people by at least one level 
on the National Framework of Qualification (NFQ).  (The NFQ is Ireland’s 
framework of accredited training and education awards which operates on a scale of 1 
to 10 with a doctoral qualification at 10.  The Leaving Certificate, which is the normal 
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school exit exam at eighteen years of age, and many national craft certificates are at 
level 5 or 6).  The skills strategy adopted has significant implications not only for the 
level of investment required in training, but also in the nature of the training required 
as it places such a heavy emphasis on accredited training programmes.  
 
Government policy on interventions in the training marketplace through public 
provision and grant support assumes ignorance on the part of SMEs in particular in 
relation to the benefits of training, which in turn leads to a market failure (Storey and 
Westhead 1997).  The ignorance theory assumes that there are significant benefits to 
training in relation to enhanced firm performance.  The benefits are assumed to be 
such that any SME which was aware of them could not fail to invest in training 
initiatives.  As there is a perceived under-investment in training by SMEs (OECD 
2003), it is therefore assumed that if the ignorance issues could be overcome, then 
firms would invest more in training, thereby resolving the market failure.  This gives 
rise to publicly funded programmes which reduce or eliminate the cost to firms to 
participate in training and also to programmes of intervention which encourage firms 
to engage with training more generally. The alternative view is that there is in fact no 
market failure in the training market.  SMEs invest at the current level because there is 
in fact no automatic linkage between investment in training and firm performance.  
Market forces result in a level of spending on training consistent with the perceived 
economic return to the firm.  Storey and Westhead (1997) found that SMEs also work 
to shorter payback timescales for investment than larger firms, and so might be more 
reluctant to invest in programmes (like management development) which might take 
longer to provide a return to the firm.    
 
Neither the market failure nor the market forces propositions adequately explain the 
perceived under-investment in training by SMEs.  Both positions suffer from a 
philosophical and methodological bias which seeks to narrow the debate to causality 
in a manner which regularly results in flawed research (Storey 2004, Gibb 2000, 
Curran 2000, Storey and Westhead 1997).  Equally, the arguments tend to consider the 
issue in relation to training as an isolated process, rather than considering training as a 
key component in the delivery of specified objectives. Training interventions should 
be used as part of a planned process of actions to meet coherent business objectives 
which are clearly identified (Sels 2002).  The market failure debate also effectively 
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considers all training to be of a similar nature which is capable of being assessed in 
short term measures. 
 
Government reports consistently show a lower investment level in training for SMEs 
than their larger counterparts.  The OECD (2003) reporting on levels in five countries, 
found a lower level of investment along a number of criteria which was almost 
perfectly correlated with firm size. 
 
Table 1: Investment in training by firm size 
Firm size % of Managers on 
external courses this year 
Days training per person 
p.a. 
1-9 37 2.2 
10-24 44 2.4 
25-49 51 2.7 
50-99 57 2.7 
100-249 66 2.4 
250-499 75 2.8 
500+ 82 2.9 
   
Source: OECD 2003   
 
This table shows a very significant disparity in the number of managers who 
undertook external courses in larger and smaller firms.  However, the statistics are 
silent on the benefit of the programmes undertaken and the purpose for which the 
programmes were chosen.  
 
The OECD report, along with other research on training levels, focused on external 
and structured programmes (Gibb 2000, Storey and Westhead 1997, Westhead and 
Storey 1996) and excluded more informal programmes.   This is not surprising given 
that the costs associated with external programmes are more easily identified than 
those with internal programmes and that cross firm comparisons of internal 
programmes are open to difficulties of interpretation and certainty in comparators.  
However, we also know that entrepreneurs prefer to learn from their peers in more 
informal settings.  If entrepreneurs do not consider informal training to be training at 
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all (Gray and Mabey 2005, Barry and Milner 2002) then it is possible that there is an 
under-reporting of training levels in smaller firms relative to larger firms based on 
interpretation alone. The impact the inclusion of less formal training activities may 
have had on the OECD comparison between larger and smaller firms is unknown. 
 
In Ireland, the Expert Group on Future Skills Need (2005b) described a number of 
reasons that SMEs offered for lower levels of engagement with management 
development training in particular. Most respondents specified time (the ability to 
release staff from their normal duties for training), financial cost (the absolute cost of 
the training being too high) and the relevance of the training itself (many programmes 
are designed too generically to be of real benefit to an SME). Storey and Westhead 
(1997) found similar reasons and suggested that these issues are more significant in 
smaller companies.  This is because the proportionate impact of one staff member in 
say six being on a training programme is more significant that one in sixty or one in 
six hundred for larger companies.  Similarly, Storey and Westhead argue that the cost 
is proportionately higher for smaller companies in terms of the overhead required to 
manage the identification of training needs and the procurement process.  The 
financial costs may also be higher and the training may be less relevant as the smaller 
firm will tend to have to settle for the generic programme available from trainers.  As 
larger companies may have sufficient numbers of employees to completely fill a 
training programme, they will be better placed than smaller companies to have a 
programme tailored to their specific corporate needs.   In addition, Storey and 
Westhead (1997) also found that the lack of an internal labour market in SMEs 
restricted promotional opportunities for employees and therefore dampened demand 
for management training from staff.  These authors also found an additional internal 
labour market difficulty where employees did wish to engage with management 
training. Owners were often reluctant to invest in the training as the expectation was 
that trained staff would leave, thereby negating any gain to the organisation possible. 
 
Other less commercial or economically based reasons may exist for the low take up by 
entrepreneurs of formal structured training programmes.  Martin and Halstead (2004) 
in a study of a programme to attract entrepreneurs back to training in the UK found 
that entrepreneurs cited poor experience in school as reasons to avoid engagement 
with formal training situations.  It seemed that the bad experience the entrepreneurs 
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had as children still greatly affected their willingness as adults to engage with 
structured training programmes which were considered to be like school.  The Expert 
Group on Future Skills Needs (2005b) went further to suggest that some of the more 
economic or commercial reasons given were in fact excuses offered by owners who 
did not wish to engage in the development of their staff for fear of exposing their own 
educational deficiencies.  In addition, some owners were concerned that if they 
engaged in management development training for their employees, that they would be 
challenged in terms of the strategy being followed or in having to explain decisions 
made.  There was a clear reluctance to engage in this process.  The implications of this 
suggestion are significant.  If owner-managers refrain from investing in management 
development to avoid self-exposure in some way, then any interventions in this area 
need to recognise this fact and take steps to ameliorate it. 
 
Since the Bolton Report (1971) there has been an assumption in public policy that 
investment in training is positively associated with firm performance. Despite this 
assumption, there is a significant debate in the literature on the link (if any) between 
training and firm performance.   
 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) suggested that management development training would 
only result in a reduction in the variation of performance between firms rather than 
influencing the performance per se.  Their contention was based on the premise that 
most management development training emphasised mistake avoidance rather than 
anything else.  Fuller-Love (2006) in a thorough review of the literature in this area, 
suggests that at the very least there is a correlation between management development 
training and the reduction in failure rates in SMEs. This is supported by Curran et 
al(1996) who suggest that management training leads to growth and reduced risk of 
failure. This concept of the impact on survivability is supported by OECD (2003).The 
OECD report quotes two Canadian studies which stated that “the main reason for 
failure is inexperienced management. The managers of bankrupt firms do not have the 
experience, knowledge or vision to run their businesses” (Baldwin et al. 1997 as 
quoted in OECD 2003 p 7) and “even after controlling for other establishment 
characteristics, we found that establishments with the strongest commitment to 
training were significantly more likely than other firms to report positive revenue and 
productivity trends over the previous two years” (Betcherman, Leckie and McMullen 
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1997 as quoted in OECD 2003 p.7).  Henry, Hill and Leitch (2004) in a longitudinal 
study of Irish entrepreneurs during and following their participation in an 
entrepreneurship training programme suggest that there is some benefit, in relation to 
performance, to targeted training on a range of issues prior to start-up. Whilst this 
study may suffer from some selection bias, at the very least, the confidence levels of 
the participating entrepreneurs were enhanced.  Equally, there was some evidence that 
some potential entrepreneurs were dissuaded from start-up, which might be seen as a 
positive outcome from a macro-economic viewpoint (as they may well have failed). 
 
Storey (2004) states that despite substantial research attempting to demonstrate a 
causal link between training and improved business performance and return on 
investment from training that there is in fact little evidence to support the claims 
made. This article draws on research from the UK and five other OECD countries 
(Canada, Finland, Germany, Japan and the USA) and argues that the accepted low 
take up of training by small firms (defined as under 500 employees in some countries 
and under 250 in others) is as a result of the key decision makers being unconvinced 
of any return on investment. This lack of causality is largely supported by Gibb (2000) 
and Curran (2000).  These contributions to the literature are positioned in a debate on 
governmental policy in the UK in relation to training supports.  The appropriateness of 
training interventions being promoted by the UK government to the SME sector and 
the relevance of homogenous programmes for SMEs which are heterogeneous in 
nature may be key reasons for the failure of such programmes to yield any 
improvement in business performance (Curran 2000, Gibb 2000).  Storey (2004) 
robustly and properly challenges studies which purport to demonstrate the 
performance link in a variety of ways, saying that “…their methodology is unable to 
disentangle, even if a positive correlation existed, whether it is small firms that train 
which perform better or small firms that perform better which can afford to train” 
(Storey 2004 p.123). However, his view of the requirements for a comprehensive 
study to establish the link between performance and training seem excessive when 
there is ample evidence of well-structured impact measurement studies of individual 
training programmes (Phillips 2003). 
 
There is a substantial gap in the literature relating to return on investment in training.  
Planned training interventions should be preceded by an assessment of some 
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performance gap which relates to an organisational objective or aspiration (Sels 2002, 
Rowe 1996, Mabey and Finch-Lees 2008).  Yet the literature tends to focus on the 
period after the training programme (for formal programmes) and seeks to identify 
attributable results.  It would be useful to see more research which introduced an 
assessment of the pre-training planning and the clarification of the desired learning 
outcomes as a key factor in improving business performance. It is also the case that 
many companies do not in fact plan their training in such a manner.  Sels (2002 p. 
1285) in his research into training in Belgium found that “the companies which 
systematically translate strategic changes of direction into a decision of new training 
needs form a small minority”.  He argues that unless there is a clear linkage between 
the firm’s strategy and the training identified, then increasing the level of investment 
in training is misguided. Any investment which is not tied to specific objectives 
related to a firm’s strategy is less likely to result in a worthwhile return on the 
investment than an investment carefully planned with specific business objectives and 
measures of performance in mind (Sels 2002). 
 
The debate in relation to the return on investment on training is part of a larger similar 
debate in the human resources management field (Harney 2009).   Hesketh and 
Fleetwood (2006) are one of the few authors questioning the validity of the quest for 
an empirical causal link between human resources management initiatives (including 
training) and performance.  Part of their concern is that the absence of a demonstrable 
link may cause worthwhile activity to be terminated – i.e. not proving the linkage does 
not equate to there being no linkage present. These authors understand the “real 
world” of corporate life and the competition for scarce resources which exists.  They 
recognise the boardroom is unlikely to be the location for philosophical debate, yet 
they propose that a more in-depth analysis of the issues and relationships which exist 
in organisations is required for a better understanding of what actually happens. As 
one respondent put it “When I want to know, ‘Well, what do we actually in fact 
“do”?’ I have to lift up the stones and have a look underneath.”  (Hesketh and 
Fleetwood 2006 p. 691). The critical realism approach adopted in this thesis is 
appropriate to answering questions of this nature. 
 
Rowe (1996) found that despite the significant levels of investment in developing less 
autocratic styles of management that “especially when the going gets tough, the 
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dictatorial, autocratic style (stemming from scientific management) remains the 
dominant form (of organisational approach)” (p. 19). In other words, despite 
significant investment to engender what has been deemed by some to be a more 
appropriate style of management, tension and stress tend to see managers revert to a 
more blunt form of management. This type of finding suggests that the investment in 
training by firms in developing management styles may be ineffective. 
 
Mabey and Finch-Lees (2008) in their discussions on management training hold out 
the possibility that larger companies may invest significant sums of money in 
management development in order to indoctrinate managers into the company way of 
thinking.  Ezzamel and Wilmott (2001) posit that employees may resist training as it 
can be an attempt by management to impose a way of thinking and acting which is 
fundamentally exploitative of the employees. Rusaw (2000) agrees specifying that 
training can be emancipatory if allowed to develop freely but that organisations 
frequently constrain the content and direction of training and also limit access in an 
attempt to control behaviour. Kamoche (2000) in his study of a multi-national 
organisation found evidence of the use of the management development programme to 
promote and continue organisational ideology.  Whether one agrees with the 
exploitative propositions of many critical theorists in this area or not, it is clear that 
large organisations can and do use management development programmes to promote 
the firms ideology and processes and adherence to established routines.  For policy to 
then suggest that a similar level of investment is warranted in smaller companies when 
the same issues and breadth of organisation are not involved is misguided. 
 
Progression in larger companies can be based on performance on internal 
development programmes which by their nature are based on what the company 
believes is the right way to manage and develop the business.  By the company 
determining what is right in this fashion, it may be inadvertently restricting the 
learning which may be possible.  At the very least, it is possible to imagine 
circumstances where a company invests significantly in training and actually achieves 
a negative long term result through inadvertently restricting the options considered by 
its developing managers.  In this situation, the higher level of investment in training 
by larger firms is not worthy of emulation by SMEs. 
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3.2 A model of organisational learning 
The training debate has also suffered from a lack of clarity in definitions and 
terminology which hampers discussion and often conflates very disparate issues into 
falsely homogenous terms.  A comprehensive discussion of training issues should 
reflect the complexity of the topic in terms of the nature of delivery of material, the 
nature of the learning sought and the potential significance of that learning to the 
individual or organisation.   
 
The word “training” is used so commonly in every day speech and referenced so 
commonly in organisational dialogue that it may be taken for granted that its 
definition is commonly agreed and understood. Training may include technical issues 
ranging from a demonstration of how to use a new fax machine to a comprehensive 
programme of training on the operation of a multi-million euro printing machine; it 
may be on communication style in relation to telephone sales skills; or it may be on 
strategic planning and the tools by which a company may assess and plan for its 
future.  
 
The Oxford dictionary defines training as to “teach (a person or animal) a particular 
skill or type of behaviour through regular practice and instruction”. This definition 
allows the manner in which one shows a dog how to perform certain tasks to be 
equated in terminology with how humans may be shown how to perform new skills.  
Such instruction may be formal and structured in a classroom style environment or it 
may be less formal and structured in the sense of the traditional apprenticeship system 
where an experienced technician demonstrates over time and during the execution of 
the task to the apprentice. Such an approach to the instruction of an individual is 
valuable in many circumstances. However, to limit the acquisition of knowledge to 
such a structure would be very restrictive.  
 
A more useful term to use to capture the role of the person engaged with the process 
of acquiring new skills is “learning”.  The Oxford dictionary defines learning as to 
“acquire knowledge of or skill in (something) through study or experience or by being 
taught” or to “become aware of by information or from observation”. This definition 
allows a much broader scope in how an individual might acquire knowledge in that it 
allows for experience, observation, self-study as well as being taught in a more formal 
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manner. Beach (1980) defines learning as “the human process by which skills, 
knowledge, habit and attitudes are acquired and altered in such a way that behaviour is 
modified”  This has become the accepted academic definition of learning (Gibb 1997, 
Sullivan 2000).  The definition relies on the necessity for behaviour to be modified for 
learning to have been deemed to have occurred. This transfer of learning is critical and 
is also learner focused rather than teacher focused. Learning is based on what the 
learner already knows not on what the teacher knows (Gibb 1997).  
 
However, Huber (1991 p. 89) defined learning as “an entity learns if, through its 
processing of information, the range of its potential behaviours is changed”. This is a 
broad interpretation as it does not require actual behaviour to have changed.  There is 
no requirement for improvement in performance, nor is there necessarily any 
requirement for intentionality as an entity may process information involuntarily.  
Indeed, Huber (1991) expressly states that his definition holds for humans, animals, 
groups, organisations, industries and societies.  In other words, an entity learns if its 
range of potential behaviours changes as a result of processing information it 
encounters. There is no value judgement inherent in this definition, as an entity may 
process the information encountered incorrectly or make erroneous conclusions and 
thereby learn something which is in fact incorrect. Equally, that which has been 
learned may cease to be true if circumstances or the environment were to change.  
However, Huber’s definition remains useful as it also recognises the breadth and 
encompassing nature of learning.  In relation to people and organisations it allows for 
unintended consequences where people may learn from the actions of others.  It 
allows for learning to occur which is entirely appropriate in the prevailing 
circumstances, but which ceases to be so when the environment changes. It allows for 
intentional, deliberate learning in formal and semi-formal educational environments.  
 
Building on Huber (1991), Crossan, Lane and White (1999) developed their 4I model 
of organisational learning.  This model expressly addressed the realm of individual 
and organisational learning. The model recognises that there are three levels in an 
organisation (individual, groups and the organisation) and proposes four processes in 
relation to learning (Intuiting, Interpreting, Integrating and Institutionalising).  
Intuiting is defined as the recognition of patterns or possibilities in personal 
experience.  However, Crossan et al (1999) posit that unless that individual engages 
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with another individual on the subject, that it remains a personal and individualistic 
issue.  Interpreting is the process of explaining to oneself or others of the insight or 
idea garnered at the Intuiting stage. Integrating is the process where a shared 
understanding is developed between individuals and where an agreed set of 
coordinated actions occur. If these actions are recurring and significant in an 
organisational context, the Institutionalising may occur.  This is the process by which 
routinized actions are ensured in the organisation. This model has considerable value 
as it explores the process of learning in an organisational context and builds from the 
individual to the organisation.  The authors recognise that the while the processes are 
built on each other sequentially, there is not necessarily a clear delineation from one 
process to the next as these processes form the bridge from one organisational layer to 
the next. 
 
Crossan, Lane and White (1999 p. 532) state that “organisational learning is a 
dynamic process”. What has been learned may influence future actions and what has 
been previously learned influences how people act and think. One’s ability to intuit is 
based on the ability to recognise patterns or possibilities in experience.  This ability is 
itself dynamic as experience evolves.  The ability to articulate an idea to another 
requires an ability to explain the thoughts and concepts which underpin it. 
Successfully achieving shared understanding requires the people listening to the 
explanation to explore it in sufficient detail to overcome their own mental 
preconceptions of the idea as it emerges.  “The real test of shared understanding is 
coherent action” (Crossan, Lane and White 1999 p. 533).  The authors also recognise 
the inherent organisational dangers of the manner in which learning occurs.  An over-
emphasis on institutionalising can undermine the ability to intuit, as intuiting may be 
considered subversive to the organisations established processes. Yet institutionalising 
is a critically necessary process if the organisation is to be capable of capturing the 
value consistently of any new process. 
 
In considering the 4I model, Lawrence et al (2005) hold that the consideration of how 
power and politics may be used within the organisation can have a direct impact 
(positively or negatively) on learning. Decisions are made in organisations about 
which ideas are supported and advanced.  These decisions are not always based on the 
objective merits of the case as genuine objectivity may be difficult as those involved 
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are likely to have a view based on personal experience and previous learning. The use 
of episodic power refers to “discrete, strategic political acts initiated by self-interested 
actors” whereas systemic forms of power “work through the routine, on-going 
practices of the organisation” (Lawrence, et al. 2005 p. 182). In other words, the latter 
is an indication of the organisation inertia considered by Crossan et al (1999), whereas 
the former relates to the deliberate actions of individuals with power.  Neither should 
be considered as automatically negative.  An organisation is unlikely to wish for a 
constant state of flux in processes as this could jeopardise efficiency dramatically.  
Consequently, some organisational resistance to change is probably healthy as it 
requires a new idea to have a demonstrable advantage prior to its acceptance. Equally, 
the use of power by self-interested actors may be very positive as it may result in 
valuable ideas being promoted which might otherwise have been suppressed by the 
organisational inertia. Schilling and Kluge (2009) concur that the self-interest of 
employees in the organisation must be considered within the 4I model.  In their 
exploration of barriers at each stage of the process, they propose that if the 
professional identity of the employee is likely to be undermined by the learning 
identified, then it is likely to be resisted.   
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3.3 Orders of Learning  
Appreciating the distinction between learning and training and understanding how 
learning takes place in organisations is only a beginning.  The concept and scope of 
learning is not singular or uniform.  Learning must be considered as a broad topic with 
very significant distinctions within it relating to the nature and impact of the learning 
acquired.  The distinction between learning and training, explored above, essentially 
relates to the degree of involvement of the participant in the process of acquiring new 
skills and competences, the responsibility taken by the participant for their own 
learning, as well as allowing for the inclusion of many forms of learning including 
experience, observation and self-study as well as the more formal and structured 
forms of learning facilitated by organised programmes and courses.  However, a 
discussion of learning must also reflect on the fact that there is an order of learning, 
which must be understood in the context of any review of organisational learning or 
the impact of learning on an organisation’s development. 
 
Argyris (1976) described single and double loop learning as a dichotomy of learning 
types.  Single loop learning described simple processes where the task to be completed 
was well defined and the desired outcomes clearly understood. Single loop learning 
adequately describes much traditional and functional training where the trainee is 
expected to acquire the skills to perform a specific task to an acceptable standard.  It is 
easy to conceptualise single loop learning in the context of a machine technician being 
shown how to set-up a machine in a timely and accurate manner for a specific task.  It 
is also relatively easy to assess the extent of the skills acquired through demonstration 
of the task. Single loop learning is not confined to manual tasks and could also 
describe most specific skills training where the participant is not required and in fact is 
often positively dissuaded from showing any initiative in the end result required or the 
method to be followed.  Double loop learning involves some reflection on the task to 
be achieved and consideration of the options available to achieve it. Such learning is 
potentially more complex as the outcomes are not necessarily known in advance and 
the appropriate method may not be established.  
 
In describing Senge’s (1990) terms of adaptive and generative learning, Wang (2008 
p. 638) states that adaptive learning occurs “within a set of recognised and 
unrecognized organisational constraints” which lead to learning within the boundaries 
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of those constraints.  Consequently, learning tends to be sequential and incremental in 
nature.  These constraints are frequently based in the assumptions made in the 
organisation about its capabilities, its client requirements and the environment in 
which it operates.  The concept of organisational image (Penrose 1959, Weick 2001, 
Hilliard 2004) will be explored in detail in Chapter 5, however it is worth noting here 
that an organisation’s managers may have a perception of their firm and its 
environment which is based on experience, previous decisions and personal 
perceptions. There is significant potential for such an image to be inconsistent with the 
view which others in the market have of the firm.  Consequently, learning, especially 
experiential learning based on such perceptions can be myopic in that they are based 
on false assumptions (Levinthal and March 1993, Maskell and Malmberg 2007).  
When these constraints and assumptions are questioned, the possibility of generative 
learning presents.  It is characterised as “creativity, breakthrough and organisational 
learning” Wang (2008 p. 639).   
 
Fiol and Lyles (1985) describe lower and higher level learning to distinguish forms of 
learning.  Lower level learning “occurs within a given organisational structure, a given 
set of rules” (p. 807). The authors stress that that the terminology should not be 
confused with the organisation level of any individual, rather it is reflective of the 
nature of a learning which is bounded by assumptions and where a pre-determined 
behaviour or level of performance is defined. In this context there are clear similarities 
with Senge’s adaptive learning which is also constrained by existing assumptions. 
Higher level learning “aims at adjusting the overall rules and norms rather than 
specific activities or behaviours” (Fiol and Lyles 1985 p.808).  This type of learning 
requires greater reflection on the part of the learner to challenge existing assumptions 
and modes of operation.  This type of reflection is difficult for many learners as it 
requires an ability to identify what the assumptions in use are.  In the context of 
organisational image described above, it can be difficult for managers to identify their 
own misperceptions until an event occurs which demonstrates the error. Consequently, 
Fiol and Lyles suggest that some form of crisis may be required for this type of 
learning to take place. Jones and Macpherson (2006) concur in stating that a crisis can 
often lead a firm to seeking external help which can assist in challenging assumptions 
in the business.  Cope (2003) agrees finding that it is discontinuous change (often in 
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the form of a critical incident) which forces the entrepreneur to reflect on their core 
assumptions and so develop higher order learning. 
 
Organisations require both forms of learning.  Lower order learning is required to 
ensure that processes and routines which provide the basis of an organisations service 
are delivered consistently and to a standard expected by the market.  However, higher 
order learning is also required if an organisation is to sustain itself for the long term in 
the face of continuous market change.  Relying on lower order learning will not 
deliver the clarity on constraints and assumptions which may limit the organisations 
options for growth. While many authors present the distinction between lower and 
higher order learning as a dichotomy, it may be more useful to consider them as points 
on a continuum. It is possible to imagine different learning opportunities as being 
more towards the lower order or higher order without necessarily being easily or 
usefully categorized as either.  In this thesis, the distinction between lower and higher 
order learning is relative in this way rather than absolute in definition. 
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3.4 The SME context 
Storey and Westhead (1997) articulated a number of reasons as to why SMEs train 
less than larger firms.  SMEs have a higher failure rate than larger firms and so it is 
rational for them to seek shorter paybacks on their investments. Lack of internal 
labour markets mean that employees in smaller companies are less likely to seek 
training opportunities as the opportunities for advancement are fewer. The costs of 
training may be proportionately higher for the smaller firm and the opportunity costs 
of released staff are also higher.  However, if one accepts the propositions that Storey 
and Westhead make but still believe that there is a benefit to SMEs in engaging in 
management development training in terms of lowering failure rates, then it is 
arguable that some form of government intervention is warranted to alleviate the 
issues which Storey and Westhead raise which have the potential to be self-fulfilling 
in terms of firm failure if unaddressed.  Programmes such as the Training Networks 
Programme managed by Skillnets specifically attempt to address these issues through 
the funding of networks of firms where the identification of appropriate training 
solutions and the management of those training solutions can be jointly funded by the 
firms and the government.  
 
SMEs are not smaller versions of larger firms (Penrose 1959, Gibb 2000). They have 
different characteristics and function differently from larger firms.  Penrose (1959 
p.19) in discussing the implications of firm growth on organisational structure and 
management function stated that “organisations will become so different that we must 
look at them differently; we cannot define a caterpillar and then use the same 
definition for a butterfly”. Smaller companies often emphasise management 
informality in order to retain flexibility (Gray and Mabey 2005).  Yet the constant 
comparison of training levels between larger and smaller firms persists.  If there are 
significant differences between them as business organisms and how they operate, is 
there any basis for drawing conclusions on the relative value of their investment in 
training as public policy presently does?   
 
Research has shown that hands-on training - where a more experienced operator trains 
a less-experienced operator by a close quarter’s demonstration - is one of the preferred 
training approaches of SMEs (Gray and Mabey 2005, Barry and Milner 2002). 
However, the same research reported that many owner-managers do not really 
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consider this informal, yet very effective, technique to be training at all.  This seems to 
relate to the lack of formality of the training rather than any view that the results are 
unsatisfactory.  The literature also suggests that entrepreneurs learn best from their 
peers and probably in settings which are informal rather than formal, particularly 
through networking opportunities (Gibb 2000, Sadler-Smith, Down and Lean 2000, 
van Gelderen, van der Sluis and Jansen 2005).   
 
Jones and Macpherson (2006) extended the 4I model to the context of the SME and 
considered how those firms might access external knowledge to enhance internal 
resources. They suggest that the 4I model has a weakness in relation to small firms as 
the model “pre-supposes the existence of structures and procedures which is often not 
the case in small firms” (Jones and Macpherson 2006 p. 169).  This lack of systems 
makes it difficult to share and institutionalise new knowledge.  The ability to 
institutionalise learning in small firms may require the intervention of external parties 
to assist the owner-manager to make the transitions required.  They describe three case 
study firms who engaged with external parties to acquire new knowledge.  The 
authors describe three different types of learning that occurred as being normative 
(where a customer helped the firm to establish the expected standards and procedures 
for quality control and continuous improvement programmes), mimetic learning 
(learning by imitation where one firm chose from options presented which had worked 
in other organisations) and coercive learning (where the firm’s customer threatened to 
remove business unless certain managerial systems were changed).  Their research 
recognises that the owner-manager is central to decision making and that the SME 
context may be quite different to larger organisations and that third parties can have a 
direct influence on organisational learning in a number of ways. 
 
In exploring the question as to whether SMEs under-invest in training a number of 
issues need to inform the research.  (i) Learning is both formal and informal, (ii) 
entrepreneurs may not perceive informal training activity to be training when asked, 
(iii) entrepreneurs have been shown to prefer to learn informally and ideally from their 
peers, (iv) larger firms may require greater levels of investment in training than SMEs 
for reasons of coordination and (v) there is evidence that firms do not plan the 
learning outcomes sought in advance of training thereby raising doubt as to the 
efficacy of much spending on training initiatives.  Because the research approach 
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generally adopted fails to incorporate these issues in their analyses, the accepted 
conclusion in the literature that SMEs under-invest in training is premature. Analysis 
of firm’s level of investment in training should include consideration of the reasons 
for the level of investment as well as capturing the full extent of the investment in all 
activity leading to organisational learning. The case study on the Perigord Group 
explores the reasons for and outcomes of the firm’s level of investment in training and 
development.  The critical realism perspective requires a level of analysis to consider 
the issues involved and to reveal the underlying mechanisms that give rise to these 
investments. 
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4. Perigord Case Study & Case Analysis 
The Perigord Group is an Irish owned company with operations in Ireland, USA and 
Singapore. Coming from a printing industry background, it offers brand management 
and artwork services to multi-national information and communication technology 
industry clients, pharmaceutical companies and the international gaming software 
industry.  This case study, using a critical realist approach, explores the reasons for 
and outcomes from the company’s level of investment in training and development 
initiatives.  The data revealed a transition from lower order learning to higher order 
learning within the firm.   
 
The industry context and approach to training and development are presented prior to 
describing the Perigord Group in detail.  The history and development of the firm are 
presented, with a particular emphasis on the period from 2002 to 2010.  The data 
reveals a significant evolution in the firm in terms of its product and service offering 
at a time when the industry in which it operates was in turmoil.  The reasons for this 
evolution are examined. 
 
4.1 Print sector issues 
The Perigord Group was established in 1974 as Litho Studios Ltd., a company 
providing origination services to print and publishing companies.  Although it has 
now evolved into an organisation which is as much a marketing services company as a 
print sector company, its history and development are firmly rooted in the printing 
industry. The structure, scale and context of that sector must be understood to allow 
full consideration of Perigord’s context and development path. 
 
4.1.1 Market scale and significance 
The print and packaging industry in Ireland is a significant sector which employs 
approximately 17,000 people in 750 firms (National Centre for Partnership and 
Performance 2009).  The industry had a turnover of € 2.5 billion in 2002 with € 333 
million of that exported (The Print and Packaging Forum 2005).  The profile of firm 
size in the sector was that 84% of companies had less than fifty employees. While this 
was smaller than average for the manufacturing sector at that time, it was consistent 
with the international print company size profile generally. In 2004, 86% of 
companies in the print and packaging industry were privately owned, with the 
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majority being owner-managed and a majority of these still run by the founder (The 
Print and Packaging Forum 2005).   
 
4.1.2 Technological developments 
The printing industry has undergone a radical level of technological change in the 
twenty five years from 1984 to 2009.  The invention of the Apple Macintosh computer 
and the development of personal computing generally had a significant impact on the 
sector.  The move to digitisation, which allowed data to be captured, stored, 
manipulated and processed in many forms, had significant implications for capital 
investment and skills requirements in the sector (The Print and Packaging Forum 
2005).  In particular, the ability of the average computer user to make and use digital 
images, to create complex, multi-page documents which use extensive amounts of 
colour imagery revolutionised the elements of the sector which relied on origination 
services. 
 
A significant implication of these changes has been the blurring of the previously 
clear delineations in skills and competency requirements for different tasks. In the past 
originators were charged with the production of material up to and including the 
creation of the media which would carry the image to the printing device.  Printers 
operated printing machinery which only placed the image on to the substrate.  
Finishing operators or carton makers then took those printed substrates and converted 
them into the form shipped to the client (books, magazines, cartons, leaflets etc).  
Technological changes have meant that equipment now exists which can take a file 
from a client, paginate it, print it and bind it into a finished form in one process.  In 
effect, this has resulted in three different processes being combined under one 
operator’s control.  There are many less comprehensive combinations of previously 
distinct skills, but the impact has been the requirement for operators with a broader 
range of skills than before (The Print and Packaging Forum 2005).  This has 
significant implications in relation to the training requirements of both firms and 
individuals. 
 
Similarly, the commercialisation of fibre optics technology and other significant 
engineering developments have greatly influenced the technical complexity of the 
manufacturing equipment in use in the printing sector. Enhancements in the data 
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processing power of computer chips has allowed extremely large data files to be 
processed at sufficient speed to facilitate an entirely new (since 1994) digital 
commercial colour production process.  This process allows the production of printed 
items in commercially acceptable colour directly from disk without any intermediate 
steps or substrates.  This has resulted in significant market changes within the sector. 
This also has significant implications for firms in relation to the development or 
acquisition of the necessary skills and expertise required to harness these 
developments adequately. 
 
4.1.3 Market changes 
The market for print and packaging companies has changed radically over the past 
decade.  There has been a marked increase in the globalisation of competition 
facilitated by the ease of communication and the transfer of data files.  The files 
prepared by an author for a book can be transmitted anywhere in the world in minutes 
for subsequent manipulation and production. This ease of communication has 
removed a significant barrier to entry to local markets for internationally based 
suppliers. Companies export products to an increasing range of countries which has 
implications for the languages in which they must produce documentation and 
packaging.  For example, a generics drugs manufacturer may require a leaflet, label 
and box to be produced for ten or twenty languages to meet all market needs.  
Microsoft has stated an intention to supply products in up to one hundred languages to 
meet needs in developing countries.  Changes in consumer habits have required 
greater production flexibility to meet demand for products and services which are 
differentiated, customised, up-to-date and of a high quality. An increase in the number 
of single person households, demand for convenience, and a growing awareness of 
health and environmental issues are all fuelling the demand for new forms of print and 
packaging (The Print and Packaging Forum 2005 p.ix).  
 
The alternative methods for dissemination of information have had major implications 
for companies in the sector.  Data which traditionally was produced in a printed form 
only can now be provided through web pages, to mobile phones and PDA’s.  New 
electronic reading devices (e.g. Apple I-Pad, Kindle, Sony E-Book) make it possible 
for consumers to carry hundreds of publications (journal articles, books or magazines) 
on a device no bigger than a small novel.   
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The implications of these market changes have led industry associations to propose 
that management need to develop a capability to operate in the new environment in 
which they find themselves. In particular, firms in the print and packaging sector need 
to develop flexible processes which minimize equipment downtime for make ready 
and product changeover and that maximize customer responsiveness (The Print and 
Packaging Forum 2005).  The market developments which have occurred in the recent 
past and the expected rapid pace of technologically facilitated market change require 
firms to develop new skill sets and competencies to both leverage the possibilities and 
where possible to drive developments in their favour. The changes have significant 
implications for the nature of management development as the skills and breadth of 
vision required is radically different than that which was required twenty years ago. 
 
4.1.4 Approach to training and development 
The printing industry has a historical commitment to training in the form of 
apprenticeships.  The original system of an indentured trainee working alongside a 
skilled craftsman in a carefully defined and demarcated aspect of the trade has now 
been developed to a multi-skilled technician with a broad range of competence, but 
with a specialism in one area (National Centre for Partnership and Performance 2009).  
The industry in Ireland has consistently reviewed the apprenticeship structure to make 
it more relevant.  The old “time-served” approach which required seven years to 
complete is now fully replaced with a standards based approach, which proposes a 
three year cycle, but which is actually dependent on the individual’s ability to acquire 
and demonstrate the necessary skills range.  
 
Prior to the publication of the report of the Print and Packaging Forum in 2005, the 
focus of training in the Irish print sector was largely limited to the apprenticeship 
scheme.  That report contained a series of recommendations on training and 
development which emphasised the need for greater management development 
training in the sector.  The report included a services matrix, Table 2, originally 
proposed by the Printing Industries Association of Australia (2004), which outlined 
the ancillary services which would be expected of a printing company over the 
following five and ten years (The Print and Packaging Forum 2005 p.156).  These 
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services require an investment in staff development to acquire the necessary skills and 
competences. 
 
Table 2:  Services required of printing companies 2004-2014 
 
Ancillary Services (expected of a printing firm) 2004 +5 Years +10 Years 
• Digital Printing    
• Graphic Design    
• Fulfillment Management    
• Warehousing    
• Mailing Services    
• Desktop Publishing    
• Telemarketing –   
• Electronic File Storage –   
• e-Books –   
• Database Management –   
• Photo CD Services –   
• Digital Print Libraries –   
• CD Rom Services –   
• Multimedia Services –   
• Webpage Production/ History –   
• Digital Right Management –   
• Marketing Services – –  
• Systems Integration – –  
• Full Logistics Services – –  
 
Source: The Printing Industries Association of Australia (2004), Training & Education Needs of the 
Printing Industry Now and Into the Future. 
 
The services which a printing company required at the time in 2004 included the 
traditional production services which many companies had provided for many years.  
Some companies in the preceding ten years had added digital printing services.  
Developments in fulfilment services are, for example, where a printing company 
might now collate all of the material (Report, shareholder notifications, envelopes etc) 
with the Annual Report, sort the mailing per postal service regulations and deliver the 
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entire mailing directly to the mail centre.  This extension of service exemplifies the 
route many progressive print companies took to expanding client service. 
 
The services identified as being required within five years, which is approximately the 
time of this research, include a range of what could be broadly termed knowledge and 
data management services.  These proposed services recognised the trends, which 
were emerging in 2004, of devices capable of delivering readable content without the 
need for paper as well as a range of value adding services which could enhance the 
utilisation and value of pre-existing data.  The ability to re-author existing material for 
delivery to additional devices or for use in completely novel ways had the potential to 
greatly expand traditional services.   
 
The report proposed a ten year window for the development of full logistics and 
marketing services. The Irish printing industry had developed the logistical side of its 
business in the 1990’s to support the multi-national companies who required computer 
manual services.   So while some firms in the industry were ahead of the curve in this 
aspect, they fell behind in relation to the development of other elements of service 
development. The report also advocated the development of marketing services and 
systems integration.  This was proposed as a means by which firms could become 
more central to the core operations of their clients, thereby protecting their market 
positions.  
 
4.1.5 Recent developments in training and development 
The Print and Packaging Skillnet was established in 2006 under a funding agreement 
between the Irish Printing Federation
4
 and Skillnets Ltd, funded by the Government 
Department of Enterprise Trade and Employment under the National Training Fund in 
Ireland.  The Print and Packaging Skillnet is a training network which is co-funded by 
member firms and Skillnets Ltd.  The network provides a wide range of training in 
response to the needs identified originally in the Print and Packaging Forum Report 
and subsequently confirmed in training needs analysis with the participating 
companies.  In the four years of operation to the end of 2010, the Design, Print and 
Packaging Skillnet (renamed in April 2010) had delivered 7,939 days training to 1,373 
                                                 
4
 The Irish Printing Federation is a representative association for print firms in Ireland and is in effect 
an employer’s trade union. 
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individuals.  The total investment of the network was over € 1.6m including network 
management and training activity.  This training has included sales and sales 
management training, time management, supervisory management, desktop publishing 
and Microsoft Office Training.  It has also developed to incorporate pilot Lean 
Manufacturing programmes and accredited diplomas in packaging technology and 
print and digital media technology. The number of industry companies who have 
participated in training initiatives remains at approximately one hundred of a potential 
six hundred companies in Ireland. 
 
Despite the technological and market changes taking place and the requirements 
suggested for training and staff development, the industry’s level of engagement with 
training initiatives remains low (The Print and Packaging Forum 2005). The Forum 
Report found that average investment in structured training by print employers in 
2004 was 0.9 of 1% of total employee costs compared to an industry average of 1.4% 
for all manufacturing companies. In the intervening period, the only change of 
substance to the training profile of the sector has been the Print and Packaging 
Skillnet.  The impact of this spend on the sector has been marginal as it amounts to 
approximately € 95 per person employed in the industry over the six years of 
operation, or only € 15 per person per annum. However, its impact has been much 
more significant in the companies who have participated as the investment in training 
per person involved has been approximately € 1,200. This brings the average 
investment in those employees’ cases closer to the average for all manufacturing firms 
in Ireland. However, it remains clear that the industry continues to invest less than its 
manufacturing peers. 
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4.2 The evolution of Perigord 
4.2.1 The company context  
The Perigord Group is an Irish owned company with operations in Ireland, USA and 
Singapore. The firm offers brand management and artwork services to multi-national 
clients from a number of industries. The Perigord Group of companies consists of five 
wholly owned subsidiaries which operate in Ireland, Singapore and the USA. The 
group employs eighty people and has combined sales of approximately €10 million 
(US$14m).  The company’s international subsidiaries have sales of € 1.5m with an 
additional € 1m of the sales produced in Ireland being exported. 
 
The firm, in its present form, began in 1974 as Litho Studios Ltd. following the 
liquidation of a previous entity. Over a short period of years, Mr. Pat Leamy became 
the principal and finally the sole shareholder in the business. Leamy had been a sales 
person for the company. The firm focused on supplying pre-press services to the 
printing and packaging trade as well as directly to a number of end user clients in the 
newspaper and general publishing businesses. The business was dependent on a range 
of highly skilled operators including scanners, re-touchers and hand planners. In 
general, these operators had served a seven year apprenticeship in an industry which 
was heavily unionised. 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s Perigord experienced a period of high profitability. This 
allowed it to attract investment from venture capital firms.  The firm successfully built 
a client base in the USA, selling pre-press services to large publishers. This reflected 
the firm’s knowledge and expertise in colour reproduction.  The skill of the 
company’s employees in the art of colour separations (splitting the original 
photograph or image into the separate colours required for the printing process) and in 
re-touching (making minor but delicate adjustments for quality) to those separations 
won the company business despite the distances and time delays involved. Publishers’ 
production schedules at the time were long and allowed for international shipping and 
any associated delays. The development of the USA business led to the acquisition of 
Allied Colour Inc. in Connecticut, USA in the 1980s. It was unusual for small 
privately owned Irish companies in the printing industry to have overseas operations 
at that time.  
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The company made several attempts at expanding its business in Ireland through the 
acquisition of an educational book publisher in the 1980s and through the 
establishment of its own print facility in the early 1990s.  The print business failed and 
the publishing business was subsequently sold.  
 
Two sons of the founder have worked in the business since the 1980’s. Alan Leamy 
became CEO in 2002 and Paul Leamy is now the Chief Technical Officer.  These two 
executives are the controlling shareholders in the company.  Other key managers are 
Anne Cooke, who manages the group’s printing subsidiary Fine Print Ltd; Michael 
Fleming, General Manager of Perigord Premedia Ireland; Séamus Lonergan, President 
of Perigord Premedia USA and Andrew Scanlan, Group Finance Director.  
 
4.2.2 Changing technological environment 
In the 1980s the technological landscape of the company began to change radically 
with the introduction of the Apple Mac in 1984 and associated technologies. This lead 
to a profound change in the industry with many print and packaging companies 
bringing much of the service previously provided by Litho Studios in house for cost-
benefit reasons which were technology driven. This resulted in the collapse of the pre-
press service sector in Ireland in the 1990s with all but 3 of 38 companies 
disappearing during the 1990s. For Perigord, the impact of the digitisation of pre-press 
activities on the firm was that there was a gradual but definite shift away from many 
of the skills which had differentiated the company in the eyes of its clients. This was 
facilitated by the ease with which individuals could complete complex image and 
document manipulation using previously unavailable software like Quark and Adobe 
Photoshop. 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s Pat Leamy responded to the changing competitive and 
technological environment in a number of ways. He invested in equipment and 
developing technologies during this phase and continued to be recognised as a firm at 
the forefront of technical capability. For example, the firm purchased an Apple Mac in 
1990 and the firm was the first firm in Ireland to buy a Scitex system. Scitex was the 
brand name of a workflow system which allowed pre-press companies to manipulate 
client images and files, make on-screen amendments, especially to colour graphics 
and then output the data to imaging devices seamlessly.  It was an enormous 
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technological advance for its time as previously, the capability to manipulate images 
was very limited to minor hand based adjustment.  The adage of “the camera never 
lies” was born from this older era where a captured image was generally reproduced 
very faithfully (including all flaws) from the original.  The Scitex system, coupled 
with the use of Apple Macintosh based software, allowed the image to be digitised 
and then manipulated in terms of content and colour.  The capability to adjust images 
was a tremendous advance for publishers as flaws could be corrected and images 
made more perfect.  The Scitex system was a powerful innovation as it also allowed 
the management of files in a workflow system for the first time which had significant 
control and quality consistency advantages for the user.  
 
The firm was proactive in using the new technology. The firm developed its digital 
pre-press capability to manage work for multi-national software and hardware 
companies including Apple Computers and Microsoft (both firms had significant 
operations based in Ireland at the time). Perigord developed expertise in identifying 
solutions to issues, such as how to manage fonts in different languages, as they 
emerged 
 
New expertise was hired. For example, in 1991 Alan Leamy pushed for Pat Leamy to 
hire an executive with considerable Apple MAC sales experience to act as a link 
between the newly developing technology and clients in that market space. One of the 
major contracts that this executive secured was a contract with Microsoft which the 
firm has successfully retained and developed until the present time.  
 
The firm sought to diversify its activities by expanding the range of businesses and the 
geographical scope of its activities (Table 3). While some of this activity was 
unsuccessful, Pat Leamy persisted with this strategy. In 2000 he entered the print 
market through the acquisition of Fine Print Ltd. Founded in 1990, this company had 
built a capability and reputation in the ICT sector for producing small format items 
(leaflets, registration cards etc) in relatively small quantities. The founder of the 
company, Anne Cooke, was retained and the operation thrived as a distinct operation 
within the group of companies. 
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Table 3: Acquisitions and new ventures 1983 to 2010 
Year Firm / Activity  Outcome 
1983- Acquisition Allied Colour Inc., Connecticut, USA. 
Pre-press company to service local USA 
clients in New York area. 
Still in group ownership 
1985- Acquisition Educational book publisher Disposed of in 1994 
1989 – New venture Establishment of subsidiary to manage 
the creation of origination for 
newspaper sector 
Merged into business in 
1993 
1990 – New venture Establish printing facility in Ireland to 
leverage group print business. 
Business failed and sold 
off in 1992 
2000 - Acquisition Fine Print Ltd., Ireland. 
Printing business focussed on supplying multi-
national software and hardware companies 
with leaflets and registration cards. 
Still in group 
ownership. 
2007 - Reorganisation Establishment of Precise Data Ltd as 
software development subsidiary 
Still in group ownership 
2007 – Overseas office 
2010 – Overseas office  
Singapore office established. 
New Zealand office established 
 
Source: Perigord Group Business Plans 
 
4.2.3 New management – new market positions 
In 2002, due the illness of Pat Leamy, Alan Leamy assumed management 
responsibility for the group. The son of the owner, Alan Leamy had worked in the 
business from 1984 to 1997 in a variety of roles including the management of a small 
group subsidiary which provided services to the newspaper industry. This firm 
experienced a significant loss of business with the changes in newspaper firms’ use of 
technology in the late 1980s. Alan Leamy was responsible for developing new 
services in the subsidiary and grew the business by 500% over a four year period. 
Alan Leamy took a five year sabbatical from the group between 1997 and 2002, 
during which he travelled and then co-founded a printing firm.  
 
This new firm, started by Alan Leamy, was founded as a result of a relationship Alan 
developed during his sabbatical.  On return from his travels, Alan Leamy bought and 
then managed a small stationery business from his father. The business used a 
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photocopier and Alan became friendly with Enda Casey who owned a business which 
serviced the machine.  They became aware of an opportunity with a multi-national 
information and communications technology business that required training material 
produced in small but frequent quantities.  Utilising a simple on-line tracking solution 
which Paul Leamy had created, Alan and Enda secured a significant contract with the 
multi-national which led to the establishment of the new firm Exact Digital Ltd.  Alan 
worked on this business with Enda for a period of time until his return to the Perigord 
Group in 2002.   
 
As a consequence of the changes in technology the Perigord Group began as early as 
1999 to develop a range of software tools which would allow it and its clients to 
manage and control the production workflow more tightly. This was facilitated by the 
skills developed by Paul Leamy, another son of the original owner. Paul Leamy had 
worked in the business for a number of years having studied and worked in the optical 
design industry in the UK.  Leveraging software skills learned while in the software 
division of anoptical design company, Paul Leamy was able to create basic tracking 
tools for Perigord’s own use. These tools allowed much greater control and visibility 
on projects being worked on in the pre-press services area.  It started to become 
apparent that the tools which were proving so useful internally had an application 
externally for clients. A small software development team was established and 
working in close cooperation with a major pharmaceutical company in Dublin, Paul 
Leamy was able to create a suite of tools which gave the pharmaceutical company a 
much higher level of control of its documentation (leaflets, labels and cartons) as well 
as radically shortening the time to market for new product developments. As the range 
of modules expanded and the significance of the impact of the software for the 
generics pharmaceutical sector became more apparent, Perigord decided to re-
structure the software into a configurable off-the-shelf software offering for the 
pharmaceutical sector.   
 
The software developed had two significant implications for the Perigord Group. The 
first was the ability to generate a new revenue stream from software system sales and 
support was established.  More critically, the second implication was that the software 
solutions provided the company with a clear market differentiator which is a key 
facilitator in winning new business for the company’s other services.  The ability to 
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offer a managed service solution which includes the back-end services offered has 
allowed the company pitch for business for which it would have previously been 
excluded on the basis of scale and breadth of service. 
 
Reflecting the fact that this software development business is a business in its own 
right, the company established a new subsidiary Precise Data Ltd in 2007 to develop 
and market the software solutions. By 2008, the business of Litho Studios Ltd had 
changed so dramatically from its history of supplying pre-press services to printing 
companies to being a provider of services to publishers in the ICT sector and to 
generic pharmaceutical companies, that the name was changed to Perigord Premedia 
Ltd.  Allied Graphics in the USA was also re-named to Perigord Premedia Inc.  
 
The firm won a number of international contracts including a world-wide contract 
with Microsoft. This required the establishment of an office in Singapore to service 
the Asia-Pacific requirements of these contracts.  Perigord Premedia Singapore was 
established in 2008 with staff from Dublin supporting and training local employees. 
By 2009, the group had three subsidiaries in Dublin focusing on software 
development, premedia services and printing.  Interests in the USA included premedia 
in Connecticut and sales services on the West Coast.  
 
By 2009, the software service had evolved to the point where the software tools 
allowed the tracking of documents through the creation, amendment and production 
cycles to ensure complete traceability of changes and the appropriate procurement 
control on all items
5
. This service is rapidly becoming the driving force for all 
business development within the group.  This is because the service capability which 
can be offered relates to control and visibility of requirements as much as it does to 
the production of the products. This allows the group companies to differentiate 
themselves in an increasingly commoditised sector.   
 
                                                 
5
 A multinational software company uses this software to manage the creation and procurement of its 
stationery items.  An employee chooses from pre-agreed templates and enters their own personal data.  
The user approves the document (business cards, letterheads etc) for content before submitting it to the 
system which seeks purchasing approval.  Once finally approved, the files are automatically submitted 
to the production process with printed items shipped to the user within 2 working days. 
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Other developments which evolved over many years were where the company had to 
find ways to produce the language versions required by the client and find solutions to 
the font and reading direction issues which arose. Many languages use fonts which are 
effectively graphics rather than letters.  Some languages read from left to right or from 
top to bottom rather than the more western world style of reading from left to right.  In 
addition, the length of text required to make the same statement varies considerably 
from language to language.  This has significant implications for product and 
packaging design where a company is attempting to ensure that products in all 
language versions convey a similar message.   Over the very recent past, the company 
has begun to engage in a research process which examines the possible integration of 
third party tools to automate the production of artwork in a manner which is not 
possible at present.  This has the potential to radically alter the processing time 
required for product iterations in many languages.  It could also facilitate the 
economic production of material in many more languages than are currently viable.  
The extent of their ambition is indicated in that the company has been invited to work 
in collaboration with a major international software company on this process. 
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4.3 Case analysis 
The Perigord Group operates in an industry which has experienced dramatic 
technological and market changes since 1990. The firm has survived while many of its 
competitors have failed. This analysis begins by summarising the evolution of the 
services of the Perigord Group from 2002 to 2010 before asking why this evolution 
took place. This section concludes with an assessment of the outcomes from this 
initial case analysis. 
 
It is clear from the case data that the print and packaging industry has experienced a 
period of rapid technological change since 1990. As a result of the commercialisation 
of the Apple MAC and associated technologies in the late 1980s, companies offering 
the range of services offered by Litho Studios came under intense competitive 
pressures. As Alan Leamy described it “that was 1991 … I remember looking there 
was 38 competitors in our business and if you look now … there are probably only 
one or two others left”.  This competitive pressure resulted from printing companies 
buying the technology which allowed them deliver internally the services which the 
pre-press companies had traditionally delivered to them. Alan Leamy made several 
comments in this regard “Irish Independent was changing technologies so the business 
was gone”; “the prepress business wasn’t looking the best”; “you could see the switch 
that the whole prepress in the industry was splitting up”. 
 
The company recognised this changing dynamic at an early stage.  It invested heavily 
and early in the developing technology: “we bought our first Apple Mac in 1990” and 
“we invested heavily in equipment all through the years” (Alan Leamy Interview); 
“the company bought the first Scitex system in Ireland” (Michael Fleming Interview). 
The company was also progressive in the ways it used technology to client advantage.  
Michael Fleming had many stories related to this approach: “we had to go out and find 
out how to do it” in relation to localising a language like Hebrew where the 
knowledge did not readily exist to handle the characters and pagination issues which 
arose; “We eventually amassed the knowledge to do it.  But there wasn’t a provider 
who could tell us how to do it or anything” 
 
Perigord has developed many of the skill sets recommended in the Print and 
Packaging Forum Report published in 2005 and referred to in Table 2 above.  This 
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report advocated a skills matrix related to ancillary services.  The matrix suggested 
that firms needed to develop skills in web design, digital rights management, digital 
print libraries and database management within five years.  Perigord has effectively 
developed all of these capabilities.  In fact, of the services proposed in the report, the 
only ones not developed by Perigord relate to telemarketing and e-book services.  
More critically, Perigord has also developed the services advocated for development 
within ten years.  Marketing services, system integration and full logistics services are 
all now supported by the company through its software and physical services.  These 
services have not been developed with Perigord in response to the industry report. 
They have been developed as described above in relation to market and technological 
development and client needs assessment.  The close correlation between the 
company’s development path and the path advocated in the report suggests an 
affirmation of the company’s approach. 
 
It is established that a significant evolution of Perigord took place between 2002 and 
2010.  Why did this happen?  The following sections address this question in relation 
to (i) the focus of Alan Leamy on the firm’s performance, (ii) the approach of the firm 
to investing in the development of its staff’s expertise and (iii) the evolution of higher 
order learning within the firm. 
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4.3.1 Theme 1 - A focus on performance 
Alan Leamy is very focused on the company’s performance, defined as the financial 
and operational performance of the firm. It was clear from the interview data (Table 4) 
that he was very conscious of the decline in that performance for a number of years as 
the transition in the sector and the company described above was worked through.   
 
Table 4: Performance focus 
Profit Focus 58 "we were very successful in the 1980s" (Alan Leamy)
211 "prepress had lost its allure (for investors)" (Alan Leamy)
114 "we were always very profitable in the 80s and you know we were 
very profitable, extremely profitable…" (Alan Leamy)
526 "we will be very profitable for the next 5 months" (Alan Leamy)
Environmental 
Change
346 "walking back into an absolute hell for 5 years, trying to keep the 
business going" (Alan Leamy)
70 "..gradually you could see the switch that the whole prepress in the 
industry was splitting up" (Alan Leamy)
51 "it was about service, service, service and quality, quality, quality and the 
price wasn’t as important"(Anne Cooke)
692 "can we change the way - can we look at how we do it" (Paul Leamy)
280 "now our customers are driving it as much as we are" (Michael 
Fleming)
 
In an interview with him, he made a total of six references to how profitable the 
business had been in the 1980s and early 1990s.  He described the interest which a 
venture capital company had taken in the business as a result and their subsequent 
departure as “the prepress business had lost its allure”. He discussed with great energy 
the period he spent in one company subsidiary, Cosmon, where he had been 
responsible for growing the business from sales of IR£ 400,000 p.a. to IR£ 2.000.000 
over a four year period (approximately € 500,000 to € 2,500,000).   
 
The changes in the market place where technological developments had allowed client 
companies take many of Perigord’s traditional services in-house had meant a dramatic 
decline in profitability.  Alan Leamy described “walking back into absolute hell for 
five years, trying to keep the business going” when he re-joined the company in 2002.   
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Similarly, other interview respondents made references to the impact of environmental 
factors on the business.  The need to emphasise service and to find new ways of 
providing solutions to clients was emphasised by Anne Cooke and Paul Leamy. 
Michael Fleming observed that the client base had begun to drive changes in relation 
to new technologies as they became increasingly aware of the scale of change and the 
potential of new developments. 
 
4.3.2 Theme 2 – Capacity Building: People and Technology 
The scale of technological and market changes in Perigord’s industry segment had a 
dramatic impact on profitability according to Alan Leamy.  Yet the same changes 
provided opportunities for the introduction of new products and services to both 
existing and new clients.  Perigord has a history of investing in staff training and 
development as a means of developing its capabilities and product offering.  This 
investment in staff continued in the face of the unfolding crisis of firm profitability. 
 
The interview data provided examples of how the company was focused on the 
development of its capacity, defined as the firm’s ability to service client needs and to 
develop internal solutions to meet evolving requirements.  This capacity development 
was focused primarily on people and technology. 
 
Developing the capacity of people: 
The company supported the industry apprenticeship programme prior to the 
fundamental change in technology caused by the Apple Mac.  Both Alan and Paul 
Leamy made references to the apprenticeship system of training. The change in 
technology reduced the level of craft involved to the point where Alan feels that “there 
is no colour knowledge left in the industry” (Alan Leamy Interview). 
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Table 5: Capacity building - people 
People
189 "there were opportunities there to go on this course or that 
course" (Michael Fleming)
360 "I think that’s down to investing in people" (Alan Leamy on 
keeping abreast of developments)
235 "because it gives them confidence to do the job better and it 
gives them confidence to speak up and involve more…that’s less 
tangible" (Anne Cooke on the benefits of even basic skills courses)
450 "if we don't have a multi-talented workforce we're not going to 
be able to be efficient" (Michael Fleming)
358 "…in some ways it was forced upon us" on hiring project 
managers from Microsoft (Michael Fleming)
344 "we wouldn’t be doing the work if we didn’t have very good 
project managers who were able to sort all that stuff" (Michael 
Fleming)
382 "I don’t know whether it was a belief and I said no, lets give him 
a go. He did, he clicked." (Alan Leamy on recruiting an experienced 
Apple computer salesman)  
 
It is clear from the core data that the company invested heavily in its people.  Alan 
Leamy expressed the view that the use of emerging technology and the right people 
was central to success.  Rather than being a formalised company policy, he stated that 
“it was something that I believed in”.  This perception of a lack of formality is 
supported by Paul Leamy who did not believe that this approach to training was a 
company ethos as much as something which evolved in response to needs. Paul felt 
that it was only the advent of access to funding from Enterprise Ireland that led to the 
formalisation of training plans within the company. It is also clear that both Paul and 
Alan Leamy perceived training as one means of addressing the development needs of 
the business. Paul discussed the training interventions required to assist employees 
make the transition from older technology to computer based processes (Paul Leamy 
Interview).  Michael Fleming described his personal experience as a new recruit to the 
company in the mid 1990’s.  He entered the organisation at an operator level.  He had 
a reasonable knowledge of Personal Computers (as opposed to Macs) and became 
recognised as someone who could resolve problems.  Michael referred to the many 
training courses he had attended in relation to new pieces of equipment or 
technological advances.  These included courses on new imaging devices, new 
software and workflow systems (Michael Fleming Interview). As he took on more 
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managerial responsibility, Michael attended an Irish Management Institute course on 
supervisory management. 
 
The commitment to training included senior management training and development as 
well.  Anne Cooke referred to the Transform Programme which she and Alan Leamy 
attended (Anne Cooke Interview).  This programme involved an in depth review and 
strategic assessment of the business over a ten month period.  The programme was 
sponsored by Enterprise Ireland and run by the Irish Management Institute in Dublin. 
A two day project management programme was run several times to ensure that all 
key customer facing staff, including senior managers, could attend. However, it 
should be noted that this decision to invest in senior management evolved in 2005-
2006 as Alan Leamy recognised a gap in his own training.  He made several 
references in his interview in 2008 to his lack of formal management training and to 
the extent to which he relied on his “gut instinct” to make decisions. 
 
The investment of Perigord in its staff can be quantified.  The firm has invested 
heavily in staff development, particularly in the period 2005-2008, spending at least 
400% more than the average of comparable firms in Ireland. The level of investment 
by Perigord Group in the period 2005 to 2008 is shown in Table 6. This data is a 
summary of the expenditure of the company on training and includes an assessment of 
employee time. The average of 3.2% of labour costs can be compared to the average 
spend on training for all Irish enterprises, which was .67 of 1% of labour costs in 
2006, and to manufacturing firms which was only .62 of 1% in 2006 (CSO 2006). 
This training has included substantial cross-training and multi-skilling initiatives for 
operators as well as more strategic programmes for senior managers, including the 
Transform programme with Enterprise Ireland. This programme encourages senior 
executives to focus on the strategic development of the company during a ten month 
programme. The company has also invested in less overtly technical skills for sales 
people, sales managers and project managers. Two staff were funded to participate in 
an accredited diploma programme in packaging technology.  
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Table 6: Perigord Group Investment in Training 2005-2008. 
Investment in training as 2005 2006 2007 2008 4 year average 
Percentage of Sales 1.6 2.2 1.7 1.8 1.8 
Percentage of Added Value 2.3 2.9 2.1 2.2 2.4 
Percentage of Labour Cost 3.0 3.5 3.2 3.1 3.2 
Source: Perigord training records and accounts 
 
The firm has been successful in securing considerable funding from Enterprise Ireland 
in relation to staff development and training and is also an active participant in the 
Design, Print and Packaging Skillnet which has provided funding for additional 
programmes.  
 
Developing technological capacity 
The firm has made considerable investments in technology.  Alan Leamy and Michael 
Fleming made frequent references in their interviews to the scale of investment in 
developing technologies over many years.  The traced the evolution of the digitisation 
of origination workflows and the investments which these required.  Alan Leamy 
stated that “we invested heavily in equipment all through the years and technology" 
with Michael Fleming offering the view that Perigord “at that stage we were leading it 
(technology)" as a result of the investments being made. 
 
Table 7: Capacity building - technological 
Technology
485 "if we don’t do it quickly the opportunity is going to be gone" 
(Michael Fleming on developing the GLAMS solution)
75 "we invested heavily in equipment all through the years and 
technology" (Alan Leamy)
527 "which will generate cash which will allow us to do other things" 
(Alan Leamy on press investment)
109 "at that stage we were leading it (technology)" (Michael 
Fleming)
200 "we can react, we can change, we can move" (Paul Leamy)
 
Alan Leamy also made reference to the link between investments in technology and 
firm performance.  In referring to a substantial printing press investment he stated that 
it would “generate cash which will allow us to do other things" in relation to the 
development of the software solutions which he perceived to be the firm’s future. 
Similarly, Michael Fleming and Paul Leamy alluded to the firm’s continuous 
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investment in technology development in an effort to react to developments and to 
grasp the opportunities which these developments presented.  The training 
programmes referred to above also yielded developments in the technological capacity 
of Perigord as many of the programmes were technical in nature or designed to 
increase the technical competence of the individual. 
 
4.3.3 Theme 3 – The evolution of higher order learning  
It is clear from the case data that Perigord invested heavily in the development of its 
employees and managers.  However, much of this investment was related to specific 
skills which were required in relation to changing technology and the changing 
environment.  However, the data also revealed a development in the learning of senior 
managers as they became more aware of the development of the firm.  Table 8 
includes data from the interviews in relation to developments in learning. 
 
Table 8: The Evolution of Learning in Perigord 
Personal Learning
487 "but now I can actually stand back and go ok there is no 
difference" (Alan Leamy on investing in the development of the 
software vs. buying a press.)
184 "I learned from suppliers, I was in the YMPs…trade shows, 
exhibitions etc" (Anne Cooke)
558 "and that was probably one of the best processes for me to go 
through personally" (Alan Leamy on developing the formal business 
plan for Precise Data)
263 "it’s the discussion that’s generated between your peers in the 
room" (Anne Cooke on learning informally as well as formally)
222 "you have to find out what the need is…its all about  
networking" (Anne Cooke)
Organisational 
Learning
179 "it may be that there isn't as much a requirement to go down 
that kind of road" (Paul Leamy reflecting on the need for formal 
training in software development)
24 "a transition from the skill sets or people who worked on a bench 
…to people who are nearly only computer operators" (Michael 
Fleming)
146 "we eventually amassed the knowledge to do it" on how to 
handle Hebrew files. (Michael Fleming)
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Alan Leamy made specific references to the changes in how he now viewed various 
capital investment projects and planning processes in which he had been involved. He 
was very comfortable with the decision to invest in a printing press as this was 
familiar territory for him.  The decision to invest in software development was less 
certain for him as the basis for making a decision were less grounded in his 
experience.  He suggested that he can now see that “there is no difference” in the 
nature of these decisions.  Alan Leamy also reflected on the planning process which 
had recently been completed for the investment in the software solution and stated that 
this was “probably one of the best processes for me to go through personally” as it had 
required him to think through the issues in a structured manner. 
 
There is evidence that other interview respondents have also reflected on the changing 
nature of their own learning and that of the organisation.  Anne Cooke made a number 
of references to how her ability to learn had evolved through participation in a number 
of meetings and training programmes which included industry peers. Michael Fleming 
commented on how the skill set of the workforce had transitioned over time to people 
how now “are mostly computer operators”.  Michael also discussed the development 
in organisational learning which had resulted in sufficient learning to be amassed in 
relation to how to manage languages which challenging font issues such as Hebrew.  
This reflection did not necessarily always conclude that investment in formal training 
was required or useful.  Paul Leamy considered that investments in formal software 
development training would not necessarily be productive for the company.  This 
showed a developing and realistic perspective on training solutions not being the 
appropriate solution to all business issues. 
 
It is evident that Alan Leamy had a belief in the value of training and offered several 
examples of his reasons for this belief. It was evident that the type of training 
programmes became more related to specific needs identification over time. However, 
the firm did not formally consider or assess the return on investment from its training 
programmes. There was not one example of an assessment of the return from those 
investments in the data reviewed or in the interviews transcripts.  The lack of formal 
analysis suggests that the positivist inspired debate on the causal link between training 
investment and improvements in performance is a moot point in practice as this firm 
made no effort to assess such a link. However, recognising the experience of the 
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managers involved and their view of the benefits of these investments suggests that a 
link to performance is present. 
 
It can be argued that there was a transition from lower to higher order learning within 
some aspects of the firm’s training programmes.  Initial activity focused primarily on 
skills developments (apprenticeship, new equipment and new processes).  More recent 
investment has included the Transform programme, the Diploma in Packaging 
Technology and project management training.  These programmes are designed and 
delivered in a manner to encourage participants to reflect on current practice and to 
consider alternatives.  This transition has not been to the exclusion of lower order 
skills which are still required and of value to the firm.  
 
It is clear that the firm faced a crisis in relation to the technological and market 
changes it faced.  The literature (Fiol and Leyles 1985) suggests that such a crisis is 
often required before firms will be capable of engaging in higher order learning. It is 
not established here if these crises led to this development.  The crises which impacted 
on the firm developed slowly over a number of years.  This allowed the firm to react 
in an incremental manner which suggests that the crisis type described by Fiol and 
Leyles (1985) did not arise.  
 
Alan Leamy, the CEO, is performance focused.  He recognised the changes underway 
in the traditional marketplace of the firm and recognised the need for the business to 
address these changes.   He also recognised his own lack of formal management 
training and the extent to which he relied on instinct over analysis. It can be argued 
that the transition to higher order learning emanated from this recognition and Alan 
Leamy’s desire to bring additional rigour to managerial decision making. 
 
 
4.3.4 Outcomes of the initial analysis 
The Perigord Group operates in an industrial sector which has undergone radical 
technological and market transformation. The number of firms operating in this 
section of the print and packaging industry in Ireland has declined significantly over a 
fifteen year period.  The company has transformed itself in terms of its client offerings 
and has leveraged software development to capture and retain new business.   
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This case study began by exploring the reasons for and the outcomes of Perigord’s 
level of investment in the training and development of its staff. Perigord is an example 
of a firm that has invested in training and development over a sustained period of time 
and also at a level which is substantially above that of its peers.  While the case data 
does not suggest that this training “caused” the success of the firm, it is evident that 
given the context that Perigord operated in, its very survival is a significant outcome.  
The case data offers a partial explanation for why this high level of investment 
occurred and of how the investment might be related to the survival and success of 
Perigord.  The case suggests the possibility that a slow decline in performance may 
have been a trigger to continued and even increased investment in training.  It further 
suggests that the approach to training was both sustained and involved staff at all 
levels and may have been associated with a shift from lower order to higher order 
learning. 
 
The analysis of the case data suggests that three themes begin to explain the evolution 
of the Perigord Group.  Firstly, the focus of the CEO, Alan Leamy, on the firm’s 
performance is evident in the data. He was aware of and concerned about the 
declining performance of the firm.  This led to a realisation that the firm needed to 
develop new services if it were to survive. Secondly, the firm invested heavily in the 
capacity of its people and its technology.  The data revealed the level of investment 
made in training programmes which was at a rate substantially in excess of 
comparable industry averages. The data also revealed a continuous investment in 
technological capacity both through training initiatives, capital investment and in the 
development of technology based solutions for clients.  Finally, the data revealed a 
transition in the nature of learning in the firm where it is possible to identify elements 
of higher order learning in how the senior manager’s perceptions and capabilities have 
changed.  
 
However, the analysis of the data herein suggests that other factors, not explained by 
the themes of focus on performance, capacity building and learning are also involved.  
Perigord developed and acquired resources to allow it address client needs which it 
had identified or which it projected would be required.  The company developed a 
capability in identifying and acquiring these resources. Alan Leamy seemed to have 
an ability to utilise his network of friends and associates to deliver advantage to his 
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business.  An alternative view of the case data is that it describes a development in 
company capability over time which resulted in the transformation of the business.  
This led to a review of the literature related to firm capability. Additionally, the 
literature was re-visited in the context of Alan Leamy’s use of his personal network of 
contacts and the role personal networks might play in explaining how Perigord 
identifies and assimilates new information. 
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5. Literature Review: Dynamic Capabilities  
The case data suggests that the survival and success of Perigord was associated with 
the development of the new skills that were required in a changing market place. A 
focus on training in its narrow sense does not provide an explanation for either (i) the 
investment in training or (ii) the possible outcomes of this training.  However, the data 
highlights how Perigord could be characterised as a firm that evolved new skills over 
time.  This evolution in skills could be described as an evolution in firm capability. 
 
Factors such as the development in Perigord’s software solution, the addition of a 
wide range of new services and the manner in which Alan Leamy utilises his network 
of contacts led me back to the literature in search of possible ways of explaining the 
changes in the capabilities of the firm between 2002 and 2010.  This chapter reviews 
the literature on dynamic capability and its foundational concepts.  It then examines 
the factors which might explain the emergence of dynamic capabilities in SMEs. 
 
5.1 Definitions 
Dynamic capability is defined here as the ability of a firm to develop the capacity to 
“purposefully create, extend or modify its resource base” (Helfat et al. 2007 p.4).  This 
perspective places the firm’s ability to adapt purposefully to its environment at the 
centre of strategy. The needs for such purposefulness are several in that: 
 environments can change rapidly, thereby negating the value of a previously 
valuable resource (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000).  To be successful, firms must 
adjust their strategy in the context of the market environment in which they 
operate. Such adjustments should begin with an assessment of the 
environment and how the firm’s resources continue to fit well with what is 
required. 
 a firm’s history and experiences can limit the alternatives which management 
can see or are prepared to engage with (Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997, Weick 
2001, Schlemmer and Webb 2008). Managers within a firm have a range of 
experiences over time.  Their perception of any issue or problem is influenced 
by their experiences to date.  Similarly, the choices which they consider to be 
available to them may be restricted by their previous experiences.  This is 
explored in detail below.  
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 some resources and processes become self-limiting due their own success 
(Leonard-Barton 1992).  As firms develop, they may have a tendency to rely 
on processes which were very suitable at one point but which have become 
unfit for purpose as a result of some change.  Reluctance to change what may 
be considered a winning approach can result in significant problems as 
markets evolve. 
 
The challenge for a firm is to develop routines and processes (Nelson and Winter 
1982) which allow it to continuously assess its environment and to assess the fit 
between existing resource capability and that environment.  The firm must also 
develop a capacity to creatively search (Pandza and Thorpe 2009) the environment to 
identify new possibilities. 
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5.2  The evolution of the dynamic capabilities concept 
The dynamic capability concept is founded theoretically in the Resource Based View 
and Evolutionary Theory with its emphasis on routines and processes (Helfat and 
Peteraf 2009).  These two foundations are discussed in the next sections before 
elaborating on capabilities and dynamic capability as an emerging theory. 
 
5.2.1 The Resource Based View 
Penrose (1959) in a significant departure from the neoclassical economics of the time 
proposed that the configuration of the resources possessed by a firm was the key 
source of competitive advantage in relation to firm growth:  “if we want to explain 
why different firms see the same environment differently, why some grow and some 
do not….then we must take the resources approach” (Penrose 1959 p.217).  Economic 
theory at that time held that firms were largely homogenous entities operating in 
markets in search of equilibrium.  Economic theory did not generally consider the 
differences which existed between firms nor did it attempt to include the actions of 
individual managers or entrepreneurs in its theories.  Helfat and Peteraf (2003 p. 19) 
argue that “it is an understatement to say that economic theory underplays the role of 
the manager; in fact, the strategic manager simply does not exist in any recognizable 
form”.  
 
Penrose proposed that it was the manner in which firms utilised their resources and the 
services which that use could deliver which was paramount, rather than the simple 
existence or otherwise of the resources themselves. She defined resources to include 
both the physical resources available to a firm and the human resources employed and 
available to the firm.  Penrose also found that there was an interrelation between the 
physical and human resources which influenced the productive services which might 
be possible.  Clearly, the physical resources present shape the services which 
management might be capable of delivering.  However, Penrose (1959 p.5) also held 
that “…the experience of management will affect the productive services that all its 
other resources are capable of rendering”. This recognition of the critical role of 
management pervades Penrose’s work and is central to the theory developed.  Penrose 
also found that the image which the firm’s managers held of their own firm and the 
environment in which the firm operated was a critical issue in relation to the decisions 
which those managers would take.  
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Wernerfelt (1984) seemed to synthesise Penrose (1959) and Porter’s (1980) 
contributions when he argues for examining firms from a resource perspective rather 
than a product perspective. Building on this concept Barney (1991) proposed four 
indicators in relation to resources (value, rareness, imitability and substitutability) 
which are all required if a resource is to deliver a sustained competitive advantage to a 
firm. Sustained competitive advantage is defined as when a firm “is implementing a 
value creating strategy not simultaneously being implemented by any current or 
potential competitors and when these other firms are unable to duplicate the benefits 
of this strategy” (Barney 1991 p.102). Barney’s definition is onerous in that a 
competitive advantage might only be deemed sustained when attempts to duplicate it 
by competitors have ceased.  It is not related to time in an absolute sense, but rather to 
the attempts of competitors to duplicate the advantage.  In his thesis Barney (1991 
p.106) defined valuable resources as enabling a firm “to conceive or implement 
strategies that improve its efficiencies and effectiveness”.  Resources are considered to 
be rare in the sense that they are not widely available.  Barney struggles to define the 
level of rarity which is necessary for sustainable competitive advantage.  It is possible 
that rarity becomes less significant if one accepts Penrose’s proposition that it is the 
way in which the resources are used which is paramount as each firm has the 
propensity to use a similar resource differently.  Barney’s final two requirements in 
relation to resources of imperfectly imitability and substitutability are related.  If the 
resource which is valuable and rare can be imitated by competing firms then sustained 
competitive advantage is not possible.  Similarly, if the resources or the results of the 
application of the resources can be achieved through the application of different but 
strategically equivalent resources, then the competitive advantage cannot be sustained. 
 
Peteraf (1993) proposes a four factor resource based view model for sustained 
competitive advantage which develops Barney’s (1991) four criteria. Peteraf concurs 
that resources must be heterogeneous if they are to be of value in sustaining 
competitive advantage. The second factor relates to “ex-post limits to competition” 
(Peteraf 1993 p.182).  This factor includes two of Barney’s requirements relating to 
imitability and substitutability.  Clearly, if a competing firm can substitute an 
alternative resource for the same result, any competitive advantage will be short lived.  
However, imitability is more difficult as the basis of the advantage may not be clear or 
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well understood (even by the firm possessing it). The third factor relates to the 
mobility of the resource.  Where the resource is imperfectly mobile, then there is a 
greater opportunity for sustaining the competitive advantage. A particular case of 
immobility relates to resources which have a greater value when used together. The 
fourth and final factor is that of “ex-ante limits to competition” (Peteraf 1993 p.185).  
This proposes that there must have been limited competition for the position now 
occupied by the firm.  If competition had not been limited, then no sustained 
competitive advantage could have ensued as any potential gain would have been 
competed away. Like Barney, Peteraf finds that all four factors are required for 
sustained competitive advantage and that the four factors may in fact be related. 
 
Barney (1991) posits that the context of the firm both in terms of its market 
positioning and its historical context are critical factors.  Resources which are valuable 
in one context may have no value in another. The same resource in two different firms 
could have significantly different potential as a result of the historical decisions 
previously taken in each firm and the understanding which might then exist in relation 
to the resources possible uses and related outcomes. Like Penrose, Barney appreciates 
the role of managers “for it is managers that are able to understand and describe the 
economic performance potential of a firm’s endowments.  Without such managerial 
analyses, sustained competitive advantage is not likely” (Barney 1991 p.117). 
 
5.2.2 Organisational Routines  
For a firm or any organisation to function a constant stream of decisions must be 
taken. Many of the simpler decisions are made without necessarily involving 
conscious thought.  Employees often answer phones with a standard greeting without 
consciously thinking what they will say; in printing companies orders are processed 
into management information systems without the operator deciding on the best way 
of achieving the task; even football players perform basic functions like kicking a ball 
without necessarily making conscious decisions on the motor actions involved.  These 
decisions are all based on practiced skills which the individual had to learn at some 
point.   
 
In general discussion we all understand the exercise of these skills as routines which 
have been learned and which may have been improved with practice. More complex 
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decisions can also be the subject of routine behaviour.  Many organisations will have 
an emergency procedure which is to be followed in the event of a fire.  Such a 
procedure will require the evacuation of a building and some basis for ensuring that all 
employees are accounted for.  Simultaneously, such a procedure might also involve 
notifying the emergency services and might also involve a trained team of employees 
tackling the fire in the first instance.  Such procedures are often practiced so that if the 
event actually occurs, the responses and decisions made by individuals will be 
coherent and safe.  This is the essence of a routine. 
 
The literature describes routines in two different ways: as behavioural or cognitive 
regularities.  Behavioural regularities propose routines as “recurrent interaction 
patterns” (Becker 2004 p.645).  These patterns occur in the interaction between a 
number of actors rather than the actions of one person.  To clarify this point, (Dosi, 
Nelson and Winter 2000 p.5) propose “reserving the term skill to the individual level 
and routines to the organisational level”. Viewing routines as cognitive regularities 
would define routines as rules which suggest how to react to or deal with specific 
situations.  Examples could include standard operating procedures, rules of thumb and 
programs.  
 
Following Winter (2003 p.991) routines are defined as “behaviour that is learned, 
highly patterned, repetitious, or quasi- repetitious, founded in part in tacit knowledge 
and the specificity of objectives”. Nelson and Winter(1982 p.97) stated that well 
defined routines “structure a large part of organisational functioning at any particular 
time”.  The essence of a routine is as follows.  The objective of the behaviour is 
known.  They are targeted at specific outcomes in specific contexts. Removing 
routines from their context may render them largely meaningless (Becker 2004).  The 
behaviour is learned, with the definition allowing for a role for tacit knowledge, 
knowledge which is often not articulated but developed as a result of experience. 
Finally, the definition requires patterned behaviour which is repetitious or at least 
repetitious as necessary in response to similar situations. 
 
Routines develop over time and are based on the history of the organisation (Teece, 
Pisano and Shuen 1997, Nelson and Winter 1982) and also the experience of the 
individuals involved (Levinthal and March 1993, Helfat and Peteraf 2003).  As 
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organisations develop the routines within them are regularly subject to incremental 
adjustment.  While a firm may have a specified routine for a specific task, it is open to 
the individual to adjust that routine based on experience. There is clearly a role for 
agency in the implementation of a routine which may lead to incremental adjustments.  
Such incremental stages can be on an individual level or when a group agrees to 
change a routine.  Becker (2004 p.660) discusses the example of a team which meets 
regularly and agrees to switch from paper based minutes of the meetings to electronic 
copies of the minutes. This is an incremental and seemingly minor change to the 
routine.  However, Becker suggests that such a change could be relatively significant 
as electronic documents can be searched automatically making it easier to extract or 
detect certain facts.  
 
This incremental change to context specific routines is also significant in terms of the 
resource based view of the firm.  A central premise of the resource based view is that 
the resources available to firms are heterogeneous in nature (Penrose 1959, Barney 
1991, Wernerfelt 1984).  The routines of a firm are a resource and play a critical role 
in the services which the configuration of resources in any firm can produce.  The 
incremental and context specific adjustment of a firm’s routines is a key source of 
resource heterogeneity (Helfat and Peteraf 2003).  Hilliard (2004), in her research into 
the environmental performance of pharmaceutical companies in Ireland, found that 
firms with strong routines in this area did not necessarily start environmental 
management development earlier than the weaker firms.  Rather the explanation of the 
significant differences in capability at the time of the research lay “in the qualitatively 
different experiences or evolutionary paths of these firms” (Hilliard 2004 p.12). 
 
Routines allow an organisation to store knowledge.  Nelson and Winter(1982 p.99) 
propose that “the routinisation of activity in an organisation constitutes the most 
important form of storage of the organisation’s specific operational knowledge.  
Basically, we claim that organisations remember by doing…” (original authors 
italics). It is in the practice of the routine that the knowledge is maintained.  It is the 
tacit knowledge stored by routines that differentiate them from other forms of 
knowledge in the organisation.  Hilliard and Jacobson (2011 p. 2) describe the essence 
of evolutionary theory as “the firm is a repository of knowledge, that this knowledge 
resides in the organisational capabilities of the firm and that these organisational 
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capabilities then determine the firm’s performance”.  Nelson and Winter (1982) 
discuss how individuals in organisations respond to the messages they receive, based 
on their knowledge of the organisation and its requirements rather than being based on 
the content of the specific message received. Instructions frequently require 
interpretation in the specific context of the firm.  “ For example, they often omit 
reference to the typical locations of objects or individuals names in the directives; 
only someone who has been around the place long enough can easily supply the 
interpretation” (Nelson and Winter 1982 p.102). 
 
Routines also provide stability and control to organisations.  The capability to 
consistently and accurately interpret instructions in the example above is an important 
factor in ensuring firm performance. “Routines work by enhancing the interactions 
among participants…” (Becker 2004 p. 655). Routines define expected and effectively 
accepted actions and behaviours in an organisation. Nelson and Winter (1982) refer to 
the “truce” which exists within an organisation where the expected and actual 
behaviours are sufficiently aligned that conflict does not arise. This does not mean that 
nominal standards and expectations are being met, but that an accepted standard is 
being maintained that results in a level of coordination which is acceptable overall. 
Barnard’s (1938 p.137) description of “a zone of indifference” which “resides in each 
individual within which orders are acceptable without conscious questions of their 
authority” echoes the truce described by Nelson and Winter.  Kogut and Zander (1992 
p. 396) concur stating that it is the stability in the relationships between capabilities 
and social knowledge of how the firm operates that “generates the characteristics of 
inertia in a firm’s capabilities”.  Routines, therefore, allow the organisation to function 
in a controlled and stable manner, all other things being equal.  
 
All other things do not remain equal indefinitely.  The environment in which any firm 
exists changes over time and may change frequently. As routines are context specific 
and objective specific, a changing environment may mean that once appropriate 
routines become obsolete.  A reliance on an “established set of cognitive routines is an 
attempt to reduce complexity rather than to absorb and internalise it, and it amounts to 
the application of routinised past-learning to conditions whose novelty may render 
such learning redundant” (Child 1997 p.50)  Experience can be an inhibitor to change 
as individuals can fail to see the changed circumstances in which they now operate 
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(Levinthal and March 1993, Leonard-Barton 1992).  Negative feedback mechanisms 
within the routine can be ignored leading to inertia (Becker 2004).  Routines are 
capable of being changed in response to experience and feedback.  This change can be 
incremental or more fundamental depending on the significance of the changes 
experienced. 
 
5.2.3 Capabilities 
All organisations have capabilities.  Citing the example of the airline industry (Dosi, 
Nelson and Winter 2000) describe the ability of an airline to process passengers in a 
generally uneventful manner from check-in, to boarding, through the flight and safely 
to the destination.  A more in depth view of the delivery of this service reveals a series 
of organisational routines which have worked in a harmony of sorts to deliver a 
maintained aircraft to a specific gate on time, with an appropriately trained crew to 
operate it, with fuel for the journey and food for the passengers etc.  In this sense it is 
easy to understand routines as being building blocks of capabilities (Dosi, Faillo and 
Marengo 2008) although not necessarily the only building blocks required.  Dosi et al 
(2000 p.4) attempt to distinguish between routines and capabilities by attributing no 
“presumption regarding evident purpose” to routines.  This is completely at variance 
to the definition subsequently used by Winter (2003) and discussed above which 
firmly places routines in context with a “specificity of objectives” (Winter 2003 
p.991).  The attempted distinction in Dosi et al (2000) is unnecessary if one considers 
routines as elements of the construction of capabilities.   
 
Helfat and Peteraf (2003 p.999) define organisational capabilities as the ability of an 
organisation to “perform a set of coordinated tasks, utilising organisational resources, 
for the purpose of achieving a particular end result”. This focus on a defined result is 
generally accepted in the literature (Winter 2003, Dosi, Faillo and Marengo 2008). 
Helfat and Peteraf (2003) also place their definition clearly in the context of 
organisational resources as defined above. Dosi et al (2008 p.1179) describe 
capabilities as not being “things” but “ways of doing” and use the analogy of “fuzzy 
algorithms” to express a lack of certainty about how they may operate.  There is a 
sense of collective knowledge at play. In a much earlier work, Richardson (1972 
p.888) referred to capabilities as “appropriate skills, knowledge and competence” at 
the level of the organisation.  
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Winter (2003) proposes that there are different levels of capability.  He defines “zero 
level” capabilities as the capabilities which allow a firm to function, delivering a 
consistent rate and quality of production in a market place where the volume and 
nature of demand is static.  Where an organisation changes the product or service 
being offered, or changes the process by which it is created or changes or adds to the 
locations where the product or service is offered, then a higher form of organisational 
capability has been invoked.  This distinction is useful as it highlights that all 
capabilities are not equal, and some capabilities may be completely inadequate in the 
face of an environment which is changing. There is also a clear parallel with the 
learning literature and the lower and higher order learning which can arise (Fiol and 
Lyles 1985, Argyris 1976, Senge 1990). 
 
A distinction can be drawn between technological and organisational capabilities 
(Dosi, Faillo and Marengo 2008). Technological capabilities refer to capabilities 
which deal with the physical elements of an organisation’s resources.  They suggest 
routines for how to handle such issues and might relate generally, for example, to 
capabilities in relation to the operation of printing machinery, the control of utilities 
supply to a factory etc.  Organisational capabilities relate more to the coordination and 
social interactions within the organisation and relate more to human relations than the 
physical resources.  There is an overlap between these capabilities as the particular 
manner in which a physical process may operate might be affected by the human 
relations context.  Equally, the extent of the physical resources available and their 
condition might influence the interaction taking place.  The real value in the 
distinction is that it is conceivable that very similar technological capabilities could be 
present in different firms and in quite different contexts, whereas the organisational 
capabilities are more likely to be heterogeneous among firms as the context and 
history of each firm will be different. 
 
Bender (2008 p. 28-9) introduces an additional typology in describing 
transformational capabilities as “the enduring ability of an organisation to transform 
available general knowledge into plant, firm or task specific knowledge and 
competence" and configurational capabilities as "enduring ability to synthesise 
novelty by creating new configurations of knowledge, artefacts and actors".  
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Transformational capabilities have a close relationship to the concept of absorptive 
capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990) which deals with an organisations ability to 
assimilate knowledge into to its routines, processes and capabilities.  This typology is 
supported by Levinthal and March (1993) who describe the need to have capabilities 
which both explore (pursue new knowledge) and exploit (using and developing things 
which are already known). While it is difficult to be prescriptive in relation to a 
balance between the transformational and configurational efforts, a successful firm 
will require a balance of both (Levinthal and March 1993, Bender 2008). 
 
Helfat and Peteraf (2003) also found that capabilities are subject to lifecycles in a 
broadly similar way to product or market lifecycles in the marketing literature. This 
capability lifecycle concept is a useful tool to bring the concepts of resources, path 
dependency, routines and capabilities together.  The founding stage of the lifecycle 
requires an organised team with a specific objective which entails the creation of a 
new capability.  The experiences and abilities which the members bring to the team 
coupled with any other existing resources bring a history and path dependence to the 
team at its birth. The development stage is where the team is learning and developing 
its capability in the light of experience.  As the capability development stabilises it 
enters the maturity stage of the lifecycle where the capability can become more 
embedded in the organisation through use. Like routines, the exercise of the capability 
has an impact on how well it is maintained. Once a capability is in maturity, it may be 
threatened with obsolescence or indeed opportunities for growth or change in some 
way (Helfat and Peteraf 2003). The model proposes that such impacts can lead to one 
of six possible outcomes: retirement (where the capability is withdrawn by the firm), 
retrenchment (a decline in the level of the capability),  renewal (where the firm 
searches for and develops new alternatives), replication (where the capability is 
reproduced in another geographic market), redeployment (where the capability is used 
in a different but related product market) and finally, recombination (where the 
capability is combined with another capability or set of capabilities) (Helfat and 
Peteraf 2003 p. 1005-6). 
 
5.2.4 Dynamic capabilities 
Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997) developed an additional perspective on this resource 
based view in considering how firms sustain competitive advantage in the face of 
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environmental change, and particularly in environments of considerable change.  
Teece et al (1997 p. 515) stated that a firm must be dynamic, described as “the 
capacity to renew competences so as to achieve congruence with the changing 
business environment” and that it must have capabilities, described as “the role of 
strategic management in appropriately adapting, integrating and reconfiguring internal 
and external organisational skills, resources, and functional competences to match the 
requirements of a changing environment” if it is to sustain competitive advantage.   
 
Eisenhardt and Martin (2000 p.1107) found that “dynamic capabilities thus are the 
organisational and strategic routines by which firms achieve new resource 
configuration as markets emerge, collide, split, evolve and die”.  These authors argue 
that as such routines are idiosyncratic to firms but could result in similar outcomes, 
they cannot therefore be the source of sustained competitive advantage.  Eisenhardt 
and Martin found that the processes and routines which would underpin the capability 
were more in the nature of best practice than a source of sustained competitive 
advantage. 
 
The definition of dynamic capability as the ability of a firm to develop the capacity to 
“purposefully create, extend or modify its resource base” (Helfat et al. 2007 p.4) 
synthesises the development from Penrose (1959) to Eisenhardt and Martin (2000).  
Dynamic capabilities relate to the capacity of a firm for purposeful changes.  Such a 
capability, grounded in appropriate processes and routines, should have a positive 
impact on a firm’s absolute performance and on its relative performance against 
competitor firms without such capability. 
 
Newey and Zahra (2009) held that there was a difference between operating 
capabilities and dynamic capabilities but that a relationship between them exists.  
Clearly, dynamic capabilities are likely to change the operating capabilities in 
organisations as they develop.  However, Newey and Zahra (2009 p. S97) held that 
“operating capabilities also affect dynamic capabilities by influencing the knowledge 
that is available for the latter to undertake future reconfigurations of the former”.  
Zahra, Sapienza and Davissson (2006) concur with both the distinction between  
operational (termed substantive) capabilities and dynamic capabilities and the view 
that a co-relationship exists between them.  Zahra et al held that this relationship is 
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moderated by organisational knowledge.  These authors defined dynamic capabilities 
as “the abilities to reconfigure a firm’s resources and routines in the manner 
envisioned and deemed appropriate by its principal decision maker(s)” (Zahra, 
Sapienza and Davidsson 2006 p. 918).  This definition is very similar to the Helfat et 
al (2007) definition but also places the key decision maker(s) at the centre of the 
discussion. This theme will be re-visited below in relation tothe leader’s role having 
considered some of the criticisms of dynamic capability in the literature. 
 
Ambrosini, Bowman and Collier (2009) propose three levels of dynamic capabilities 
which are related to firm managers’ perceptions of the level of environmental change 
or dynamism.  Incremental dynamic capabilities relate to the incremental changes 
associated with continuous improvement processes in firms where the environment is 
effectively stable.  Renewing dynamic capabilities relate to a more radical level of 
change in a substantially more dynamic environment.  Ambrosini et al (2009 p. S14) 
posit that this level of dynamic capability is required as “resource based advantages in 
dynamic environments may well be rapidly eroded”  and is the level generally referred 
to in the literature by Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997), Eisenhardt and Marin (2000) 
and Helfat et al (2007).  Regenerative dynamic capabilities are considered necessary 
in environments which are perceived as turbulent by the firm’s managers and are the 
dynamic capability by which the existing dynamic capabilities are changed. If the 
existing dynamic capabilities are not appropriate to the new environment, then 
Ambrosini et al argue that the firm in question may fail.  The distinctions in the forms 
of dynamic capability proposed are useful in that they suggest that not all dynamic 
capabilities are equal.  Echoing Winters (2003) consideration of zero and first order 
capabilities, Ambrosini et al’s (2009) contribution allows a consideration of dynamic 
capabilities which are appropriate in more or less dynamic environments. 
 
It should be noted that the empirical literature on dynamic capabilities has tended to 
examine large firms and has rarely examined the SME environment.  Teece (2007 p. 
1320) described dynamic capabilities as being “especially relevant to multinational 
enterprise performance in business environments that display certain characteristics”.  
Wang and Ahmed (2007) in their review of dynamic capability literature reviewed 
thirty three empirical studies conducted between 1995 and 2005.  Only one of the 
studies included related to an SME or to a group of SMEs.  In general, the focus of the 
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studies were very large organisation such as airlines, telecommunications companies 
and automotive companies. Similarly, Barreto (2010) in his review of dynamic 
capabilities research considered forty papers from the period 1997 to 2008.  Of the 
nineteen considered to be empirical in nature, only three studies related to small or 
medium sized firms.  These two reviews of the dynamic capabilities literature 
demonstrate the lack of empirical research in a small firm context. 
 
5.2.5 Criticisms of dynamic capability  
The primary criticism of the resource based view and dynamic capability is that of 
tautology (Priem and Butler 2001, Arend and Bromiley 2009).  The argument 
presented suggests that defining either the resources or capability under review in the 
context of superior performance is somewhat self-fulfilling and certainly likely to bias 
any results which subsequently demonstrate superior competitive performance arising 
from the use of the resource or capability.  The argument as presented is valid, 
however the presentation is not.  Barney (2001 p.42) refutes the presentation of Priem 
and Butler (2001) by demonstrating that it is possible to construct parameters for 
elements of the theory in a way which “makes it possible to generate testable 
empirical assertions”.  Similarly, with dynamic capability, the tautology argument 
fails as the existence of a capability is no guarantee of its use and as a result no 
guarantee of any specific competitive impact (Helfat and Peteraf 2009). 
 
The existence and use of dynamic capabilities are no guarantee of success (Helfat et 
al. 2007, Zahra, Sapienza and Davidsson 2006, Ambrosini, Bowman and Collier 
2009).  Dynamic capabilities are founded in the purposeful actions of the firm’s 
managers.  Consequently, the appropriateness of the dynamic capability is likely to be 
a reflection of the validity of the perception of the environment by those managers.  
Ambrosini and Bowman (2009 p. 39) hold that “if managers misperceive the situation 
of the firm, they may trigger inappropriate dynamic capabilities”.  Zahra et al (2006 p. 
926) concur stating that as a consequence of the potential for managerial error (or 
mistaken analysis of the environmental conditions) dynamic capabilities do “not 
ensure organisational success”. The accusation of tautology also fails on this basis. 
 
Arend and Bromiley (2009) also criticise dynamic capability as being weak in 
theoretical foundation.  This argument seems extraordinary given that dynamic 
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capability has solid foundations in evolutionary theory (Nelson and Winter 1982), 
elements of the resource based view (Penrose 1959, Barney 1991, Peteraf 1993) and 
organisational learning (Zollo and Winter 2002, Argyris 1976, Senge 1990) which are 
all well established theoretical areas in their own right.  Dynamic capability attempts 
to synthesise these and other areas in an effort to understand how firms sustain a 
competitive advantage (Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997). Adner and Helfat (2003 
p.1012) examined the potential for synthesizing elements of the resource based view, 
upper echelons theory and absorptive capacity to explain dynamic managerial 
capabilities “with which managers build, integrate, reconfigure organisational 
resources and competences”.  The foundations of the dynamic capability concept are 
substantial and well researched in their own right. 
 
Arend and Bromiley (2009) also accuse dynamic capability as lacking the robustness 
required of social science research. They outline a number of criteria as being 
“traditional objectives of social science research” (p. 86) which are entirely positivist 
in nature requiring extensive prediction and prescriptive advice for firms.  Helfat and 
Peteraf (2009) refute this argument on the basis that dynamic capability is not yet a 
fully blown theory and will take some time to achieve that status. They point to its 
relative youth as a field of study with its seminal article only published in 1997 by 
Teece, Pisano and Shuen.  Helfat and Peteraf also proposed that only when the theory 
is more fully developed will the tests proposed by Arend and Bromiley (2009) be 
valid.   A more fundamental argument with the tests proposed by Arend and Bromiley 
is that related to philosophical and methodological approach.  The tests they propose 
are exclusively positivist.  They seem to exclude the possibility of worthwhile 
research and theory building from any other tradition.  This seems unnecessarily 
limiting and has the potential to choke off potentially valuable research into business 
strategy. 
 
There have been calls in the literature for more qualitative research in the dynamic 
capabilities area.  Ambrosini and Bowman (2009 p. 46) suggest that “the seeming 
dominance of quantitative studies” may be compounding the problem of tautology as 
it may infer the existence of dynamic capabilities by examining firm performance.  
These authors also claim that additional research is required to aid clarity on a number 
of factors including the question of how dynamic capabilities are created. Lockett, 
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Thompson and Morgenstern (2009 p.25) posit that it is “those resources that are 
complex, unobservable and difficult to measure that are likely to of greatest 
importance” when conducting research.  These authors call for greater diligence in 
quantitative research and suggest that “insightful” case studies could usefully 
accompany such research.  Easterby-Smith, Lyles and Peteraf (2009) echo this call for 
a combination of qualitative and quantitative work to develop the subject but 
recognise the strength of qualitative research to provide detailed descriptions of the 
processes involved. 
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5.3 How do dynamic capabilities emerge in SMEs? 
The literature on dynamic capability has tended to consider the issues of the definition 
of dynamic capability and the identification and impact of those dynamic capabilities 
(Wang and Ahmed 2007, Barreto 2010).    There have been few studies which 
examined the emergence of dynamic capabilities.  These have tended to examine the 
emergence of dynamic capabilities in larger firms and have further tended to 
concentrate on the issues of routines and processes which support this emergence.  
Wang and Ahmed (2007) and Barreto (2010) reviewed published research on dynamic 
capability in the period 1995-2005 and 1997-2008 respectively. Table 9a and 9b 
presents an analysis of their findings in relation to the research approach adopted, the 
purpose of the study and the context in relation to firm size.  Of a total of seventy 
articles reviewed, fifty four were considered by these reviewing authors to have been 
empirical rather than conceptual in nature.  Of these fifty four, only four studies 
related to an SME context.  The overwhelming majority related to large firms or 
clusters of large firms.  Of the studies which could be considered to have addressed 
the issue of the emergence of dynamic capabilities (Table 9b) only one, Salvato 
(2003) addressed this in an SME context.  Other studies considered the emergence 
issue in a larger firm or more conceptual context.  A number of core themes have 
emerged in this literature in relation to what might be termed the foundational 
elements to the emergence of dynamic capabilities.  
 
Table 9a: Summarising research on Dynamic Capability 
Review Authors:
Number of 
Studies 
Reviewed
Conceptual Emirical
Large Firm / 
Industry SME
Wang & Ahmed (2007) 32 32 31 1
Barreto (2010) 38 16 22 19 3
Research Approach
Research Context      (of 
Empirical Research)
Source: Wang and Ahmed (2007), Barreto (2010) 
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Table 9b: Studies of the emergence of dynamic capabilities 
Review Authors Article Authors
Conceptual
Empirical 
Large Firm
Empirical 
SME
Wang & Ahmed (2007) Pisano (2000) X
Verona & Ravasi (2003) X
Barreto (2010) Blyler & Coff (2003) X
Pablo, Reay, Dewald & Casebeer (2007) X
Rosenbloom (2000) X
Salvato (2003) X
Teece (2007) X
Zahra, Sapienza & Davidsson (2006) X
Zollo & Winter (2002) X
Research Approach of Studies 
considering the emergence of 
Dynamic Capabilities
 Source: Wang and Ahmed (2007), Barreto (2010)  
 
Zollo and Winter(2002) explored the importance of learning in the evolution of 
dynamic capabilities and propose that three mechanisms, the tacit accumulation of 
past experience, knowledge articulation and knowledge codification practices, 
contribute to the development of dynamic capabilities in firms. They suggest that the 
practice of routines and their gradual improvement through trial and error results in a 
level of learning of what works in a given context.  Zollo and Winter argue that is in 
the articulation of this knowledge and especially in its codification that the “know-
why” as well as the “know-how” can be adequately captured.  This process allows the 
organisation to develop a shared understanding which can be exposed to critical 
review in the codification process which may result in the correction of some 
experientially based learning which is in fact ill-founded in reality. 
 
Verona and Ravasi (2003) in their study of the Danish company Oticon A/S held that 
dynamic capabilities were made up of three knowledge based elements.  These were 
knowledge creation and absorption (related to investments in science and its 
technological and market applications); knowledge integration (managing the 
integration of latent and dispersed knowledge resources); and knowledge 
reconfiguration (allowing a sufficiently open structure to allow new configurations of 
resources).  The interaction of these three elements allowed a process of continuous 
innovation which facilitated and encouraged new resource combinations to be 
developed. 
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Rosenbloom (2000) in describing the decline and recovery of the NCR Corporation in 
the USA emphasised the importance of leadership in the transformation which they 
observed.  Rosenbloom (2000 p. 1083) argues that a new leader was able to “actualize 
latent dynamic capabilities” within the firm thereby enabling the firm to prosper once 
again.  Similarly, in examining strategic change in a public sector environment Pablo 
et al (2007) emphasised the importance of organisational leadership and trust between 
that leadership and the employees of the organisation if dynamic capabilities are to be 
enabled. The study focused on existing dynamic capabilities within the organisation 
which were effectively latent and which the leadership had to identify and then 
facilitate their enactment. Salvato (2003 p. 103), in his study of two medium sized 
Italian firms, concurs finding that “managerial leadership played a direct role in 
guiding firm evolution”. 
 
Teece (2007) proposed a complex model of the micro foundations of dynamic 
capabilities which are based on three core elements of sensing, seizing and managing 
threats/reconfiguration.  In sensing opportunities, Teece proposed that the relevant 
micro foundations relate to processes which facilitate organisations to systematically 
seek new ideas and to assess, shape and filter those opportunities.  In relation to 
seizing, Teece proposes micro foundations related to defining firm boundaries, 
processes related to cooperation with other firms, decision making protocols which 
avoid error and a series of basic processes related to the successful commercial 
implementation of new products.  Finally, the model proposes the micro foundations 
of the final core element of managing threats and allowing for reconfiguration are 
knowledge management, proper governance to ensure consistency in processes as well 
as adherence to the agreed processes and the decentralisation of the organisation to 
allow as much flexibility as possible coupled with sufficient integration and 
coordination processes to ensure adequate control.   
 
Blyler and Coff (2003 p. 680) propose the criticality of social capital in the 
development of dynamic capabilities in relation to the contribution the social network 
can make as they “enable novel resource combinations by making new possibilities 
more salient”. Social capital is defined, by these authors, at the level of an individual’s 
ability to secure benefits through the membership of a social network (Portes 1998).  
They go so far as to claim that social capital is “a necessary (though not sufficient) 
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condition for the existence of a dynamic capability” (Blyler and Coff 2003 p.680) as it 
is through the internal and external social ties of the individual that ideas for new 
configuration of resources may be revealed or identified. 
 
Although the literature, and in particular empirical studies, on the emergence of 
dynamic capabilities is still relatively limited it is clear that a number of themes have 
evolved in relation to the mechanisms which may contribute to that emergence.  
Organisational and individual learning is an explicitly central element in the work of 
Zollo and Winter (2002) and Verona and Ravasi (2003).  However, it is possible to 
identify elements of learning in the work of Teece (2007) where the organisation may 
learn to adjust its micro foundations over time; in the work Rosenbloom (2000) and 
Pablo et al (2007) in their consideration of how leaders were able to leverage existing 
organisational knowledge; and in the work of Blyler and Coff (2003) where it is clear 
that individuals may learn from their social network. 
 
The micro foundations proposed by Teece (2007) relate substantially to the sensing 
and seizing of opportunities in a multi-national organisational context.  It is possible to 
re-frame this element of Teece’s proposition in terms of an SME firm’s ability to 
identify new knowledge and then assimilate it into their operations, what is termed by 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) as absorptive capacity. Similarly, it is possible to identify 
aspects of absorptive capacity in the work of Verona and Ravasi (2003) in terms of 
how new knowledge is created or identified and then made of use to the firm.  
 
In the context of an SME, the owner-manager is central to developments in strategic 
direction and decision making.  Consequently, the role of leadership identified in the 
work of Rosenbloom (2000) and Pablo et al (2007) in larger organisations is likely to 
be amplified in the SME context. Finally, the influence or impact of the owner-
manager’s network of contacts, identified by Blyler and Coff (2003) is also likely to 
be relevant. 
 
The following sections consider how dynamic capabilities may emerge in SME’s in 
terms of the themes that are emerging from the literature on dynamic capabilities.  
These themes are (i) learning, (ii) identifying and integrating new knowledge, (iii) the 
role of the leader and (iv) the use of the owner-managers network of contacts. 
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5.3.1 The role of learning in the development of dynamic capability 
Levinthal and March (1993), in discussing organisational learning, distinguished 
between organisational exploration and exploitation as two elements which are 
necessary to overcome the dangers of experiential learning.  While experiential 
learning can play a useful role in organisations in relation to simple tasks and routines, 
these authors consider experience to be often a poor teacher as people can misinterpret 
experience in the light of outcomes which may not necessarily be tied to the decisions 
made or the routines followed.  It is argued that it is entirely possible for an outcome 
to be influenced by factors which those concerned may not be aware of which can 
lead to erroneous assumptions about the cause of the perceived success. Where there 
is a large group of individuals involved, or groups of such groups as is often the case 
in larger organisations, the potential for erroneous learning is exacerbated by the 
complexity of factors involved.  Maskell and Malmberg (2007) concur that this 
myopia is common and that erroneous deductions , often based on very small samples, 
become widely held “because everyone believes that others have made the sufficient 
validation, and no lethal or instantaneous consequences prove them wrong” (Maskell 
and Malmberg 2007 p. 605).  This myopic learning can exist within an organisation or 
across a range of organisations which are spatially related either geographically or by 
industry (Levitt and March 1988).  Levinthal and March (1993) argue that exploration 
(the pursuit of new knowledge) is essential for the organisation to ensure that its 
products and services remain relevant in a dynamic environment. Similarly, 
exploitation (the use and development of things already known) is required to convert 
knowledge into tangible outputs in the context of the firm.  A balance between these 
capabilities is required to ensure that the organisation prospers in the long run. 
 
Zollo and Winter(2002) propose that learning is an underlying capability in the 
development of dynamic capabilities. Three elements are considered; experiential 
learning, knowledge articulation and knowledge codification in relation to how 
organisations learn.  Experiential learning is generally tacit as the learning is based on 
a trial and error process.  Following Levinthal and March (1993), Zollo and Winter 
(2002 p.342) propose that the articulation of that tacit knowledge in a group 
discussion can “help to penetrate the ambiguity” which exists in relation to the 
performance implications of organisational processes.  Knowledge codification is a 
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development of articulation and involves the committal to paper of the articulated 
knowledge.  The process of codification requires reflection on what occurred and the 
performance implications of the factors involved. “By going through that effort, they 
will most likely emerge with a crisper definition of what works, what doesn’t work, 
and why” (Zollo and Winter 2002 p.342).  The authors recommend that this process 
should capture the “know-how” as well as the “know-why” (Kogut and Zander 1992) 
as it is the latter which will assist the organisation more where the learning relates to 
issues or circumstances which arise less frequently or for issues which tend to be more 
heterogeneous. It is argued that the codification of knowledge is a central element in 
the development of dynamic capabilities as it requires a level of reflection on both the 
routines utilised and their performance implications which has the potential to lead to 
changes in the resource base and the configuration of those resources. Paradoxically, 
Kogut and Zander (1992) propose that such codification activity may increase the 
imitability of the knowledge as the process requires the specification of that which 
might otherwise have remained more tacit. 
 
Bender (2008 p.31) discusses the role of learning in the context of innovation which 
he proposes is not necessarily about R&D but “is always about reconfiguring existing 
knowledge, components and actors”.  Bender (2008 p.28-29) describes two innovation 
enabling capabilities which he terms transformational capabilities which are the 
“enduring ability of an organisation to transform available general knowledge into 
plant, firm or task specific knowledge and competence” and configurational 
capabilities “the enduring ability to synthesise novelty by creating new configurations 
of knowledge, artefacts and actors”. There is a clear correlation between Bender’s 
transformational capabilities and Levinthal and March’s (1993) exploitation 
capability.  They reflect the ability of the firm to utilise generally available knowledge 
in a way which allows it some competitive advantage over other firms in its sector.  
This is particularly relevant in low tech industries where the ability to differentiate a 
firm can be largely based on the extent to which one can transform generally available 
knowledge into local knowledge and competence.  Bender’s configurational capability 
echoes Levinthal and March’s exploration capability in that it requires the 
organisation to identify ways to utilise elements of technology or processes in new 
ways through combinations or adjustment and also to link actors who possess certain 
competences with knowledge and technology.  Bender (2008 p.39) states that 
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transformational and configurational capabilities are “two sides of the same coin” and 
that a firm requires both to be innovative. 
 
In an SME context the owner-manager is central to decision making.  Section 3.2 
above described a model of organisational learning which described a dynamic 
process which has the potential to be heavily influenced by the evolution and previous 
learning of both the organisation and of the individuals within the organisation 
(Crossan, Lane and White 1999).  The 4 I model (Intuiting, Interpreting, Integrating 
and Institutionalising) is not free from the influences of power.  Learning can be 
frustrated or accelerated by the inertia of the organisation or by the acts of individuals 
(Lawrence, et al. 2005).  It must also be understood that the self-image of employees 
in a firm may also impact on the nature of learning which may occur (Schilling and 
Kluge 2009).  Individuals may consider that certain types of actions or forms of 
thinking are not appropriate to their role in the organisation.  Furthermore, they may 
consider that their professional identities are likely to be undermined if certain core 
assumptions are challenged.  Consequently, organisational power and politics may 
prevent the reflection required in order to allow higher order learning evolve. 
 
A further weakness in the model outlined is that its applicability to the context of the 
SME is not assured (Jones and Macpherson 2006).  This is because the SME often 
lacks the structures assumed in the 4I model to share institutionalised knowledge.  As 
a result, the ability of the owner-manager to dedicate sufficient time and resources to 
strategic activity can be limited (Jones, et al. 2007). These authors emphasises the 
importance of absorptive capacity and social capital as factors which can assist an 
owner-manager to develop what was defined as “strategic space” namely “to 
accomplish learning and transformation within SMEs there needs to be the time, 
resources, motivation and capabilities for different constituencies, particularly owner-
managers, to reflect on and review existing organisational practices”  (Jones, et al. 
2007 p. 287).   
 
Reflexivity is the process of reflecting on oneself or one’s own situation.  The key 
element in a learner making the transition from lower to higher order learning is the 
capability and practice of reflection (Fiol and Lyles 1985, Argyris 1976, Wang 2008, 
Levinthal and March 1993).  Child (1997) questioned the value of unreflective 
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decision making based on previous experience or learning which might now be 
redundant.   Similarly, in her study of the environmental performance of Irish 
pharmaceutical companies Hilliard (2004) discovered a considerable difference in 
capability. This difference in capability was partially attributed to how reflexive action 
helps to “translate” experience (Hilliard 2004 p. 18) into capability and might also 
explain why “some firms may not possess any capability in a given area”.   
 
Snyder, Manz and Laforge (1983) suggest that entrepreneurs who engage in self-
assessment in relation to their skills, particularly at different stages of a firm’s life 
cycle, and then self-manage to address weaknesses are more likely to be successful 
than those who do not.  Entrepreneurs need to engage in critical reflection to 
internalise learning for their own benefit and this can be facilitated though small 
action sets of entrepreneurs (Clarke, et al. 2006).  Small failures can lead to 
considerable learning if reflected upon as the pain or losses incurred is sufficient to 
attract attention but not sufficient to cause denial (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). Jones, 
Macpherson and Thorpe (2010 p. 660) concur proposing the need for managers in 
SMEs to create “strategic space” to allow time for reflection. 
 
Hilliard (2004) found that firms who adopted deliberate learning strategies, from a 
perspective that their firms could always learn more and improve, were more capable 
of challenging their own existing assumptions and thereby become more dynamic than 
those firms who did not adopt such learning strategies. Pandza and Thorpe (2009 
p.S121) posit that managerial thinking “becomes an instrumental and crucial part of 
dynamic capabilities”. 
 
One specific deliberate learning strategy which a firm may adopt is to use third party 
intermediaries to challenge their assumptions or to broaden their thinking.  Schlemmer 
and Webb (2008 p.129) postulate that “it could be useful to use resources or dynamic 
capabilities that are not controlled by the firm” through the use, for example, of 
external consultants. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000 p.1109) state that “such experiences 
enhance innovation by breaking down the thought worlds that arise because people 
with different experiences not only know different things, but they know those things 
differently”.  Whilst these authors were discussing internal product development 
teams, the concept is equally applicable to external intermediaries.  
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Devins and Gold (2000) in their research into SMEs in the UK found that firms were 
less reluctant to engage with funded programmes once they had been approached and 
engaged on a personal level by someone with whom they could establish some trust.  
Similarly, Devins and Gold (2002) found that it was through the establishment of trust 
with an intermediary that firm owners began to share their concerns in a manner 
which allowed the intermediary introduce options related to state supports.  Gold and 
Thorpe (2008) in their in-depth case study found similar results in that it was only 
through the close interaction with the entrepreneur and through entering and 
understanding their world view that an intermediary can influence an entrepreneur in 
relation to training and other funded programmes. Jones and Macpherson (2006 p. 
170) concurred on the influence of intermediaries in examining different forms of 
learning in three firms, finding that “external agents helped create the internal 
mechanisms by which organisational learning took place”. 
 
5.3.2 The role ofthe process of identifying and integrating new knowledge in the 
development of dynamic capability 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990), in considering firms’ learning and innovation processes, 
first described an organisational capability which they termed absorptive capacity. 
These authors defined it as the organisations ability to recognise the value of new 
information, to assimilate it and to then exploit it in the innovation processes of the 
firm. Cohen and Levinthal (1990 p.128) proposed that absorptive capacity is “largely 
a function of the firm’s level of prior knowledge”. This fits well with Evolutionary 
Theory as described by Nelson and Winters (1982), where future organisational 
developments tend to be linked to prior knowledge and experiences.  Cohen and 
Levinthal (1990 p. 131) also discuss learning theory and conclude “learning is 
cumulative, and learning performance is greatest when the object of learning is related 
to what is already known”.  
 
Recognising the value of new information is not assured.  Indeed, identifying new 
information which may be of value requires some form of search activity by the firm. 
Zahra and George (2002 p. 189) conceptualised absorptive capacity as a dynamic 
capability and proposed that knowledge acquisition depended on the intensity, speed 
and direction of the search. This approach proposes that the level of absorptive 
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capacity may be influenced by conscious effort on the part of the firm, but is also 
dependent on the direction of the search.  The contribution of Levinthal and March 
(1993) is discussed above in the context of explorative and exploitative learning.  If a 
firm does not explore adequately, it risks missing potentially critical information and 
may suffer from its path dependence rather than benefiting from it (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990, Levinthal and March 1993, Leonard-Barton 1992). For absorption to 
begin at all, the information has to be valued (Todorova and Durisin 2007). 
 
Assimilating information relates to how the valued information is analysed, processed, 
interpreted and understood by the organisation (Zahra and George 2002). There are 
similar issues involved with assimilation as with the valuing of information as a firm’s 
history and development is likely to influence the basis on which the analysis and 
interpretation takes place.  Cohen and Levinthal (1990) posit that diversity of learning 
and experience will aid absorptive capacity as it facilitates innovative linkages 
between new and existing knowledge. Zahra and George (2002) proposed the 
additional required step of transformation which is where the firm fully internalises 
the new information and converts it for its own use. Todorova and Durisin (2007), in 
accepting the distinction between assimilation and transformation, hold that they are 
two discrete processes rather than subsequent stages in the process as proposed by 
Zahra and George.  The distinction which Todorova and Durisin make is that 
assimilation occurs when the difference between the new knowledge and the 
individuals or firms existing thought processes are slight.  The information is easily 
absorbed and integrated into processes and routines.  Transformation is required when 
there is a substantial and challenging difference between the new knowledge and the 
firm’s processes. Adopting the perspective of Todorova and Durisin (2007) that 
assimilation and transformation should be viewed as two alternative processes for 
integrating new knowledge into firm’s processes and routines seems to allow a greater 
depth of analysis as it recognises that new information can be closely aligned to 
existing information or radically different.  This is not to discard the important 
distinction which Zahra and George (2002) also make between a firm becoming aware 
of new information and the firm actually converting it for its own use. 
 
Exploiting new knowledge relates to how the firm puts the newly assimilated or 
transformed knowledge to use.  If new knowledge is used to improve a process or 
 123 
 
routine, or is used to change the strategic direction of a firm, then the impact of the 
exploitation of that knowledge is likely to be identifiable and measurable in some 
way.  Whether it has a positive impact on performance is not relevant from the 
perspective of establishing that new knowledge was identified, valued, assimilated or 
transformed prior to it being exploited by the firm. It is clear that there is a temporal 
dimension to absorptive capacity.  It takes time for a firm to go through the process of 
searching for and identifying new information, analysing and interpreting it and then 
adjusting its behaviour in some manner to exploit it. What is less clear is the time span 
of this process (Zahra and George 2002).  It is also possible that firms can identify 
valuable new knowledge but not be in a position to exploit it immediately.  Zahra and 
George (2002) used the terms Potential and Realised Absorptive Capacity to 
distinguish between the abilities to identify and capture new knowledge without any 
guarantee of being able to exploit it.  Todorova and Durisin (2007) criticise this 
construct as a simple re-labelling of the original terms of identification and 
assimilation (as potential absorptive capacity) and transformation and exploitation (as 
realised absorptive capacity).  However, the concept of distinguishing between 
potential and realised absorptive capacity seems very useful.  While it uses the 
original four terms within the new construct, it draws attention to the possibility that 
the process from identification to exploitation is not necessarily smooth or linear. The 
construct allows the possibility that a firm can learn something new, but not be in a 
position to exploit it for some considerable period of time, if at all. Zahra and George 
(2002 p. 191) introduce the concept of an “efficiency factor” to describe the ratio of 
potential to realised absorptive capacity. A higher efficiency factor suggests that a 
firm converts more of its potential to realised absorptive capacity.  However, this 
construct might be misleading as a firm which rarely sought information outside of its 
narrow sphere of experience might be very efficient in this conversion, but suffer 
competitively over time if its search for new information remained too focused. 
 
Lichtenthaler and Lichtenthaler (2009) in addressing issues related to knowledge 
management incorporated the concept of absorptive capacity in describing how firms 
explore and retain knowledge and put it to use within their organisation.  The 
framework proposes six knowledge capacities which related to distinctions between 
internal and external sources of knowledge and the need for exploration, retention and 
exploitation of knowledge.  The analysis is clearly in the context of larger firms.  The 
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framework proposes a series of definitions which are to some extent ambiguous in 
relation to their temporal dimension.  For example, transformative capacity is defined 
as “...a firm’s ability to retain knowledge inside the organisation” (Lichtenthaler and 
Lichtenthaler 2009 p. 1320).  This is immediately qualified as referring to the “process 
stage of maintaining knowledge  ... and subsequently reactivating this knowledge”.  
However, the definitional adjustment is critical as it requires reactivation to close the 
loop.  A firm could be judged to have low transformative capacity at a point in time 
whereas the reactivation of the knowledge held could materialise subsequently.  In 
addition to issues of definition, Lichtenthaler and Lichtenthaler’s (2009) model 
effectively proposes dichotomies between stages of knowledge identification, 
retention and exploitation which seem artificial.  For example, connective capacity is 
described as relating to the process by which knowledge is maintained in 
interorganisational relationships and the subsequent reactivation of that knowledge.  
While suffering from the same weakness in relation to the need for reactivation as 
outlined above, this connective capacity is defined as being external to the firm.  For a 
firm to be capable of maintaining knowledge in external relationships, the firm must 
firstly have some sense of the knowledge which is available and that it is in some 
manner likely to be useful.  This immediately suggests that the knowledge in question, 
or some aspects of it, must have become internal to the firm.  It also suggests that the 
knowledge or the potential of the knowledge has been assimilated in some way.  It 
may even suggest that the firm can identify a possible basis for the knowledge to be 
exploited.  In any event, the framework proposed, while useful in terms of considering 
aspects of knowledge management to be considered, seems implausible in terms of its 
dichotomies.  
 
Absorptive capacity is a cumulative phenomenon (Cohen and Levinthal 1990, Zahra 
and George 2002, Easterby-Smith, et al. 2008). Cohen and Levinthal (1990 p.135-6) 
state that “prior knowledge permits the assimilation and exploitation of new 
knowledge”. As new knowledge is assimilated and exploited, it, in turn, allows the 
identification of additional new knowledge and so on. The desirability of having a 
breadth of knowledge is apparent if one recognises that new knowledge acquisition is 
to some extent dependent on the existing level and breadth of knowledge. Van den 
Bosch, Volberda and De Boer (1999) propose that as firms develop their absorptive 
capacity capability they will identify an increasing level of opportunity which is likely 
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to create a competitive advantage over firms with lower levels of absorptive capacity.  
Such a divergence is likely to amplify over time as the cumulative impact of 
developing absorptive capacity will be greater in the firm with the higher relative 
level. Giuliani and Bell (2005) in their research into the Chilean wine industry found 
that firms with higher absorptive capacity were more likely to establish linkages with 
sources of knowledge outside of their immediate cluster of firms.  This was more 
likely to result in new knowledge which might be of use to the firm. 
 
The path dependent nature of absorptive capacity is undeniable, yet it is not 
unavoidable. The identification of new information can be as a result of a directed 
search or it can be more related to chance.  The path dependent nature of the process 
suggests that a directed search will tend to favour existing knowledge streams.  In a 
given firm, this is likely to result in a certain structural inertia as enquires will tend in 
one direction over time.  Jones (2006) challenges this focus on structural issues at the 
expense of individual agency.  He proposes that firms are managed by individuals and 
that these individuals have the capability to make choices which are different to the 
choices made in the past. Jones based his research on a case study of a manufacturing 
company which had a long history of supplying the Ministry of Defence in the UK.  
While the market was relatively static and predictable, the company prospered.  
However, its lack of absorptive capacity caused it significant problems when the 
market became more dynamic.  Jones identified a number of key roles in the process 
of identifying, assimilating and exploiting new knowledge, namely gatekeepers, 
boundary spanners and change agents.  It is the effectiveness with which these roles 
are implemented that will determine the organisation’s absorptive capacity. Easterby-
Smith et al (2008 p. 498) concur with this perspective by proposing that absorptive 
capacity “depends on deliberate will and individual agency”. 
 
The development of the absorptive capacity capability of an organisation can impact 
on the self-image of the organisation.  Cohen and Levinthal (1990) held that the 
expectations of the individuals within the firm change as absorptive capacity is 
developed.  This is related to their perception of the firm as being outward looking and 
that this was a positive thing for the development of the business.  This self-image can 
also be problematic as it can contribute to the view of what information fits with the 
organisation. This can lead to the problems referred to above in relation to core 
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rigidities (Leonard-Barton 1992).  Zahra and George (2002) also recognise the impact 
of transformation on the organisation’s self-image and how it views its competitive 
landscape. Van den Bosch, Volberda and De Boer (1999) argue that as absorptive 
capacity increases, the firms expectations will be increasingly defined in terms of the 
opportunity in its environment, independent of its current performance. In other 
words, the firm increases its ability to see opportunity in the environment and so 
frames its expectations accordingly. 
 
5.3.3 The role of the leader in developing dynamic capability 
In his ground-breaking article, Child (1972) posited that firms could make strategic 
choices rather than their strategy being determined by the environment in which they 
operated and the technology being used or the size of the firm.  The decisions thus 
made were a reflection of the key managers of the firm, the dominant coalition.  Child 
argued that it was the perception of the environment by this coalition of senior 
managers that was relevant.  The prior ideology of the decision makers is "assumed to 
colour this evaluation in some degree" (Child 1972 p.17).  The criticality of the senior 
management team in relation to decision making was echoed by Hambrick and Mason 
(1984).  These authors proposed an upper echelons theory which stated that the 
decisions of senior managers are reflections of their background characteristics.  The 
basic theory has evolved somewhat to allow for a number of issues; differences in 
influence amongst a management team, reverse causality where managers with certain 
characteristics or experience being recruited into specific organisational situations, 
different cultural situations and finally the differences which arise in industry 
performance. 
 
The relevance of this upper echelons theory to research in SMEs is that the dominant 
coalition in an SME is very small and frequently relates only to the entrepreneur. 
Jones and Macpherson (2006 p. 170) referred to the entrepreneur as being the “sole 
authority within the firm”.  The centrality of the entrepreneur in decision making is 
self-evident in small firms, however, the background characteristics alluded to by 
Child and Hambrick and Mason have relevance. Penrose (1959) discussed the 
importance of the “image” of the environment which the entrepreneur held in his or 
her mind.  This image and the potentially different images in the minds of different 
entrepreneurs would influence strategic choice and decisions made.  Hilliard 
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(2004)expanded on this by examining the actions of pharmaceutical companies in 
Ireland and was able to demonstrate the influence of the image held within the firm on 
the decisions made and approach taken to environmental (e.g. waste management) 
matters. In her study, Hilliard found that the dynamic capabilities of some firms were 
grounded in their tacit perceptions and their purposeful problem solving processes.  
The tacit perceptions were themselves influenced by past experience and learning. 
 
In their study of the US Petroleum industry, Adner and Helfat (2003) examined the 
impact of strategic decisions on corporate performance.  In particular, they examined a 
series of decisions related to corporate downsizing on the relative (rather than 
absolute) performance between industry firms. The emphasis was on relative 
performance as the industry went through several radical changes in the period under 
review which impacted on absolute profitability levels.  Their findings were that 
“corporate strategy does in fact matter” and that “the results also strongly suggest that 
corporate managers matter” (Adner and Helfat 2003 p.1023).  In other words, 
corporate strategic decisions could be shown to have influenced relative performance 
positively.  At the same time, it was clear that the senior management in the different 
organisations, which faced the same environmental conditions, made different 
decisions in relation to how to react to that environment.  This research seems to 
support the assertion that key decision makers’ assessment of the environment may 
differ across firms facing what might objectively be seen as the same environment.  
The decisions which follow this assessment can influence relative firm performance. 
 
The importance of leadership as an issue is the potential it holds in terms of firm 
direction and performance (Child 1972, Hambrick and Mason 1984, Adner and Helfat 
2003, Hilliard 2004). The ability of leaders to exercise their managerial agency 
implies that the evolution of the firm does not inevitably determine future paths.  
However, the inertia of previous decisions coupled with the existing knowledge base 
of the firm mean that the exercise of managerial agency is influenced by this history 
(Penrose 1959, Leonard-Barton 1992).  It is also influenced by the image which the 
leaders have of themselves and their organisation (Penrose 1959, Hilliard 2004).  One 
mechanism which may assist owner-managers to learn or become aware of 
possibilities which might encourage and allow the necessary reflection to take place is 
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the use of their network of peers and contacts (Jones, Macpherson and Thorpe 2010).  
The following section discusses this concept of social capital. 
 
5.3.4 The role of the owner-manager’s network in the development of dynamic 
capability 
The literature on the emergence of dynamic capabilities suggests that the use which an 
owner manager can make of his or her network of contacts may play a role in the 
development of dynamic capabilities (Blyler and Coff 2003).  There is a well 
developed body of literature relating to social capital.  The purpose of including a 
discussion of the role of social capital in my research is to examine the contribution it 
may make in the context of a resource which is available to the firm and it’s CEO.  
The following sections consider the evolution of the concept of social capital over the 
past thirty years, before narrowing the focus through a resource lens for consideration 
in the context of the dynamic capabilities literature. 
 
The underlying conceptual elements of social capital are not recent discoveries of the 
social sciences.  Authors like Marx and Durkheim in the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries 
discussed the links between individuals and some of the benefits, obligations and 
problems which arose from these links or relationships. However, the concept of 
social capital as discussed in the literature emanates from a much more recent debate 
over the past thirty years.  The work of Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam are central to 
the consideration of social capital (Portes 1998, Field 2003, Lee 2009). The term 
social capital may have its origins in a paper by Loury (1977) where he challenged the 
idea of a free-society where all individuals theoretically have equal opportunity to 
progress.  Loury (1977 p. 176) held that “no one travels that road entirely alone”, 
implying that the network around an individual might influence or restrict their 
potential to progress. 
 
Bourdieu (1986) discussed social capital primarily in relation to social class and 
inequality. His research focused on the benefits which might accrue from connections 
amongst privileged groups and on the deliberate investment in the construction of 
sociability for the purpose of creating a resource which might subsequently be drawn 
upon (Portes 1998).  Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992 p. 119) defined social capital as 
“the sum of resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by 
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virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships 
of mutual acquaintances and recognition”.   
 
Coleman (1994) focused primarily on the issue of education and the impact which 
social capital might have on the performance of individuals in an educational 
environment. Coleman was a proponent of rational choice theory which, at its 
simplest, suggests that economic actors act in their own best interest on all occasions.  
Coleman used social capital theory to help explain why people might cooperate with 
each other when their individual self-interest might suggest that such cooperation 
would not arise (Field 2003).  Coleman’s work was also largely based on the unit of 
the family which resulted in his definition of social capital as “the set of resources that 
inhere in family relations and in community social organisation and that are useful for 
the cognitive or social development of a child or young person.  These resources differ 
for different persons and can constitute an important advantage for children and 
adolescents in the development of their own human capital” (Coleman 1994 p. 300).   
 
Putnam, an American political scientist, considered social capital in the context of the 
fabric of society and believed that a deterioration in social capital was leading to the 
crumbling of civic society.  In an article (and subsequent book) called “Bowling 
Alone” Putnam (1995) used the metaphor of an individual bowling on their own or 
only with family members, rather than as a member of a team playing in competition 
with other local and state-wide teams, as an indication of the reduction in civic 
engagement in America.  Putnam drew on the writings of de Tocqueville who in 
describing America circa 1830 held that the post-aristocratic model which existed 
allowed, encouraged and fostered a dialogue between all which also led to a high level 
of civil engagement (Field 2003).  The reduction in this valued dialogue between 
different and otherwise distanced individuals was, according to Putnam, leading to a 
reduction in civic engagement, and therefore to be deplored.  Putnam (1993 p. 167) 
defined social capital as the “features of social organisations, such as trust, norms and 
networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated 
actions”.  Portes (1998) is very critical of Putnam and accuses him of tautology in 
some of his arguments in relation to the relationship between social capital and good 
governance.  Portes argues that Putnam effectively reduced social capital to a single 
variable, namely civic virtue, which Putnam defined as being present when 
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individuals vote, obey the law, cooperate with each other and whose leaders are 
honest and committed to the public good.  Given this definition, Portes argues that it is 
hardly surprising that such civic virtue then results in well governed cities! However, 
Putnam (2000)  also divided social capital into considering what he termed bridging or 
bonding social capital. Bridging social capital brings people together across a wide 
range of social divisions and can be very useful in terms of developing new thoughts 
and in disseminating information widely.  Bonding social capital refers to the idea of 
reinforcing existing ties and networks and tends to strengthen similarities and may 
discourage behaviours beyond the accepted norms of the group. This analysis is useful 
in that it allows consideration of different forms of social capital which may have 
positive or negative consequences depending on the context. 
 
Burt (1992) outlines a theory of structural holes in networks.  This theory holds that 
social networks are imperfect in terms of information exchange on the basis that not 
all members in a network know each other equally well or that some members of a 
network may also have access to other networks which may be of potential benefit to 
members of the first network.  As a result, Burt contends that an individual’s position 
in the network may be an asset in its own right, effectively social capital, as it allows 
the individual to broker exchanges between otherwise disconnected people.  This is 
especially relevant where weak ties (Granovetter 1995) exist in a network where 
individuals are only loosely connected, as opposed to the denser or stronger ties 
evident in the work of Coleman. 
 
Portes (1998) is generally critical of authors on social capital for their relative neglect 
of the potential negative implications of social capital. Bourdieu’s analysis is firmly 
focused on the advantages which may accrue to the members of the network.  
However, it is apparent that one who does not belong to the privileged network is at a 
disadvantage.   Coleman’s emphasis on the family and community ties has the 
potential to result in strong enforcement of an accepted norm which might be quite 
restrictive of personal freedoms.  Similarly, this enforcement of a group norm can be 
very damaging if that norm holds that members of the group should not progress in 
certain ways.  Portes references research by Bourgois (1995) which examined the 
Puerto Rican community in the Bronx, New York and the pressure which was applied 
to members of the community who were perceived to be too ambitious.  Portes calls 
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for the inclusion of such negative consequences in social capital research in the 
interests of thorough and robust research. 
 
The literature on social capital examines the subject from a number of perspectives – 
sociology (Bourdieu 1986, Portes 1998, Coleman 1994) , economics (Loury 1977, 
Coleman 1994) and political science (Putnam 1995).  However, social capital is of 
relevance to my research in relation to the use which a CEO may be able to make of 
his or her network of contacts.  In this context, the definition of social capital of 
Bourdieu (1986) in relation to the sum of the actual and virtual resources in an 
individual’s network is considered the most useful of the seminal authors. 
 
Largely following Bourdieu, Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998 p. 243) defined social 
capital as the “sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, available 
through, and derived from the network of relationships possessed by an individual or 
social unit”. By including the actual and potential in the definition, social capital 
allows for the possibility that resources may be available to the participants in the 
network of which they may not be explicitly aware. At its most fundamental, the 
concept is that there is a value in having a network of relationships and that the 
resources which arise from those relationships may be able to provide a benefit at 
some point. 
 
In their paper on the role of social capital in the creation of intellectual capital, 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) propose three dimensions of social capital; the 
structural, the relational and the cognitive.  The structural dimension refers to the 
pattern of connections between participants in the network.  Who is connected to 
whom and for what purpose?  A network which exists for one purpose, e.g. a training 
network, may be used for another e.g. development of trading relationships. The 
relational dimension describes the nature of the relationships participants have with 
each other. These can vary in relation to the frequency of interaction and the depth of 
relationship which develops. The cognitive dimension refers to “those resources 
providing shared representations, interpretations, and systems of meaning among 
parties” (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998 p. 244).  This dimension captures, for example, 
the idea that networks often possess a shared language for communicating, the 
subtlety of which might not be obvious to an outsider. 
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Social capital is an usual resource in that it is not owned by one party in the sense that 
most resources are owned by an economic actor. The resource is owned jointly by the 
participants and is not easily traded as other resources might be.  As it is based on 
relationships and experiences of inter-relating, there is a tacit dimension to social 
capital which makes it difficult to substitute one person for another in a network. 
Similarly, the social capital in a network can determine methods of operating and 
ways of perceiving the world which hinder new insights which challenge the status 
quo.  As discussed above, the core rigidities factor (Leonard-Barton 1992) which can 
impact on firms can also impact on a network.   
 
The phrase intellectual capital is used to refer to the knowledge and knowing 
capability included in a social network (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998).  Knowledge can 
be explicit or tacit (Polanyi 1966).  Tacit knowledge is not simply knowledge which 
has not been codified and made explicit in some way.  Polanyi (1966) holds that some 
knowledge will always be tacit and as such the idea of knowing is as valuable as 
knowledge. In their model of organisational learning, Crossan, Lane and White (1999 
p. 526) describe “an interesting thing seems to happen on the way to expertise.  What 
once required conscious, deliberate, and explicit thought no longer does…what has 
been learnt becomes tacit knowledge”.  This suggests that knowledge may in fact 
move from the domain of the explicit to the domain of the tacit.  In that context, 
knowing is as important as declarative knowledge. 
 
The impact of social capital on the development of intellectual capital is significant.  It 
has been established above, that breadth of knowledge and experience enhance 
absorptive capacity as the potential to identify valuable knowledge is increased.  The 
capability to interpret and assimilate that knowledge is also increased with the breadth 
of pre-existing knowledge and experience.  The use of a social network of actors to 
identify valuable information and to assist in its assimilation has the potential to 
significantly improve absorptive capacity. 
 
Yli-Renko, Autio and Sapienza (2001) examined the impact of social capital and 
knowledge acquisition in the context of a key customer relationship between young 
entrepreneurial high-technology companies and their largest client. The key findings 
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of this research were that social interaction and network ties are positively related to 
knowledge acquisition.  The constant interactions and intensive information exchange 
appear to aid this process.  However, relationship quality is negatively associated with 
knowledge acquisition.  Whilst this is intuitively surprising, the research suggests that 
the relationships may have been too close; that the small firms were insulated from 
other information sources and that lower levels of monitoring, facilitated by the 
improving relationship, reduced the potential exchange of information. In other words, 
the close relationships actually hampered development, perhaps as a result of a 
reluctance to mutually challenge the status quo. 
 
5.3.5 Explaining the emergence of dynamic capabilities in SMEs 
This research seeks to explain how dynamic capabilities emerge in small firms.  
Extant literature argues that the capacity to purposefully create, extend or modify the 
resource base of the firm is central to firm survival and success. This capability, 
referred to as dynamic capability, may relate to organisational learning and firm 
absorptive capacity.  In the context of an SME, the centrality of the owner-manager is 
established, and consequently, the owner-manager’s role in developing his or her own 
absorptive capacity should be considered.  The role which social capital plays in this 
development must be included in any analysis of the emergence of firm dynamic 
capability.  There is also a temporal dimension involved in the emergence of dynamic 
capabilities.  The literature on learning in Chapter 3 describes the potential for a 
transition from lower to higher order learning, which takes time.  The literature on 
absorptive capacity recognises that there may be a substantial time lag between the 
identification of new knowledge and the eventual use of that knowledge within the 
firm. In summary, the literature reviewed in this chapter posits that a number of 
factors should be considered in explaining the emergence of dynamic capabilities in 
the context of an SME: organisational learning, the role of the leader, identifying and 
integrating new knowledge and the role of the owner-manager’s network of contacts. 
 
In the context of the Perigord Group, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 explore the following 
three questions: (i) did dynamic capabilities emerge in the Perigord Group? (ii) If so, 
what caused that emergence? And (iii) are there underlying mechanisms which were 
not empirically observable which facilitated that emergence? Chapter 6 re-assesses 
and extends the case data in the light of the literature on dynamic capability and the 
 134 
 
factors which may help to explain its emergence.  The changing strategic priorities of 
the owner-manager are also considered. These changes in priority reveal the 
developments in the firm between 2002 and 2010. The data is then analysed in the 
context of the literature on dynamic capability. Chapter 7 develops a theoretical 
explanation for the emergence of dynamic capabilities in the Perigord Group. 
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6. Re-analysing the Perigord Case Study 
The initial presentation of the case in Chapter 4 highlighted the significant level of 
investment in training and development in the Perigord Group.  It also revealed the 
scale of development in the services of the firm in an industry which was experiencing 
technological and market turmoil.  Several key themes emerged from the data in 
relation to the focus on performance of the CEO Alan Leamy, the level of capacity 
building which took place in relation to people and technology and finally the 
evolution of higher order learning within the firm.  However, this was only a partial 
explanation of the firm’s development, leading to a further review of the literature.  
The concepts of dynamic capability, organisational capability and routines and 
processes seemed a useful way to re-engage with the data.  Drawing on additional 
data, the extensive interviews and notes of 186 meetings with the CEO of the Perigord 
Group, Alan Leamy, the evolution of Perigord is re-examined.  As noted earlier, these 
meetings occurred in the context of a business relationship between the researcher and 
the CEO. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows.  Section 6.1describes the 
changing strategic priorities of the CEO during the period covered by this research, 
showing how Perigord evolved in this time. Section 6.2 discusses the changes in the 
firm in relation to the themes originally discussed in Chapter 4.  These themes are 
expanded upon and some additional themes emerge. Finally, section 6.3 addresses the 
first research question in relation to whether dynamic capabilities emerged in the 
Perigord Group. 
 
6.1The evolution of Perigord re-examined 
In Table 10 the changing strategic priorities of Alan Leamy for the period 2002 to 
2010 are shown. This table is drawn from the notes of 186 business meetings between 
me and Alan Leamy.  The data suggests that over time Alan Leamy has become more 
focussed on identifying how to leverage the group’s intellectual and managerial 
resources to maximise its strategic opportunity, rather than being focused on specific 
client needs and developing appropriate responses. The following paragraphs describe 
these issues in more detail.  Whilst the presentation of the data suggests well 
delineated events, it should be understood that the allocation of priorities to specific 
years is somewhat arbitrary as priorities tend to evolve and dissipate in an irregular 
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fashion. The methodological foundation for this table is found in Chapter 2 
(Methodology) in the discussion of the 186 business meetings which took place 
between me and Alan Leamy. 
 
In the early stages of the business relationship (2002-2003) the agenda was dominated 
by the impending collapse of the core business of Perigord.  The pre-press business 
was changing rapidly.  Customers were installing equipment which would make the 
services of Perigord redundant.  Some initial work was done on training plans in terms 
of identifying the training needs of individuals.  Separately, Alan Leamy was 
interested in exploring how he might develop the management structures of Perigord 
and how he might leverage the human resources assets available to him. 
 
There was a significant escalation of the regularity of meetings in 2004 which was 
indicative of a momentum which had developed in terms of progressing the evolution 
of the firm.  The meetings (coupled with the training plans described above) showed a 
focus on a more formal assessment of the skills deficits of staff and the creation of a 
plan to address those skills gaps. This ultimately resulted in an application to 
Enterprise Ireland for funding under a training grant in 2005. The other major 
discussion item in 2004 was the potential which was being identified in the software 
solutions in Precise Data. This manifested itself in a series of meetings with Alan and 
Paul Leamy to discuss the developments which had already taken place with the 
software and outline planning for a major application to Enterprise Ireland for 
research and development funding under a Research, Technology and Innovation 
(RTI) initiative. 
 
The year of 2005 continued this consideration of the application for research and 
development funding for Precise Data to fund the software development.  More 
significantly, the relationship with a large pharmaceutical company in north Dublin 
was developing quickly.  A range of pre-press production services were being 
provided and initial discussions had taken place in relation to the software solutions 
which might be provided.  An opportunity arose with this client to place printing 
equipment on site to produce all of the leaflet requirements of the plant. Instruction 
leaflets were required for each pack of medication produced to instruct the user in 
proper dosages, contra-indications etc.  This project, although ultimately never 
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implemented, resulted in many meetings with the client company and a number of site 
visits to explore possible locations and the resulting operational issues which might 
arise from establishing a small printing facility on site. These meetings were 
instrumental in developing the business relationship with the client beyond what had 
previously existed.  
 
The following year, 2006, was dominated by two separate aspects of the company’s 
development.  Firstly, the changes in the company’s original core business continued 
apace and required a series of actions to manage the impact.  Secondly, the 
opportunity to develop the software business was being grasped.  The on-going 
changes to the original business meant that a focus on operations became necessary.  
Employee numbers were reduced in line with the continuing loss of traditional pre-
press business.  A project was considered and implemented to place Perigord 
equipment onto a major print company client’s site which would be operated by 
Perigord employees in situ.  This allowed Perigord to retain the contract for the 
production of all the origination material for this client.  The data work was handled in 
Perigord’s facility with processed files being transmitted via a broadband connection 
to the client’s site for output locally.  In addition to the staff reductions and client site 
capital investment programme, an application was made to Enterprise Ireland for 
funding under the Productivity Improvement Fund for two of the Perigord companies.  
This fund was designed to assist in training initiatives and capital investment projects 
which were specifically targeted at increasing the productivity of employees in the 
manufacturing side of the business.  These applications were substantial and required 
many meetings to progress in the period from September 2005 to April 2006.  The 
funding secured provided substantial additional assistance in relation to the company’s 
cross-training agenda.  In addition, capital assistance was provided by way of a 
modest grant which was partially repayable within three years.  
 
Once the funding for productivity improvement had been secured the company’s 
focus returned to the development of the software side of the business.  Plans were 
made to spin out the software development division into a separate company. 
Although the division was named Precise Data, legally it was part of the core 
company Litho Studios Ltd. A decision was made to establish the new company from 
1
st
 January 2007.  In late 2006, discussions commenced with Enterprise Ireland in 
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relation to the possibility of funding the new company under the High Potential Start 
Up (HPSU) initiative.  This funding takes the form of an investment in cumulative, 
redeemable, convertible preference shares in the business.  This became the major 
focus for 2007.   
 
The other area of focus for 2006 was the acquisition of new premises for the group 
which allowed the consolidation of all facilities under one roof in Damastown.  
Considerable work was done with architects to plan the layouts of the new building 
and the appropriate division of space between the elements of the operation.  The 
move of all of the equipment and personnel took place in the summer of 2006. 
 
The period from October 2006 to March 2008 was substantially focused on the 
development of the application for HPSU funding for Precise Data Solutions Ltd.  
This application required a considerable amount of planning and financial modelling.  
It resulted in the first comprehensive business plan for the software company.  Prior to 
this point, the planning for the software development had been relatively ad hoc with 
opportunities being pursued as they arose without any particular client industry focus.  
The planning phase involved a significant number of meetings which established the 
potential of the pharmaceutical sector for the service as well as the potential scale of 
this market segment.  Considerable time was invested in learning about this market, its 
regulatory frameworks, the operational realities of artwork production etc. The 
process culminated with two significant outputs.  The business had a robust business 
plan which mapped out the potential development trajectory.  The business also 
secured a significant level of investment from Enterprise Ireland to supplement the 
substantial company investment which was on going. 
 
The other priority during 2007 was the decision to establish a facility in Singapore.  
Perigord had a number of major international clients who operated on a global scale.  
Perigord was winning business and capturing an increasing level of market share with 
some of these clients. The delivery of these services was required on a global scale.  
Perigord was well placed to meet these demands in Europe and America with its 
facilities in Dublin and Connecticut.  
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Table 10: Alan Leamy’s changing strategic priorities 2002-2010 
2002-2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Management control 
processes. 
New business 
opportunities with 
software 
development 
 
Print facility 
on Pharma 
client site 
Productivity 
improvement plans 
and funding 
HPSU funding 
for software 
company 
Strategic Review of 
group and competitor 
review 
Stability  of 
the business 
Stability of 
the business 
Training of 
individuals 
Training plans – 
especially cross 
training of staff 
 
Training Plate-setter device in 
client print company 
 
Factory move 
 
Singapore office Group wide sales 
offering 
Funding 
software 
development 
Software 
sales 
Recognition of 
impending collapse 
of trade business 
RTI to fund software  Reduction of 
employee numbers 
Development of 
software company 
 Management 
capability 
Cost 
reductions 
R&D 
funding for 
automatic 
artwork 
generation 
 
 
                 A constant priority has been engaging with and listening to clients in relation to their needs and how the firm could meet those needs 
 
 
  
Source: Notes from business meetings with Alan Leamy
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However, it was clear that some form of presence in the Pacific Rim was required to 
respond more locally in those regions and also to demonstrate to clients and 
prospective clients that Perigord was a truly global player in this market. As a result of 
a number of exploratory visits to the region a new operation was established in 
Singapore in early 2008. An additional element of the market requirement which led 
to the establishment of the Singapore facility was the requirement by many software 
companies to expand the range of languages which they could incorporate into their 
packaging.  This led to Perigord establishing a research and development project to 
develop the range of languages it could handle in an automated fashion.  Funding was 
secured in early 2008 from Enterprise Ireland under its R&D Stimulation Programme 
to assist in this project. 
 
The priority for development in 2008 largely focused on the range of services which 
the Perigord Group had to offer.  Meetings considered the competitive position of the 
company and who the emerging competitors for the software service were.  The 
competitor companies in this space often offered a range of services which included 
all elements of the artwork production process including stages like photography and 
creative copy writing.  Perigord evaluated the competitive offerings and evaluated the 
commercial advantages of adding to the range of services available. As a result of this 
analysis, it was decided not to add to the Perigord range of services.  However, the 
analysis did lead to a decision to consolidate the sales approach of the group to a 
considerable extent.  The potential to leverage the software solutions for print services 
or for artwork management contract services was recognised. This plan meant that 
sales and promotion efforts could lead with the software solutions and the advantages 
of control and operational oversight which they would provide to the client.  This 
allowed for a differentiation from other print or pre-press services companies, even if 
the software solution was never of real interest to the prospective client.   
 
2008 was also a period where Alan Leamy was reflecting on the management 
structure of the group and the best way of utilising the skills and expertise of his 
management team.  A key issue for Alan Leamy had become the consideration of the 
most effective use of his own time. It was clear to him that the sales approach for the 
software solution required his attention at the same time that the business required the 
consistent attention of a general manager.  Plans were established to develop a small 
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number of key executives in relation to their role in promoting and selling the 
software products as well as planning for the possible recruitment of a general 
manager to manage the day to day business. 
 
The economic collapse which began in 2008 had an impact on Perigord.  Many of its 
key clients delayed significant new product launches as businesses froze all 
discretionary spending for a time.  This resulted in substantial pressure on Perigord 
from a cash flow and profitability perspective.  As a result, the focus of the company 
in 2009 shifted to a more tactical, survival mode from the preceding number of years 
which had been considerably more strategic in outlook.  A number of cost reduction 
initiatives were implemented which included staff number reductions, salary 
reductions for remaining staff and the reduction of input costs from all suppliers.  The 
company also made applications to the Employment Subsidy Scheme which was 
operated by Enterprise Ireland in December 2009.  This scheme was developed to 
provide a level of support to firms in return for a commitment to retain a minimum 
number of people in employment. It became clear in the latter part of the year that the 
level of investment which would be required to ensure the survival of the business 
overall was significant.  Perigord had been investing heavily in the development of the 
software solutions.  It had also invested heavily in the new premises in 2006 prior to 
the economic downturn of 2008-2009. This funding imperative resulted in the 
assessment of the possibility of applying for funding from Enterprise Ireland under the 
Enterprise Stabilisation Fund (ESF).  This fund was established to assist otherwise 
profitable companies to weather the storm of the economic collapse of 2008-2009.  
The investment in this case was in the form of cumulative, redeemable preference 
shares.  The preparation of the application for ESF funding dominated the company’s 
development agenda for much of late 2009 and the early months of 2010. 
 
The completion of the ESF application and the successful securing of the funds it 
provided assisted in re-capitalising the business.  The process required had resulted in 
the streamlining of the business from a cost inputs perspective and had certainly 
focused the mind of senior managers in terms of a performance imperative for the new 
software developments.  2010 saw the completion of the re-development of GLAMS 
to a configurable off the shelf system which was capable of being validated by 
pharmaceutical companies.  This meant that the focus could shift towards the 
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concerted and confident promotion of the system to a wide range of pharmaceutical 
companies.  Discussions with Alan Leamy in this period recorded the progress 
towards achieving sales in this period which saw the first two new system sales being 
achieved.  The release of the cash flow pressure of 2009 and the completion of the 
development phase of GLAMS also allowed the company to consider the next stage of 
research and development required.  It was apparent that some of the services which 
the company offers are subject to threat from low labour cost economies as the 
services are relatively labour intensive and not particularly skilled.  The potential 
exists to significantly automate these stages through an automatic artwork generation 
tool which the company believes it can develop.  Planning began in late 2010 for this 
process and an application for funding from the research and development 
programmes of Enterprise Ireland was being considered. 
 
Over the period under review, there is an evident shift in the focus from more tactical 
issues to the more strategic.  The change in focus from initiatives around employee 
skills and productivity levels to the development of strategic sales plans and 
organisational review is clear.  It is true that the means by which Alan Leamy 
addressed the earlier issues was uncommon in the industry, as demonstrated by the 
level of investment in training and development.  Similarly, although many companies 
struggled with productivity issues, Perigord was successful in securing funding from 
Enterprise Ireland for two of its subsidiaries in this regard. Throughout all of his 
tenure as CEO, Alan Leamy has demonstrated a consistent engagement with clients to 
better understand their needs and to ascertain how Perigord might meet those needs. 
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6.2Case analysis II 
A number of central themes emerged from the initial discussion of the case data in 
section 4.3.  These themes are now re-visited in the context of the additional data 
described in the previous section. 
 
6.2.1 Theme 1 – A focus on performance 
This theme emerged from Alan Leamy’s focus on the firm’s performance.  The 
additional data described in this chapter supports this theme in the manner in which 
the firm developed and in which Alan Leamy drove that development. However, little 
of value is added to this theme in the new data as this theme emerged so clearly in the 
interview data described in Chapter 4. 
 
6.2.2 Theme 2 – Capacity building 
In the discussion of this theme in Chapter 4, the development of Perigord’s capacity 
was described in terms of the development of the technology and the people 
employed. Table 11 shows the evolution of new capabilities and market positions in 
Perigord from 1974 to 2010. For convenience, the table is divided into ten year time 
spans with the final column relating to the seven years to 2010.  The labels for this 
table are drawn from the organisational capability literature discussed in Chapter 5.  
Perigord’s initial capabilities were largely people dependent and relied on a high level 
of tacit knowledge and experience.  The emergence of new technologies in the 1980s 
fundamentally altered the market opportunities available to Perigord. Perigord 
embraced the new technology and developed a reputation as experts in the 
manipulation of files and the handling of postscript (the file structure used to create 
image files).  A consequence of this change in the market was that the vast majority of 
pre-press firms in Ireland closed.  However, Perigord survived. Under new 
management, the firm has adapted to the changing environment and purposefully 
developed new resources and capabilities, allowing it to provide software solutions for 
the management of the design and creation stages of branded artwork as well as the 
global dissemination and control of files for production. The change in focus and the 
development of the software tools from 2004 has had a marked impact on the 
company’s future development potential. The following sections discuss the table 
rows in detail.
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Table 11: Capacity building in the Perigord Group 1974-2010  
 1974-1984 1984-1993 1994-2004 2004-2010 
Resources  
(firm specific) 
 
Analogue scanners 
Experienced employees 
Apple Macs 
Digitisation of pre-press 
Scitex workflow system 
Paul Leamy re-joins firm with software skills 
Michael Fleming recruited with PC and other 
skills 
Project managers hired and trained 
Alan developing management skills 
Access to intermediary 
Team of programmers created 
Access to external subject matter experts – 
software, Pharma etc. 
Alan Leamy as a creative force 
Paul Leamy’s technical excellence 
Ability to manage off-site facilities for clients 
Work with intermediary 
 
Routines and 
Competencies  
 
 
Employee skills in 
scanning, colour re-
touching, hand planning 
 
Skills in “new” digital 
technology 
Ability to work with postscript 
and font issues. Recognised as 
experts with this technology 
Output of planned film 
 
 
Skills in PC work. 
Expansion of workflow systems. 
Project Management for clients. Colour 
Management. 
Output of digital and analogue media 
 
 
Software tools allowing better management 
tracking and information. 
Project management skills. 
Workflow systems extended into clients premises.  
Client site management. 
 
Organisational 
Capabilities 
 
Scanning market for 
opportunity. 
Prepared to acquire 
resources when required. 
Prepared to invest in 
developing technology. 
Ability to leverage technological 
developments to respond to client needs. 
Matching technical capability with market 
opportunity. 
Leveraging non-employee experts. 
Scanning competitor offerings. 
Proactively seeking/developing solutions which 
clients might require. 
 
Outcomes: 
    
 
Products/ Services 
 
Pre-press services to trade in 
Ireland. 
Publishers in newspapers, 
magazines and book 
publishing including an 
expansion into the USA 
 
New customers- Apple and 
Microsoft. 
Expansion of publishing 
business 
 
Publishing – excluding newspapers 
Software clients. 
Generics Pharma  
Basic document tracking solutions. 
Project management services for 
publishing requirements. 
 
Software tools for managing the design, creation, 
amendment and production of artwork. 
Artwork management services. 
 
Source:  Business meetings with Alan Leamy 2004-2010
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Resources: 
The Perigord Group has a history of investing in the development of its technological 
and human resources. From its inception, the company invested heavily in technology 
and acquired state of the art colour scanner technology.  When the Apple Macintosh 
computer became robust enough for industrial use, the company invested to ensure 
that it remained at the cutting edge of developments.  As it became apparent that 
digitisation was the way forward, the company invested in workflow software which 
allowed it to handle client’s files with the minimum of intervention possible.  The 
recruitment of employees with the appropriate skills was a deliberate and repeatedly 
used strategy.  Alan Leamy described the hiring of a key executive with Apples Mac 
knowledge, even though he had little knowledge of the pre-press sector.  Michael 
Fleming’s recall of his own appointment to the company and his subsequent 
development through it are testimony to how the company secured and empowered 
the necessary human resources. 
 
As the emphasis on equipment based technology lessened around 2004, the company 
continued to ensure that the appropriate human resources were available.  Michael 
Fleming described how skilled project managers were brought into the company, 
initially to manage the Microsoft business.  The impact of this resource was visible 
and led to the investment in the recruitment and re-training of existing employees to 
broaden the scope of the project management approach. As the software solutions 
became a more central element of the company’s development, programmer skills 
were recruited and retained through third parties. 
 
It is evident from Alan Leamy that he values and utilises his network of contacts to 
the benefits of the business.  His recruitment of the executive with Apple Mac 
knowledge was a clear example of this.  By bringing in appropriate skills at the right 
time, the company was able to maximise the impact of the new technology.  Alan 
Leamy was able to develop a friendship with a key supplier to establish the Exact 
Digital printing business during his period away from the company.  On taking up the 
position of CEO, Alan Leamy re-established contact with me and put a formal 
consultancy agreement in place which provided strategic management advice as well 
as a key resource for the completion of specific tasks and documentation.  Some of 
these contacts were structured less formally.  Alan Leamy was also able to gain 
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valuable information on the generics pharmaceutical industry from an acquaintance 
who worked in another part of the supply chain to that sector. This colleague was able 
to provide valuable background information on the sector and developments within it.  
He was also able to provide contact details for potential clients of the software 
solutions being developed.  
 
Routines and competencies: 
It was evident in how Alan Leamy described the competitive advantage of Perigord in 
the 1970s and 1980s as being related to its skill in colour management and the 
handling of clients “re-touching” requirements.  These skills allowed the company to 
win new business from the USA despite the time difference and distance issues. 
Perigord developed skills and competences in digital workflow as soon as these 
technologies were developed.  Many originators of documents struggled with the 
technology at this stage as there were many technical issues relating to font usage and 
the manipulation of postscript files.  These issues regularly led to critical errors in the 
make-up of publications.  Perigord developed expertise in this area which allowed 
them prosper.  File handling continued to be developed with the emergence of Adobe 
Acrobat as the technical solution to these font and output issues. 
 
The company also developed strict control routines in relation to file handling, quality 
control and image processing.  Perigord was at the forefront of implementing the 
necessary controls to ensure accuracy and precision in the development of large 
format output devices in Ireland.  Developing expertise in this area was critical as this 
technological development removed a substantial part of the labour input normally 
provided by Perigord to its clients.  As imaging technology developed, Perigord 
developed the routines and competences necessary to deliver data to imaging devices 
remotely thereby allowing the company to provide pre-press solutions to clients on the 
client’s site. 
 
Finally, the development of routines and competences in the area of software 
development are now central to the firm’s success.  Capturing client feedback in a 
manner which allows inclusion into development plans is essential.  Perigord had 
learned how to explore client needs in relation to tracking solutions and information 
sharing requirements.  The firm’s employees are able to add to the functionality of the 
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software in this manner.  The requirement to have the software validated for the 
pharmaceutical industry is an example of this competence. Validation for the 
pharmaceutical sector involves demonstrating that the software and all of its 
components are consistently robust in the manner in which data is handled to ensure 
product accuracy throughout.  In this instance, the company was able to work with a 
third party organisation with experience of the validation process. By dedicating 
internal resources to the project, Perigord was able to establish the factors to be 
addressed and to deliver the project to completion. 
 
Organisational capabilities 
Organisational capabilities relate to the ability of a firm to coordinate resources to 
perform certain tasks towards a predefined outcome.  It is evident that Perigord 
managed to develop both its resources and routines and competences over time.  The 
firm developed a range of capabilities in investing in and making use of new 
technologies as they emerged.  The transition in its business from a traditional pre-
press services company to a company which offers a wide range of brand management 
and localisation services based on an internet enabled software platform suggests that 
some underlying dynamic capabilities also exist. 
 
The concepts underlying evolutionary theory are clearly evident in Perigord.  Key 
decisions taken at various stages in its development allowed it to develop a resource 
base which led to additional, but consequent developments. Hiring a key manager 
with experience of Apple Mac technology allowed the company to develop its skills 
and competences at a pace which allowed it capture market share.  Some of these 
skills allowed the creation of the developmental attitude described by Michael 
Fleming where Perigord became known for its ability to resolve client issues. A 
decision to invest in early stage imaging devices allowed the company to build up 
expertise in this area which it consistently leveraged to maximise client advantage. 
The decision to take some relatively simple tracking tools which had been developed 
by Paul Leamy for internal control purposes and to develop them into an initial client 
model allowed the company to sample the possibilities of software development.  Path 
dependency in the developmental process is obvious.  Initial decisions allowed the 
company to build on early stage developments and to create something more 
substantial. 
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It is possible to describe this development process as a rudimentary dynamic 
capability as Perigord sought information from the marketplace and adjusted its 
resources accordingly. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) stated that “the order of 
implantation of dynamic capabilities is consequential”.  That is that some capabilities 
are foundational to others and so must exist in advance of developing others.  While 
these individual examples demonstrate the company’s ability to develop capabilities, 
it is the purposefulness with which these initial decisions are taken which can be 
labelled a dynamic capability.  The company has demonstrated a consistent 
commitment to engaging with developments in a positive manner.  Where gaps in 
resources have been identified, the company has purposefully sought ways to add the 
resources necessary to begin to address them.  Over the past fifteen years, it is 
reasonable to say that Alan Leamy was at the core of these decisions.  It was rarely the 
case that Alan could foresee the final outcome of the decision being taken.  Many 
decisions related to addressing short term issues which had been identified.  However, 
there was an element of an act of faith that the addition of the resource or the 
investment in the creation of a capability would yield positive results.  In addition to 
the ability to make the initial decisions, Alan Leamy was also capable of building on 
the emerging insights of these first steps.  This is especially evident in the software 
development where the extent of the commercial opportunity went through a number 
of iterations in his mind before culminating in the current offering. This combination 
of the ability to identify the need to take action coupled with the ability to identify and 
acquire suitable resources to address the issue is at the core of dynamic capability.  
The purposefulness with which these decisions were taken and the increasing 
confidence apparent in the investment decisions related to the software development 
suggests that a dynamic capability was being developed in this area. 
 
Products and services 
Table 11 shows the development in the products and services of Perigord in the period 
under review. In effect, these are the outcomes of the processes described above and 
show the market transition which was supported by these processes.  In the first 
period, Perigord provided traditional pre-press services to its clients.  It was unusual 
amongst its peers at the time in that it supplied publishers in the USA as a result of its 
high quality colour manipulation capabilities.  Perigord was at the forefront of the 
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opportunities which arose with the growing software and hardware businesses of the 
middle 1980a and early 1990s. The ability to handle new forms of origination and the 
increasing ability to handle many languages was critical at this stage.  From the mid-
1990s, the ability to offer project management services coupled with the developing 
technical capabilities allowed Perigord to capture new markets.  
 
This development in products and services has now evolved to position where the 
client can be provided with a very broad range of services.  Perigord can develop and 
customise an internet enabled software platform which will allow the client to manage 
the process of creation, amending, storing and distributing all types of artwork related 
to print and packaging items. The system can store libraries of past documents and 
approved images.  This level of control and functionality appeals strongly to 
purchasing and supply chain managers as well as to marketing managers striving to 
produce material ever more quickly with reducing budgets.  Perigord can also provide 
a range of translation and localisation services to take English language master files 
and convert them to all significant languages on a worldwide basis.  Perigord can take 
the localised files and bring the artwork files to a condition which is ready for 
distribution to any production facility in the world. The software can also allow the 
client to manage the procurement process related to design and print projects by 
requesting and managing a tendering process and the pursuant orders and document 
workflow.  This full range service drives business levels which can be exclusively 
software related, or include software and production services. 
 
6.2.3 Theme 3 - The evolution of higher order learning 
Chapter 4 described the scale of investment in training which took place in Perigord.  
It also described the evolution in the nature of the learning which took place in the 
firm as a clearly identifiable transition to higher order learning emerged.  Table 11 in 
describing the development of the capacity of the firm also captures the development 
in skills and competences which facilitated the overall development in the firm’s 
capacity. The description of the changing strategic priorities of Alan Leamy in section 
6.1 support this theme strongly although little is added to what was previously 
identified. 
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6.2.4 Theme 4 – Managerial purposefulness 
The data reveals instances of purposeful decision making on the part of Alan Leamy. 
The changes in the market and technology described in Chapter 4 required a response 
from the CEO.  However, it is also evident that many firms in similar situations to 
Perigord did not succeed in making the required changes and surviving. The 
description of the changing priorities of Alan Leamy demonstrate his evolving 
capacity to act purposefully in leading the strategic development of Perigord. 
 
The decision to invest heavily in the development of a software solution required a 
significant departure from the previous business model of the firm.  While the 
investment level required emerged gradually, Alan Leamy remained committed to it 
and in fact developed his commitment to it as he began to appreciate the scale of the 
opportunity available to the firm.  Similarly, he made significant investment decisions 
in relation to the re-location of the businesses to a new premises in 2006 and also in 
the investment in a large printing machine in 2007. 
 
The interview data also contained references to the theme of managerial 
purposefulness in Perigord.  This data was also supported by some references to the 
entrepreneurial attitude of Alan Leamy and Anne Cooke and how this fed into 
decision making. 
 
Table 12 shows excerpts from the data which show the reliance on the senior 
management team for decision making within the firm. The centrality of Alan Leamy 
to key decisions is evident from the references to how discussions on major decisions 
evolved in relation to the printing press investment, the development of the software 
solution (GLAMS) and the decision to establish overseas offices.  The references to 
an entrepreneurial spirit by Alan Leamy and Anne Cooke reveal their attitude to 
decision making and the normalcy of being in business and making decisions in a 
positive manner.   
 
 
 
 
 
 151 
 
 
Table 12:Managerial purposefulness 
Leadership in the Senior Team
442 "it was the natural thing that I would have been talking to 
Andrew and Paul…" on developing Glams etc (Alan Leamy)
476 "Anne was heavily involved in the purchasing of that" printing  
press (Alan Leamy)
466 "I wanted to keep my options open" on procuring the new 
printing press (Anne Cooke)
442 "when I bought the press" (authors emphasis) (Anne Cooke)
316 " a lot of those are led by Alan…(Michael Fleming)
480 "he is very progressive on these fronts and he sees that they are 
necessary for doing business" (Michael Fleming on opening offices 
in Singapore and the west coast of the USA)
644 "mainly me and Alan" (Paul Leamy on the Glams ideas)
Entrepreneurial Spirit
242 "business was a natural thing for me at the time" (Alan Leamy 
on starting a dress hire business on leaving school)
259 "as you say it was probably the genes of like father, like son" 
(Alan Leamy on schools direct.)
427 "you know what I mean, there was a gut feeling" (Alan Leamy 
on decision making)
126 "I would have other things going on...I was working in hotels at 
night and working in Brunswick and studying …" (Anne Cooke)
477 "I probably could have involved the others more, but sometimes 
when you see the answer is crystal clear…" (Anne Cooke)
 
 
6.2.5 Theme 5 – Use of third parties 
The final theme to emerge from the data was that of how the firm made use of third 
parties in its development. Initially, the interview data included a number of 
references to how external parties were able to contribute to the firm’s development.  
Table 13 includes some extracts from the interview data in this regard. Alan Leamy 
and Anne Cooke made a number of references to how working with me had aided the 
development of the company in terms of adding professionalism and in dealing with 
government agencies. Alan Leamy gave an example of how he had come to know 
Enda Casey who had been supplying photocopiers to his business.  They struck up a 
relationship which subsequently evolved into a business opportunity which they 
shared. 
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Table 13: Use of third parties 
External Influences
559 "and then working with yourself" (Alan Leamy on the benefit of 
the Precise Data plan)
557 "we wouldn’t have those grants only for the likes of you. If we 
didn’t know you we could have fallen by the wayside and we 
wouldn’t be funded by EI" (Anne Cooke)
356 "we had to institute training plans…before that it would have 
been "God it would be great if we had more cross training wouldn’t 
it..." (Paul Leamy commenintg on the need to plan training due to EI 
funding)
317"through that - I met Enda Casey" (Alan Leamy on meeting 
Enda and subsequently starting Exact Digital)
 
In addition, the review of the strategic priorities in section 6.1 provided additional 
examples of how the firm made use of third parties in its development.  Industry 
experts were leveraged in the process of validating the software for use in the 
pharmaceutical industry; a pharmaceutical industry veteran was engaged to develop 
the firm’s knowledge of the European pharmaceutical sector; a USA based company 
with expert knowledge of the pharmaceutical market was engaged to manage the 
promotion of the firm’s services; a former business associate of Alan Leamy was 
contracted to open and manage the Perigord New Zealand office. This was a 
deliberate strategy on the part of Alan Leamy to leverage a required resource for a 
short period while it was required. 
 
The following section analyses this extended data in the context of the literature and 
addresses the first of the research questions posed in Chapter 1 “did dynamic 
capabilities emerge in the Perigord Group?” 
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6.3 The emergence of a dynamic capability in the Perigord Group 
6.3.1 Dynamic capabilities are present in the Perigord Group 
Dynamic capability is defined here as the ability of a firm to develop the “capacity to 
purposefully create, extend or modify its resource base” (Helfat et al. 2007 p.4).  
Based on the definitions of Teece et al (1997) and Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) this 
purposefulness is in response to environmental changes.  In other words, the 
purposefulness of the firm in creating, extending or modifying its resources in 
response to environmental change is the measure of dynamic capability. 
Purposefulness is the key as opposed to accidental or purely evolutionary change 
which might have been reasonably predicted in advance.  
 
The case data reveals instances of such purposefulness and also of what should be 
described as evolutionary change.  However, the data also reveals a significant 
increase in the purposefulness of decision making with respect to some aspects of the 
firm’s business.  This leads to the conclusion that there is evidence in the data that 
Perigord Group is characterised by a dynamic capability. 
 
The evidence from the data is as follows.  Perigord has been in business since 1974. 
The data revealed an underlying business principle of investing in appropriate 
technology and in the development of people. Many of the investments made were 
incremental in terms of keeping abreast of productive efficiency.  Incremental 
investments included adoption of new scanning technology, the installation of a Scitex 
workflow system, the evolution of capability in handling postscript and portable 
document format (pdf) files and the capability to manage an extensive range of 
languages (Michael Fleming Interview).  The investments in Apple Macs etc were a 
step change in terms of functionality and skills sets.  However, it is reasonable to view 
them as relatively incremental developments in terms of the technology in use for the 
delivery of the services offered.  Much of the training prior to 2005 was directly 
related to the equipment investment decisions made.  Although there was 
purposefulness to the decisions in terms of staying abreast of technological innovation 
and in maximising efficiencies, the environment was relatively stable until the mid to 
late 1990s. It seems reasonable to describe this capability as a capability to adopt 
rather than a dynamic capability as the environment was relatively stable and the 
decisions made were largely predictable. Anecdotal evidence suggests that most firms 
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in the industry at that time made similar investment decisions. The fact that many 
firms implemented the same resource change simultaneously does not preclude such 
actions being part of a dynamic capability as defined, but it certainly impacts on its 
noteworthiness from a theoretical perspective. 
 
As outlined in section 6.2, the firm developed a new software solution to manage its 
client’s artwork management processes beginning in 2004.  The early stages of that 
solution were completely evolutionary in that they attempted to automate control 
systems which had previously existed.  Functionality was added over time to address 
specific issues as they arose. However, by 2007, the company had recognised the 
potential value in the solution it had available.  It was able to leverage the software to 
win artwork management and printing sales. It began to see opportunity to offer the 
software as a service in its own right. Recognising the nature of the environment for 
software sales to pharmaceutical companies required a decision to address both the 
validation issue and the need to re-develop the software into a customisable 
configurable off the shelf system.  The nature of these decisions was different to the 
incremental decisions in relation to investment in technology and training in the 1970s 
and 1980s.  This decision was taken to purposefully add significantly to the firm’s 
resources to allow it to compete in a new environment in the face of significant 
disruptive change in its traditional market environment. The data revealed not only the 
development of the software tools, but also the recruitment of key software project 
management staff, software programmers and test engineers and the allocation of 
substantial existing resources to sales and market development initiatives. It is these 
decisions that suggest that a dynamic capability had clearly emerged. 
 
6.3.2 Capability, purposefulness and resource creation, extension and modification 
The following sections discuss and analyse changes in three primary factors (learning, 
resources and managerial agency) which were empirically observable in the Perigord 
Group and which played a role in the development of the dynamic capability present.  
The three primary factors map onto the definition of dynamic capability used in that 
learning feeds the capability to act purposefully while managerial agency pertains to 
acting purposefully.  Resources, and the use of intermediaries, self-evidently relate to 
the issue of resources within the definition. 
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Building capability 
Perigord invested heavily in the development of its people. Table 6 detailed the level 
of investment in the four year period 2005 to 2008. The company invested an average 
of 3.2% of labour costs in training initiatives which was four times the average 
investment level of comparable firms in Ireland.  This training included substantial 
cross-training and multi-skilling initiatives for operators.  Programmes included 
training in the use of desktop publishing software, imposition software and the use of 
specialised tools for the layout and development of product packaging.  The objective 
of these programmes was to allow existing employees develop the skills required to 
perform in the changing business (Michael Fleming Interview).  In addition, a number 
of programmes for senior managers were undertaken, including the Transform 
programme with Enterprise Ireland, six sigma training as well as a comprehensive 
programme of seminars and conferences (Alan Leamy Interview). 
 
The development of Perigord can be linked to the transition from lower order learning 
to higher order learning. The literature has several different terminologies around this 
concept, but all attempt to draw a fundamental distinction between learning which is 
task oriented within relatively clearly defined structures, where the desired outcomes 
are well understood and learning which challenges the organization to review and 
assess its fundamental assumptions, priorities, methods of operation and objectives. 
The change is being described as a transition in this discussion, although it would be 
more correct to describe it as an extension of learning as the firm continued to invest 
in lower order learning initiatives which is entirely appropriate for certain tasks and 
processes.  An extension along a continuum towards higher order learning means that 
higher order learning began to happen in addition to the lower order learning rather 
than instead of it.  The references to the transition to higher order learning below 
should be interpreted in this context. 
 
The transition from viewing the software as a simple tracking tool for the control of 
production to realising the opportunity which a comprehensive process management 
solution offers took a considerable period of time and also required a substantial shift 
in mind-set on the part of the key managers. The initial development phase was 
characterized by adaptive learning (Senge 1990) where the company engaged in a 
series of incremental learning within its traditional scope of organisational activities 
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(Slater and Narver 1995). Perigord was constrained by its own view of the market 
opportunity available to it.  The capability of the software solution was largely seen as 
an opportunity independent of the “main” business.  Initially, its value was perceived 
in relation to a simple tracking solution which could provide progress updates 
internally and then to clients.  Conversely, generative learning is characterised as 
creativity, breakthrough and organisational unlearning (Wang 2008) which accurately 
describes the shift in thinking within the firm in relation to the opportunities 
presented. Slater & Narver (1995) suggest that this requires a fundamental 
understanding of the underlying cause-effect relationship between the environment 
and the firm. The realisation of the dynamics of the pharmaceutical industry and the 
generics pharmaceuticals industry in particular in relation to the need for bringing 
product to market quickly once existing patents expire meant that the development of 
a solution to manage and expedite this process would have real market value. Alan 
Leamy and consequently the firm now appreciates the significance of the market 
offering it has and is moving to exploit the opportunity. 
 
This shift in mind-set can also be exemplified by a distinction between the two CEOs 
of the company.  The founding CEO, Pat Leamy was successful at identifying 
opportunities as they developed and aggressively pursuing them through technology 
investment or through the acquisition of resources (Allied, Cosmon, Print Facility, 
Educational publisher). The shift over recent years with the new CEO, Alan Leamy, 
has been to a much more proactive approach which seeks to create solutions which he 
believes the clients will use, but really before the clients express the need. However, 
this capability emerged in Alan Leamy over time. The review of strategic priorities in 
Chapter 6 above suggests that Alan Leamy has indeed become more focussed on 
identifying how to leverage the group’s intellectual and managerial resources to 
maximise its strategic opportunity. 
 
This transition relates closely to Argyris’s (1976) single versus double loop learning 
where the company now asks the questions of itself in relation to the business model 
being adopted, what assumptions are no longer valid and what the implications are for 
it in relation to how it operates.  The more recent move towards a global sales 
approach is an indication of the double loop thinking which goes to the heart of what 
the client base needs in the context of artwork management solutions and the 
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company’s capability to deliver that all-encompassing solution. This contrasts with the 
previous approach where sales from the Irish facilities were predominantly to Irish 
clients. 
 
Perigord, through its key managers, also learned from its own actions and from the 
processes it engaged in. The concept that capability development can be consequential 
(Eisenhardt and Marin 2000) is evidenced in Perigord’s investment decisions. 
Perigord’s market focus and ability to identify and use information was apparent in 
Alan Leamy’s description of firm investment decisions during the 1970s and 1980s.  
For example, the firm decided to invest in new computer technology at a very early 
stage and Alan Leamy took the unusual step (for the industry at that time) of hiring an 
individual with considerable process knowledge to assist the company and its clients 
in making the transition to the new technology. Alan Leamy is clearly of the view that 
these earlier investment decisions and the importance of hiring and developing staff 
were central to the firm’s growth and success. Schlemmer and Webb (2008 p.124) in 
reviewing data from thirteen companies found a “reinforcing feedback loop in which 
strong commitment towards the development of dynamic capabilities determines 
actions in their development process, which can lead to competitive advantage which 
reinforces managers’ assumptions”.  Alan Leamy learned from the actions undertaken 
and the benefits which ensued. In describing his approach to investment in new 
technology, Alan said “…so it worked … it was obviously just a gut policy that 
worked so that’s …you know …so that’s been the way” (Alan Leamy Interview).  
This cumulative impact was exemplified by the decision to hire the executive with 
Apple Mac experience. This allowed the firm to develop a capability in managing 
postscript files, which facilitated a transition to a workflow management system which 
in turn facilitated the developments in automating how some files were processed. 
 
The literature suggests that it may not be easy for a firm to engage in higher order 
learning.  This is because of the difficulty many managers have in recognising the 
assumptions which they make about their firm and the difficulty of being able to 
challenge this effectively in the normal course of business. This can be a result of the 
self-image developed over time (Penrose 1959, Weick 2001, Hilliard 2004), the 
myopia of experience (Levinthal and March 1993), the competency trap of certain 
core capabilities (Leonard-Barton 1992) or the fundamental inability of managers to 
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question their, frequently unstated, assumptions about their business model (Fiol and 
Leyles 1985, Senge 1990a, Wang 2008). It is also possible for a myopia to develop 
within an industry sector to the exclusion of new ideas (Maskell and Malmberg 2007).   
 
The literature suggests that this issue is generally only overcome as a result of a shock 
or major environmental change for a firm.  It is clear that Perigord suffered a series of 
shocks or significant environmental disturbances in the period examined.  The illness 
and death of its founder, Pat Leamy, led to a change in the management team structure 
which by its nature allowed an alternative view of the business to be developed.  The 
industry context of the firm was such that significant market and technological change 
was underway.  Chapter 4 described the development of the Apple Mac technology 
and the impact of increasing digitisation on the business.  This was coupled with the 
collapsing cost of such technology which allowed many of Perigord’s previous 
customers to invest in the technology and thereby bring the services in-house resulting 
in a significant loss of business to Perigord.  These foundational shifts in the 
technology enabled radical and life threatening changes to firms in the pre-press 
services sector of the printing industry like Perigord. These changes resulted in a 
prolonged catastrophic shake-out of the sector resulting in the closure of 
approximately 90% of its firms. 
 
It is not clear that the change in management caused any significant change in the 
fundamental strategic approach of the firm. The firm had a belief in hiring employees 
with specific skill sets and then encouraged them to develop their skills and 
competences over a protracted period of time. Michael Fleming’s description of his 
early career in the company and how he was encouraged and facilitated to develop his 
skills happened prior to the change in management.  It seems clear that there was a 
general ethos, albeit non-formalised, within the business which encouraged the 
recruitment and development of key staff. The data reveals an enhancement of this 
approach under the new management team where training initiatives became more 
structured and formalised but there is no evidence to suggest that this was a 
consequence of the change in management. It seems likely that the formalisation of 
these plans was mostly related to the requirements of the application process for state 
funding. 
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The technological and market changes which impacted on the sector had a significant 
and identifiable impact on the firm’s strategy.  It is evident in the data that these 
changes presented opportunity to Perigord.  Alan Leamy described the new business 
ventures which were created and the opportunities which the new processes created.  
However, it is equally evident in the data that the radical and disruptive nature of the 
changes also impacted heavily on the performance of the company.  Alan Leamy 
described his return to the business in 2002 as “walking back into absolute hell for 
five years, trying to keep the business going”.  The impact of this shock to the 
business clearly caused a substantial shift in how the business was perceived by its 
owners and commenced a process of development which led to a complete review of 
the business model.   
 
The literature tends to describe the change from lower order learning to higher order 
learning in terms of a discrete shift.  Wang (2008 p. 639) characterised it as 
“creativity, breakthrough and organisational learning”.  Fiol and Leyles (1985) 
described a crisis leading to a change, with a clear inference that such a crisis change 
would be relatively immediate and punctuated.  The Perigord data suggests that this 
transition in organisational learning was much more gradual and evolved over a 
protracted period of time. It is also the case that the shock which was applied to the 
business did not impact in a sudden manner as the learning literature tends to describe.  
It was a gradual process as the technological developments gathered pace and drove 
an increasing level of market change.  Perigord recognised the changes happening in 
its environment and began to react to those changes. For example, there was a 
sustained level of investment in training over the period 2004-2008 at an average of 
3.2% of labour cost as the firm acted to re-train existing staff with the skills which 
were increasingly required as opposed to older, increasingly redundant skills. The 
company began to develop its software tools and capability in an effort to provide 
additional control mechanisms and service levels to clients.  It was not until 
significantly later (2007) that the decision was made to convert the relatively ad hoc 
developments into a customisable configurable off the shelf system. From a learning 
perspective, the firm engaged in an evolution of its training programmes to deal with 
functional and cross-functional skills and gradually engaged in a number of more 
substantive programmes which allowed the development of some higher order 
learning. 
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The discussion above has referred to the change in the orders of learning of the firm.  
It is clear that a certain ethos in relation to staff recruitment and development existed 
in Perigord, anecdotally since its inception in 1974, and in a more structured 
formalised manner since 2004.  The centrality of the CEO Alan Leamy to this 
transition to greater structure and more formalised planning and investment in training 
and staff development is evident from the case data.  The literature on firm decision 
making generally focuses on the senior management team (Child 1972, Hambrick and 
Mason 1984) and that management decision making matters in the context of 
performance (Adner and Helfat 2003).  This literature relates to firms of all sizes. In 
the small firm context of Perigord, it is reasonable to assume that Child’s (1972) 
management coalition is very small in number and in many decisions only includes 
the CEO (Jones and Macpherson 2006).  The role of managerial choice and agency 
will be explored in more detail below.  However, it has been demonstrated that a 
transition occurred in the perspective of Alan Leamy over the period examined.  He 
began to question the fundamental assumptions of the business in a manner not 
previously considered. It is also clear from the changing nature of his strategic 
priorities (see Table 10) that he became more focused on the strategic development of 
the business rather than being focused on operational issues. Even where the 
economic conditions of 2009 required a more operational focus, he remained 
committed to the strategic development of the software and its potential for the firm. 
 
The capability of the Perigord Group has been substantially enhanced through the 
developments in its learning.  The transition to higher order learning is evident in the 
data.  This change in perspective allowed Alan Leamy to identify the potential in the 
software solutions being developed more clearly. The evolution of the higher order 
learning was not a discrete event but occurred over a protracted period of time.  There 
is evidence that this was a gradual shift initially as the threats of under-performance 
became clearer and some form of solution was required.  However, in more recent 
times there has a more noticeable shift where Alan Leamy continuously questions his 
own and the firm’s managers’ assumptions about their business model and client 
offering in the context of market requirements.  In the context of the dynamic 
capability observed in the Perigord Group, the “capability” element is explained in 
terms of the gradual development of higher order learning in the CEO. 
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Purposefulness 
There is a role for leadership and managerial agency in determining a firm’s strategy 
and in influencing performance (Penrose 1959, Jones and Macpherson 2006, 
Hambrick and Mason 1984, Child 1972).  Management matters!  As discussed in the 
section on organisational learning above, Child’s (1972) management coalition in a 
small firm is very small indeed and can often effectively be reduced to one, the owner-
manager or entrepreneur. In Perigord the case data reveals the centrality of Pat Leamy 
in the development of the business initially.  This involved the acquisition of the 
business in the first instance, the development of the operation in the USA and an 
investment in a green-field printing business (Alan Leamy Interview).  The data also 
reveals the manner in which Alan Leamy began to influence the development of the 
company in a singular fashion.  His decision to hire the executive with Apple Mac 
knowledge was against much of the internal opinion at the time, yet he was in a 
position to make the decision and implement it. The subsequent impact of this was 
considerable and is recorded above in the case description. The case data revealed a 
number of investment decisions which were made by a small group and ultimately by 
Alan Leamy as CEO. 
 
In his description of the development of the business, Michael Fleming described the 
centrality of Alan Leamy to the path which was established and subsequently 
followed.  The changes in the strategic priorities of Alan Leamy are reflective of 
consequent changes in firm strategy.  While it could be argued that the technological 
and market changes which occurred in the industry required a response on the part of 
the firm, the case data reveals that the source of this response in Perigord was from the 
CEO.  Alan Leamy was sensitive to the impact of changes in technology.  He had the 
previous experience of managing one subsidiary which was largely dependent on the 
newspaper sector for its revenues.  When the newspapers adopted new technology 
internally, the business which Alan Leamy was managing collapsed.   
 
While it is beyond the scope of this research to ascertain why only three of the thirty 
eight competitors referred to are still in business, it is clear that a series of decisions 
were made by Perigord’s leadership which contributed in some way to its survival. It 
is also possible that some of these decisions accelerated the demise of some 
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competitor companies. The data reveals that many of these decisions were 
evolutionary in nature and to some extent path dependent on previous decisions.  
However, the data also reveals decisions to invest in the development of its people at 
close to four times the average for comparable companies.  The company also 
invested heavily in the development of its software solutions.  The company worked 
actively with Enterprise Ireland to develop its export capability and was successful in 
attracting considerable funding.  All of these initiatives were based on the decisions of 
the senior management team and in many cases on the decisions of Alan Leamy.   
 
By contrast, firms in the print and packaging sector were weak on management 
development and slow to focus on market led innovation as opposed to purely 
technologically led innovation (The Print and Packaging Forum 2005). Alan Leamy’s 
formal education concluded with the partial completion of a diploma in the Dublin 
Institute of Technology.  The experience of the management team in Perigord was 
largely grounded in the printing industry.  Paul and Alan Leamy learned about 
business from their father.  All of these factors would suggest that the structural 
influences of the printing industry would be strong in Perigord.  The tendency of an 
industry to operate in a certain manner and to have established routines on an industry 
basis is established (Maskell and Malmberg 2007). Despite this, the case data shows 
the impact of the managerial agency in the decisions taken and implemented.  The 
structural norms of behaviour were left behind and a business with a global 
perspective evolved.   
 
The case data also revealed the purposeful addition of resources through linkages 
between an intermediary and the CEO. This intermediary was the author of this 
research. Alan Leamy described the benefit he had received in relation to the business 
planning process for Precise Data. He stated that working with me, in my role as a 
business consultant, “gave another dimension to it of professionalism, or 
formalisation”. This increase in formalisation was partly based on the intermediary’s 
ability to ask questions which challenged the assumptions prevalent in the business 
model.  By consciously choosing to engage with a third party in this manner, Alan 
Leamy purposefully added a significant resource to the firm.  The case data does not 
suggest that this was done consciously to extend the learning of the firm, yet the data 
does make it clear that Alan saw the advantage of bringing a resource of this nature to 
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bear on the firm. The manner in which he engaged with the consultant and the projects 
which evolved demonstrated the capacity of the relationship to drive change within 
the business. 
 
Anne Cooke was more categorical in her assessment of the role of the consultant. 
Anne felt that access to training was easier as a result and that the company “wouldn’t 
have those grants only for the like of you.  So if we didn’t know you we could have 
fallen by the wayside and we wouldn’t be funded by EI.” Whilst this assertion was 
phrased personally to the author, it was clear from Anne Cooke’s description of 
previous experiences with state agencies that accessing funding was a complex 
process and perceived not to be worth the effort “I actually remember…trying to get 
funding from FAS to try to train a couple of people back in Pace Print…and after 
about 2 weeks with the forms, I just gave up.  I didn’t have the patience…I just 
couldn’t be bothered.”  In this instance, the decision to add the resource of the 
intermediary to the firm facilitated significant additional resources being made 
available to the firm in the form of grant assistance, advice on training initiatives and 
research and development funding. 
 
The case data reveals the importance of an intermediary in developing the firm’s plans 
and in accessing funding for those plans. The literature supports the addition of 
resources in this manner for their ability to bring new perspectives (Eisenhardt and 
Martin 2000, Schlemmer and Webb 2008). Alan Leamy expressed the view that the 
interaction with the intermediary had added to the professionalism or formality with 
which he approached certain decisions which he clearly viewed as a positive 
development. Other examples of the use of intermediaries from the data included the 
procurement of the services of a consultancy firm to drive the validation process for 
the software solution, the use of a consultant to generate market contacts in the UK 
and Europe for the pharmaceutical sector and the use of a third party to establish and 
maintain a sales presence in the Australian and New Zealand marketplaces.  
 
A firm’s self-perception (or the managers’ perception of the firm) has an influence on 
what opportunities the firm will pursue (Penrose 1959, Weick 2001, Hilliard 2004).  
The case data reveals a clear transition in this self-image in Perigord.  It is apparent in 
the nature of the services offered previously and in the strategic priorities of the CEO 
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(Table 10) that the firm perceived itself to be a provider of pre-press services to print 
and packaging users and specifiers.  The market place was relatively local albeit that 
the firm had a facility in the USA.  Considerable efforts were made to improve the 
efficiency and relevance of that offering over time, but the self-perception was that of 
a provider of production services.  Over recent years, it is clear from the case data that 
the firm’s self-perception has changed substantially. The firm now perceives itself to 
be a global provider of artwork and brand management services. It believes in its 
capability to deliver world class solutions to large organisations across all continents.  
This is evidenced by the establishment of an office in the west-coast of the USA, the 
establishment of a sales and operational facility in Singapore and the opening of a 
sales office in New Zealand. 
 
The move from one perception to the other was not sudden but evolved over time as 
the investments in learning accrued, the resources and capabilities were developed and 
the market offering started to win new business.  All of these factors are founded on 
the managerial agency which facilitated their implementation. 
 
Resource creation, extension and modification 
The Perigord Group is a firm with a set of available resources which are combined in 
a certain fashion.  Neither the resources themselves nor the combination of those 
resources are static over time.  It is clear from the case data that some resources have 
developed in an evolutionary manner.  Other developments have involved quite 
discrete changes in the resource base of the firm.   
 
The market and technological context of Perigord in the period under review is 
outlined above.  Technologically, the changes from 1990 to date have seen some of 
the most rapid changes in technology in how printed material is originated since the 
invention of moveable type by Guttenberg in the fifteenth century.  The 
commercialisation and rapid development of the Apple Mac and other digital 
technologies revolutionised the industry sector in which Perigord operates. These 
technological changes facilitated very significant market changes as described above 
where creators of documents for printing (where documents is interpreted as any item 
prepared for print production) had the capability to do much more and firms who 
would have previously been clients for the Perigord service absorbed that 
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functionality within their own businesses. These changes happened largely over a 
fifteen year period to 2005. 
 
In the early stages of the development of digitisation, Perigord was able to leverage its 
knowledge of the processes to become a market leader in the new technologies.  The 
case data described how the firm invested in the developing technology and also 
added key human resources. This development of its resource base was predicated on 
investment in people, equipment and training as evidenced by Michael Fleming’s 
description of how the business evolved at this time.  As the technology developed, 
Perigord adjusted its capabilities to ensure it remained at the forefront of the sector.  In 
later years when the technological developments in the core technologies reached a 
state where clients were more comfortable to invest in their own right, the data 
showed that Perigord developed its resources and capabilities to allow it to manage 
facilities on-site for some of those clients. 
 
It is also evident from the case data that the firm developed its resources in relation to 
client management processes as well. The decision to invest in project management 
skills was a response to the increasing professionalisation of the client base and the 
increasing complexity of the service being offered.  In the 1970s much of the work 
done by Perigord involved the production of material for discrete items in response to 
client orders.  While some of the client relationships were long term and involved 
significant numbers of orders per annum, the majority of orders were discrete and 
involved little requirement for project management and coordination.  By contrast, the 
nature of the service offered to clients in 2010 has evolved considerably and includes 
a comprehensive project management solution which coordinates the activities of a 
number of suppliers and places considerably more responsibility for performance 
management of those suppliers on Perigord. This change in market requirement 
evolved over time and Perigord invested in its people and in hiring new employees to 
ensure that the appropriate level of resources were available.  For example, Perigord 
hired a number of project managers from Microsoft to enhance the level of the firm’s 
capability as well as to assist in developing the abilities of existing staff. 
 
The development of the software solutions currently offered clearly shows an 
evolutionary path in the resource base and capability of the firm.  It also shows an 
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evolution in the understanding of the firm in terms of the market’s needs for a solution 
to increasing globalisation, increasing product complexity, shortening lead times and 
increasing regulation in some sectors (i.e. pharmaceuticals).  The software solutions 
were initiated by Paul Leamy in response to the need to monitor order progress for 
clients in a structured manner.  The first iterations of the software provided very 
simple tracking solutions which showed lists of client jobs and the status of 
production on each job.  Items could be updated simply to show progress through the 
system and there was some simple filtering capability to allow viewing by individual 
client and types of orders.  As confidence with the software grew, functionality was 
gradually added before opening the system to client view for remote tracking.  As 
described in the case data, developments of the software in conjunction with one key 
client allowed significant external resources to be leveraged in development.  The 
involvement of a pharmaceutical company of scale in specifying and effectively 
testing the software as it was developed added greatly to its relevant functionality. 
This company made regular suggestions about additional modules which they would 
like to see added to the system.  As the realisation that the software had a use beyond 
the tracking of production, the engagement with the pharmaceutical sector also made 
it obvious to Perigord that the software would require some form of validation if it is 
was to be adopted by pharmaceutical companies outside of the development partner.   
 
Validation within the pharmaceutical sector is paramount.  All systems have to be 
capable of being validated to an exacting standard.  At its simplest form, 
manufacturers of drugs must be able to demonstrate robust systems which ensure that 
a tablet which is intended to be a 5mg dose is manufactured to that exact specification 
and that also all documentation related to it describes the dosages accurately and not 
perhaps as .5 mg or 50mg etc.  Software systems intended for use in the creation and 
amendment of product packaging must be capable of being validated to demonstrate 
this consistency and appropriate authorisation processes for it to be adopted widely. 
As Perigord became aware of this requirement, they partnered with a third party 
company with experience of working on validation projects with pharmaceutical 
clients. The temporary addition of a critical resource allowed the firm to overcome a 
market obstacle.  The required resource had no particular utility to the firm once the 
project was completed and was dispensed with. 
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The resource based view suggests that competitive advantage can be delivered if 
certain criteria are met (Barney 1991, Peteraf 1993).  The literature refers to the 
requirement for resources to be heterogeneous, that they cannot be easily imitated or 
substituted, that the resource is immobile and also a requirement that there must have 
been some limit to competition in the first place for a firm to have been able to 
establish a position of advantage.  It is clear from the case data that Perigord meets the 
criteria in relation to its software solutions.  The resources and the configuration of 
those resources within the firm are unique to Perigord.  They are a function of the 
firm’s evolution and the investments it has made in its equipment and its employees.  
The resources are also difficult to imitate as they are based on both the combination of 
the software capabilities which have been developed but also on the expert knowledge 
which the firm has in relation to document creation and amendment and the control of 
those processes for complex documents and suites of documents. There is no apparent 
substitutable service for what is offered.  There are clearly competitor companies 
offering services in the same market space, but the service offered is becoming 
increasingly central to how international businesses manage their brand and artwork 
needs.  The mobility of the resource in Perigord is difficult to define.  The literature 
suggests that if the resource is imperfectly mobile then an advantage may accrue.  The 
key source of the developments in Perigord relate to the capabilities and experience of 
the owners and a small number of key managers. This group is relatively immobile 
and is quite immobile in the context of the location of Perigord’s competitors who are 
largely based outside of Ireland.  The final requirement of some “ex-ante limits to 
competition” (Peteraf 1993 p. 185) seem present in the case data as Perigord had a 
well established position in the marketplace and seemed to have a capability to adjust 
its resource base as the market evolved.  The literature posits that firms in Perigord’s 
position should have a sustainable competitive advantage. The case data in relation to 
the software solutions being offered support this contention in so far as system sales 
are being achieved against competition from other providers who are significantly 
larger and better financially resourced. 
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6.4 The empirical evidence summarised 
The data provides evidence of the existence of dynamic capabilities in the Perigord 
Group.  The data revealed a long standing capability, which predates this research, in 
relation to the recruitment of individuals with skill sets and abilities which could drive 
the development of the business.  There is evidence of a consistent level of investment 
in the development of those individuals over many years.  While it is certain that the 
approach to investment in training and development has become more structured 
during the period covered by this research, this is more a matter of emphasis than a 
departure from a previous practice or approach.  It can be held that a dynamic 
capability exists within the firm in relation to its ability to recruit, retain and develop 
individuals who could contribute significantly to the business. This capability pre-
dates the period of this research. 
 
The data also revealed new dynamic capabilities in the firm. The development of the 
software in its configurable, customisable off the shelf form demonstrated the 
capability of the firm to purposefully extend and modify its resource base in the light 
of the opportunity identified in the marketplace. The firm became capable of assessing 
its environment and its client’s environment in a manner which allowed the firm to 
purposefully address the resource issues which then arose.  It is clear that the 
investment in learning and in the development of key staff played a role in the 
evolution of this dynamic capability.  The data also suggests that the use made of 
intermediaries assisted the firm to question some of its core assumptions, thereby 
facilitating a more comprehensive strategic review of its business. 
 
It is possible to summarise the extent of what has been identified at this stage of the 
analysis as follows.  Five themes emerged from the data (i) a focus on firm 
performance, (ii) capacity building (people and technology), (iii) the evolution of 
higher order learning, (iv) managerialpurposefulness and (v) the use of third parties. 
The definition of dynamic capability used herein relates to the capacity of a firm to 
“purposefully create, extend or modify its resource base” (Helfat et al. 2007 p. 4).  
The previous section discussed the Perigord case data in the context of this definition 
to establish that a dynamic capability emerged in the period examined.  It is also 
possible to map the five themes which emerged from the data onto this definition of 
dynamic capability.  Capacity relates to the themes of capacity building and the 
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evolution of higher order learning as the firm increased its capability and broadened 
the scope of its learning.  Capacity is also related to the theme of the use of third 
parties as some of the third parties leveraged by the firm added to its capacity to make 
changes.  Purposefulness is related to the first theme of focus on the firm’s 
performance as it was this focus which caused the initial movement to seek new 
solutions.  Purposefulness is also centrally related to leadership.  As the data revealed, 
Alan Leamy became much more deliberate in his decision making over time as his 
learning evolved and his confidence grew. The aspect of resource creation, extension 
or modification maps on to the themes of capacity building, the evolution of higher 
order learning, managerial purposefulness and the use of third parties.  In effect, all of 
the themes with the exception of the focus on firm performance relate to the 
development of the resource base of the firm as its people and technology evolved and 
as additional resources were made available through the use of third parties.  The 
evolution in the leadership of Alan Leamy also added significantly to the resource 
base of the firm.  
 
The data reveals a series of factors which were related to the evolution of a dynamic 
capability in the Perigord Group.  The focus on performance of the CEO, the 
development of the technical capacity and capacity of the people employed in the firm 
coupled with the impact of the investments in learning and the extension of learning 
along the continuum from lower order to higher order learning and the influence of the 
intermediary are identifiable factors from the data.  What is less clear from the data is 
whether there are underlying mechanisms which facilitated or enhanced the 
development of the dynamic capability revealed by the data. 
 
What is not identifiable from the empirical data is a theoretical explanation of how 
these factors led to the development of dynamic capability.  The temporal dimension 
of this development of new dynamic capabilities must also be considered in the 
explanation.  These capabilities evolved slowly over the period of this research.  The 
capabilities can be identified in their emergent state in 2007 as the decision to aim for 
a configurable system was made.  However, the capability can be seen more actively 
in the global sales approach and the emerging priority of investing in an automatic 
artwork generation solution. Chapter 7 explains how this dynamic capability came to 
emerge. 
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7. Discussion 
This chapter is divided into two parts.  The first part builds on the analysis of the data 
in Chapter 6 and examines the origins of the dynamic capabilities which were shown 
to have emerged.  Section 7.2 then considers the data and literature at a more abstract 
level and develops a theoretical explanation for the outcomes of the Perigord case 
study.  
 
Section 6.3 examined the Perigord case data and established that dynamic capabilities 
exist and had emerged during the period under review.  The explanation for that 
emergence is presented in the following section.It is in the development of this 
explanation that the critical realism approach adds real value.  Critical realism uses a 
layered ontology which considers the Empirical, the Actual and the Real (Bhaskar 
1975).  The Real is the foundational set of mechanisms which exist which a researcher 
is seeking to discover.  The Actual are the events to which these mechanisms give 
rise.  Finally the Empirical is that which has been seen or captured from a data 
perspective. It is a subset of the Actual. In critical realist research, the researcher must 
start with the Empirical and work with a combination of the data and the literature to 
consider what else may be present in terms of the Actual and more importantly the 
Real.  It goes beyond the empirical to seek an understanding of greater depth and 
persuasion.  As a critical realist I recognise that what I can observe is likely to be only 
a subset of what is happening.  Therefore, the analysis must also recognise the 
structure within which the firm operates and consider the decisions taken in that 
context. 
 
Retroduction is a core tool of the critical realist researcher. As described in Chapter 2, 
the purpose of this tool is to consider the data in context and in the context of the 
extant literature and to ask what might explain the phenomenon being studied.  Such 
an explanation might then allow additional data to be identified to support the 
explanation developed.  In the case of the Perigord Group, the five themes which 
emerged from the data and presented in Chapters 4 and 6 reveal factors which 
contributed to the emergence of dynamic capabilities in the firm.  By engaging in the 
process of retroduction, the explanations proposed below were developed. 
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7.1 A critical realist analysis of the Perigord Group 
The empirical data revealed both the existence of dynamic capabilities which pre-
dated the 2002-2010 period and dynamic capabilities which emerged during that 
period.  The CEO’s focus on performance, the extent of capacity building undertaken, 
the influence of investments in learning, the extension in the nature of the learning 
along the continuum towards higher order learning, the aspects of managerial 
purposefulness demonstrated and the process of engaging with intermediaries is 
recognisable in the data.  However, that data does not fully explain how those 
dynamic capabilities came to exist.  For a critical realist researcher, it is the 
explanation or the understanding of the underlying mechanisms or reasons for such a 
development of capability which is of central interest.  This section develops an 
explanation of the underlying mechanisms for the emergence of the dynamic 
capability identified. 
 
The critical realism perspective recognises that what is empirically observable is only 
an element of what exists.  As described in Chapter 2, the Empirical is a sub-set of the 
Actual which is generated by the mechanisms of the Real.  The following diagram, 
Figure 2, builds on Figure 1 from Chapter 2.  Figure 1 showed the relationship 
between the three elements of the Empirical, the Actual and the Real in a theoretical, 
abstract sense. Figure 2 shows the elements of the Empirical and the Actual which 
have been revealed in the analysis above.  The level of investment in staff training and 
development and the level of investment in the development of the software solutions 
and other technological developments are evident in the data.  The data revealed a 
strong and increasing client focus in the business. The firm consistently built its 
capability over time either through the recruitment and development of key staff or 
through the short term contracting of expert personnel.  The firm also used third 
parties to boost performance in key ways.  Finally, the data revealed developments in 
the leadership capacity of Alan Leamy. An underlying factor in these developments 
was the focus on performance which Alan Leamy had.  The deterioration in 
performance caused him to consider how the firm might need to change in the first 
place.  It is fair to say that the distinction being drawn here between the Empirical and 
the Actual is slightly arbitrary.  The extent of the data available and the depth of my 
own involvement with the firm and CEO mean that the unobserved element is of little 
relevance.  The Actual is being portrayed here as the less obvious factors which 
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facilitated the empirically observed events. Theme 3 relating to the transition to higher 
order learning is shown as being in both the Empirical and the Real.   
 
Figure 2: Perigord strata of reality - the Empirical and the Actual 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One advantage of the single case study method is that it allows a considerable depth of 
context to be explored.  In this research, my level of engagement with the firm and the 
CEO in particular was substantial.  The data included above resulted from that 
extensive engagement as well as documents produced during that period and data 
specifically captured for this research.  In addition to this, I have worked in the 
printing industry for twenty three years both in a managerial role and for nine years as 
a consultant offering business services to the industry.  The combination of my own 
knowledge of the sector and the depth of context provided of the Perigord Group, 
coupled with my engagement with the literature allow me to explore beyond the 
Empirical to seek to explain the mechanisms which give rise to that data. The 
following sections build the case for revealing the strata of the Real. 
 
Alan Leamy began working in the Perigord Group in 1984. In the twenty six years to 
2010 he gained considerable knowledge of business through his experiences in 
Perigord and with other ventures referred to in the case data.  He has developed an 
enormous depth of knowledge of his firm’s service capability and the market 
requirements it meets.  His entry to the industry coincided almost exactly with the 
Empirical 
• Capacity Building - investments in technology and people (Theme 2) 
• Investments in Training (Theme 3) 
Actual 
• The focus on firm performance (Theme 1) 
• Transition to higher order learning (Theme 3) 
• The role of managerial purposefulness (Theme 4) 
• The use of third parties (Theme 5) 
Real 
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introduction of the first Apple Mac computers in the USA.  He has an interest in 
technology and in how developments might impact on commercial opportunity as is 
evidenced by the many references to technological development and opportunity in 
the case data.  The data also revealed the extent to which Alan Leamy engages with 
individuals outside of the firm.  There are a number of specific instances revealed 
where he was able to draw on a contact to access information or expert opinion on a 
particular issue.  This has been evident in both an Irish and international context, 
particularly in the USA.  Alan Leamy has engaged in his own journey of development 
as a CEO in terms of his expertise and capability.  Participation in the Transform 
Programme with Enterprise Ireland allowed him to begin to see the business in a 
different perspective.  He recognised the value of my work with him on various 
projects and applications in terms of developing his own view of how to appraise 
opportunity within Perigord.  More recently, his participation in Enterprise Ireland’s 
Leadership for Growth Programme has enhanced his strategic perspective. Yet in 
some regard, these developments only added dimension to what he already knew or 
allowed him to explore the level of his own knowledge and creativity in a different 
and possibly more strategic way.  It is in this expansion of his awareness of his own 
abilities and the depth of his knowledge coupled with his ability to interact with a 
range of external parties which is the foundation of the development of the dynamic 
capability identified above. 
 
This development emerged over time and was not apparent at the commencement of 
the software development process.  It could be argued that the development of the 
software system was simply an incremental process.  It certainly started with a simple 
internal tracking tool to support operational management. The early developments 
were expansions in functionality for internal use and then for a small number of 
external clients which were identified on the basis of personal relationships 
(friendships) of Alan Leamy or more predominantly Paul Leamy.  The initial 
opportunity which arose with a pharmaceutical company was also evolutionary in 
nature and facilitated additional developments of the system.  However, there was a 
key point in 2007 where the evolutionary or incremental process gave way to 
something more discontinuous and discrete in relation to the decision taken to develop 
a configurable off the shelf system. The impact of the Transform programme and the 
work being done in relation to the development potential for the business resulted in a 
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significant change.  The influence of conversations Alan Leamy was having with third 
parties in relation to the opportunity in the generics pharmaceutical industry in 
particular also played a role in this change.  As explained above, the dynamic 
capability began to emerge in 2007 and is now evident in the manner in which the 
firm views its software capabilities and in how it sets about enhancing those 
capabilities and promoting the sale and use of those services. 
 
Revisiting the diagram relating to critical realism’s strata of reality, the Real relates to 
the mechanisms which underlie the observed events and in this case, the explanation 
of the mechanisms which gave rise to the development of the dynamic capabilities 
identified. Reviewing the developments of the firm in the context of the literature 
allows three themes (tacit knowledge, social capital and absorptive capacity) to be 
identified which link with each other in terms of the theoretical explanation for the 
development of the dynamic capability in Perigord.   
 
Alan Leamy has developed an extensive level of knowledge of his firm, his sector and 
his clients’ requirements. As was described the literature review in Chapter 5 above, it 
is not unusual for knowledge to become tacit as the level of expertise grows (Crossan, 
Lane and White 1999).  In effect, the individual becomes much less aware or 
conscious of what it is or just how much they know.   
 
The literature review also explored the concepts of absorptive capacity which was 
found to be cumulative in nature such that an increase in absorptive capacity is likely 
to lead to an additional increase in absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990, 
Zahra and George 2002, Easterby-Smith, et al. 2008). In particular, different levels of 
absorptive capacity in two firms is likely to result in an increasing divergence in 
absorptive capacity between them as the firm with the higher level of capacity adds 
additional capacity at an increasingly divergent rate (Van Den Bosch, Volberda and 
De Boer 1999).   
 
The social capital literature recognises both the actual and potential resources of an 
individual’s network and how they can be drawn upon by the individual (Bourdieu 
1986, Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998).  Figure 3 depicts these elements in relation to the 
empirically observed events. 
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Figure 3: Perigord strata of reality - the Real 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The dynamic capability which emerged in the Perigord Group was the ability to assess 
its competitive position within the marketplace and to purposefully add to its resource 
base to address the competitive opportunities identified.  The development of the 
software solution in its present form is an instance of the manifestation of that 
dynamic capability. As shown in Figure 3, it is proposed that it is the factors of the 
tacit expert knowledge of the CEO, the developments in the organisations capacity to 
identify, assimilate and exploit new knowledge and the use Alan Leamy could make 
of his networks of contacts which underpins the development of this dynamic 
capability in Perigord.  Each of these factors is now explored in the specific context of 
the Perigord Group.  
 
7.1.1 Tacit knowledge of the CEO 
The first aspect of the Real that explains the emergence of the dynamic capability in 
Perigord is the tacit knowledge of the CEO.  Knowledge can be explicit or tacit 
(Polanyi 1966).  Tacit knowledge is considered to be more than simply un-codified 
knowledge (Crossan, Lane and White 1999, Polanyi 1966).  It is difficult to measure 
and is often not something of which the possessor is particularly aware.  Polanyi 
(1966) and Crosson et al (1999) discuss this tacit knowledge as simply knowing.  
Empirical 
• Capacity Building - investments in technology and people (Theme 2) 
• Investments in Training (Theme 3) 
Actual 
• The focus on firm performance (Theme 1) 
• Transition to higher order learning (Theme 3) 
• The role of managerial purposefulness (Theme 4) 
• The use of third parties (Theme 5) 
Real 
• Tacit knowledge of CEO about the business and clients needs 
• The capacity of the CEO to identify, assimilate and exploit new 
knowledge 
• The social network (capital) of the CEO 
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Their thesis is that over time what may have been learned through the codified or un-
codified knowledge of others becomes tacit.  It is easy to understand this at a basic 
level with a learned skill like driving a car. What once required considerable tuition 
and practice to safely master the art of driving a car becomes a skill which can be 
implemented with almost no conscious thought.  One “knows” how to drive a car.  
Where this example then differs from much tacit knowledge is that it is relatively 
simple to subsequently describe to another person how to drive a car.  This skill is also 
something of which the driver can easily be reminded.  With other aspects of tacit 
knowledge, the possessor can be unaware of the extent of their knowledge or may not 
appreciate the extent of the differentiation of their knowledge from others as this 
would also require some sense of the level of knowledge of the other person or group. 
 
In the Perigord case, it is clear that there is a substantial accumulation of knowledge in 
relation to artwork management services in the senior management team and in the 
CEO particularly.  In Alan Leamy’s case this has developed both over his own 
personal involvement in the business and anecdotally from his father who was active 
in the business during Alan’s childhood.  Alan Leamy worked in the business prior to 
the significant technological changes described above which drove a level of 
automation and digitisation of the processes. The data revealed the extent of his 
involvement in the firm’s embrace of technology.  Similarly, as the firm developed its 
initial software tools, Alan Leamy was heavily involved in the requirements of this 
process as opposed to the technical software development issues.  It is clear from the 
data that the marriage of this in-depth, thorough knowledge of the business of artwork 
management and brand management coupled with the emerging knowledge of the 
capability of the software have been central to the development of the business.  
While a considerable element of Alan Leamy’s knowledge is explicit and could be 
codified with relatively little conceptual effort, it is clear that there is another 
dimension to his knowledge which is harder to reveal.  Alan knows certain things 
about his business and his clients’ needs. He has a level of knowledge which is not all 
explicit and indeed a level of knowledge which it is not clear that he appreciates he 
possesses himself. This tacit knowledge is one of the reasons that the business is being 
successful relative to its competitors and also affords the business considerable 
competitive protection in that the knowledge is not easily transferrable, even should 
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he wish to transfer it to another person. Equally, there is a risk to the business in that 
one of its main competitive advantages is dependent on the well-being of its CEO. 
 
7.1.2 Capacity to identify, assimilate and exploit new knowledge  
The second aspect of the Real that explains the emergence of dynamic capability in 
Perigord is the capacity of the CEO to identify, assimilate and exploit new knowledge.  
Absorptive capacity refers to the capability of the firm to identify, assimilate and 
exploit new knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1990).  The case data reveals many 
instances of new knowledge being exploited in Perigord: the firm was the first in 
Ireland to invest in a Scitex workflow system; it invested in its first Apple Mac in 
1990; it invested in various iterations of image output devices; it developed its own 
software tools for tracking; and it has utilised the internet heavily for its service 
delivery for several years.  It is evident that the firm has been able to exploit new 
knowledge.  An examination of that knowledge acquisition process reveals a number 
of ways in which this absorptive capacity works in the firm. 
 
Several mechanisms were described by which the firm becomes aware of new 
developments or becomes aware of developments which may be new to them albeit 
that they may have existed for some time externally.  The interviews revealed a 
number of instances where this knowledge came from suppliers (particularly relating 
to technological developments), customers, training programmes and industry reports. 
Attendance on formal training programmes also allowed certain knowledge to enter 
into the firm.  The scale and nature of the organisation has meant that any idea of 
consequence, and certainly any that involve expenditure, come to the attention of Alan 
Leamy for consideration and decision. This process was generally informal and has 
normally involved discussion between Alan and a small number of key managers.  
The assimilation process described in the literature is largely intuitive and involves 
consideration of whether the new knowledge is useful in the context of current 
operations or whether the new knowledge might open up new opportunities.  Once a 
decision has been made that the knowledge has a use within the business, the 
exploitation stage has generally followed relatively seamlessly. 
 
The literature describes the cumulative effect of absorptive capacity (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990, Zahra and George 2002, Easterby-Smith, et al. 2008). Prior 
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knowledge provides a grounding on which new knowledge may be built. This is easy 
to conceptualise with an example from the case data.  Perigord purchased an Apple 
Mac in 1990.  The level of functionality of these machines at that time was quite 
limited.  By using that technology at an early stage, Perigord became more 
comfortable with the skills required which allowed them to progress to the next stage 
of technology quickly.  By engaging with the technology, the company began to grasp 
the complexity of the postscript language which converted the clients file to 
instructions which image output devices could understand.  Building on this 
knowledge allowed them develop an expertise in file handling which was a key factor 
in being able to secure the Microsoft business.  In other words, Perigord developed its 
capability on this matter gradually and through a series of incremental learning stages.  
Similarly, though less obviously, Perigord has developed its knowledge of support 
agencies and the potential for support which is available.  Its initial engagements with 
Enterprise Ireland were at a very low level regarding strategic consultancy support and 
some training initiatives.  Over time, Alan Leamy became more aware of the range of 
supports available and then developed the realisation that these supports were 
accessible to Perigord. Finally, the use of intermediaries over the years has facilitated 
both the identification of new knowledge and the assimilation of that knowledge into 
the firm. 
 
More broadly, the cumulative effect of absorptive capacity in Perigord is evident in 
the confidence with which the firm now engages in its business.  It is clear that the 
developments of the software solutions, the support of Enterprise Ireland and the 
market reaction to the innovations promoted have made Alan Leamy more confident 
in seeking new developments and in identifying ways of exploiting the services 
available.  The literature suggests that the self-image of a firm can change as 
absorptive capacity increases (Cohen and Levinthal 1990, Zahra and George 2002).  
The firm’s expectations can become increasingly defined in terms of the opportunities 
in its environment (Van Den Bosch, Volberda and De Boer 1999).  This describes the 
evolving situation in Perigord where the firm now sees its opportunities in relation to 
the environment and less in relation to its history and own resources.  There is a 
recognition and confidence that the knowledge base of the firm is now so relatively 
broad, that new ideas and possibilities can be assimilated without undue difficulty. 
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The literature also allows that the process of knowledge acquisition, assimilation and 
exploitation may not be as straightforward as presented here.  The possibility exists 
that knowledge may be identified but that the firm can see no useful means of 
integrating it into its business model (Zahra and George 2002, Todorova and Durisin 
2007). The potential for using this knowledge at a later date is obvious if there is some 
mechanism by which it can be retained. The case data suggests that there is a high 
level of dialogue between the senior management team in Perigord which facilitates 
an exchange of ideas in an informal manner. The interviews also indicated that there is 
a considerable amount of unstructured research conducted through reading web sites, 
on-line blogs and industry publications.  This constant engagement allows the 
opportunity for new ideas to emerge.  It is also clear from the data that the manner in 
which Alan Leamy uses his social network allows for new knowledge to be both 
brought to the firm and to be tested within the network for its potential worth. 
 
7.1.3  CEO network of contacts 
The third aspect of the Real that explains the emergence of dynamic capability in 
Perigord is the ability of the CEO to make us of his network of contacts.  Social 
capital is defined as the “sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, 
available through, and derived from the network of relationships possessed by an 
individual or social unit” (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998 p. 243). In the context of this 
research, the concept of the potential resources is as important as the actual resources 
of any network.  This is because the needs of the individual are likely to change over 
time.  In the Perigord context, the issues of importance to Alan Leamy from a business 
perspective changed radically between 2002 and 2010.  Those initial years were 
dominated by the changing nature of the business and the need for the firm to re-
invent itself.  The priorities changed as described previously, culminating in the focus 
on the international promotion of the business using a combination of software 
solutions supported by state of the art brand management and artwork management 
tools and processes.  Alan Leamy has been able to use his network to gain relevant 
information, access and industry knowledge. This has not been done in any 
exploitative fashion as there is evidence that Alan shares with his network as much as 
he draws from it. 
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Alan Leamy’s ability to both develop and draw on his network emerges from the data.  
One anecdote described how the digital print business Exact was formed.  Alan had 
come to know Enda Casey in the course of some business dealings in one of his 
companies.  They began a discussion about a business idea which had emerged. They 
formed a partnership to pursue the opportunity leveraging Alan Leamy’s knowledge 
of the print business with Enda’s knowledge of the technology being used coupled 
with their joint knowledge of the potential client base.  Another example is the 
professional relationship which developed with me as a consultant to the company.  I 
had known Alan Leamy for many years through interactions in the industry.  In my 
previous role as Managing Director of a large printing company in Dublin I had done 
business with Alan and his company.  Following the establishment of my consultancy 
business in 2002, Alan Leamy approached me and began a series of discussions which 
led to the current relationship which has evolved over the intervening years.  Alan 
engaged with me to leverage my abilities, experience and contacts to the benefit of 
Perigord as it developed.  There are a number of anecdotal examples in the interview 
data, in relation to the pharmaceuticals business in particular, where Perigord was able 
to identify a person with whom they could establish contact who would be in a 
position to provide information on elements of the industry which were new to them. 
This assisted the company in terms of gaining a better understanding of quality 
processes, procurement processes and the procedures by which new products are 
brought to market.  Other members of Alan Leamy’s social network were well placed 
to introduce him to key players in the pharmaceutical market either directly or through 
a referral.  
 
The potential in a social network is an important aspect which these latter examples 
illuminate.  Alan Leamy had a number of friends who were professionally active in 
the pharmaceutical industry. This fact was of no real value to Perigord until the firm 
started to explore the potential for its services in this market.  As the opportunity 
became more apparent, the potential resource became an actual resource for Alan 
Leamy.  In a small firm context, it is not possible to completely distinguish between 
developments in a firm’s absorptive capacity and the social capital of the CEO.  By 
his nature Alan Leamy is a socially active person.  The data revealed many anecdotes 
related to his behaviour which suggest that he is comfortable in engaging with people 
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whether he knows them well or not.  Alan has an ability to network widely and 
appears to be able to leverage his network effectively.   
 
 
7.1.4 The emergence of dynamic capability in the Perigord Group explained 
A dynamic capability emerged in the Perigord group.  Section 6.3 established the links 
between learning and the building of capacity to make purposeful changes to the 
resource base of the firm.  Similarly, the link between managerial agency and 
purposeful action was explored.  Yet these factors did not fully explain the emergence 
of the dynamic capability in Perigord Group in terms of the underlying mechanisms 
which may have facilitated or led to this emergence.  The literature on small firms 
recognises the centrality of the CEO in terms of decision making and influencing or 
setting strategy.  It is difficult to distinguish between changes in the capability of Alan 
Leamy and changes in the capability of the Perigord Group in relation to dynamic 
capability.  Such a distinction has little relevance in the context of this research where 
the reasons for the emergence of the dynamic capability of the firm are being explored 
where Alan Leamy plays such a central and dominant role in that emergence. 
 
Section 6.3 mapped the themes which emerged from the data onto the definition of 
dynamic capability proposed by Helfat et al (2007).  It is also possible to continue that 
mapping onto the elements of the Real revealed in Figure 3.  Tacit knowledge relates 
directly to the themes of learning, capacity building and managerial purposefulness. 
Alan Leamy’s levels of tacit knowledge grew over time as he assimilated broader 
learning with his long experience.  As the capability of the firm grew in terms of 
technology and individual employee’s capability, Alan Leamy was able to include this 
in his sense of what could be achieved.  His increasing confidence based on this 
knowledge impacted on his ability as a leader of the firm.   The absorptive capacity of 
the CEO maps well onto all of the themes with the exception of the focus on 
performance.  The capacity to identify, assimilate and exploit new knowledge clearly 
relates to organisational learning and to developments in firm capacity.  Third parties 
were regularly used as the means by which new knowledge was brought into the firm.  
As Alan Leamy’s personal absorptive capacity increased, this had an impact on his 
ability as a leader.  Finally, the third aspect of the Real, social capital, is related to the 
themes of the use of third parties and organisational learning. It was the CEO’s ability 
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to identify suitable third parties which made them available to the firm.  Engaging 
with his network also allowed the CEO to become aware of knowledge which might 
be of use to the firm.  It also allowed him to begin to question some of the 
assumptions which he held about the firm and its role in the market which was a factor 
in the evolution to higher order learning. 
 
The following section discusses the outcomes of the Perigord case in the context of 
the extant literature on the emergence of dynamic capabilities and explores the 
relationship between the factors identified in the analysis of the strata of the Real. 
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7.2 Discussion  
7.2.1 Summarising the literature 
Dynamic capability is defined as the ability of a firm to develop the capacity to 
“purposefully create, extend or modify its resource base” (Helfat et al. 2007 p. 4).  
The literature clearly situates consideration of dynamic capabilities in the context of 
the resource based view of the firm and elements of evolutionary theory particularly in 
relation to routines and capabilities (Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997, Eisenhardt and 
Martin 2000).  The resource based view of the firm views the firm as a bundle of 
resources whose configuration determines the services which the firm may deliver to 
the market (Penrose 1959, Wernerfelt 1984).  The literature has considered the 
attributes of resources which might lead to sustained competitive advantage (Barney 
1991, Peteraf 1993).  A central aspect of this view of the firm relates to the importance 
of managerial decision making in determining how resources are configured.   
 
Routines are organisational processes which are repetitive in nature and where the end 
result is normally well defined (Nelson and Winter 1982, Winter 2003).  Routines 
involve the learning of certain behaviours by individuals (Winter 2003) but also allow 
the organisation to store knowledge as practice is developed and established (Nelson 
and Winter 1982).  Organisational capabilities relate to the ability of a firm to 
coordinate resources to perform certain tasks towards a predefined outcome (Nelson 
and Winter 1982, Helfat and Peteraf 2003). The literature has also pointed to differing 
orders of capabilities which impact on firm performance (Winter 2003, Dosi, Faillo 
and Marengo 2008, Bender 2008). 
 
However, the literature has not explored the issue of the emergence of dynamic 
capability in great depth.  The few papers which do address this issue were discussed 
in Chapter 5 and revealed a number of themes in relation to the mechanisms which 
may contribute to the emergence of dynamic capability in SMEs.   
 
Aspects of organisational and individual learning are discussed in Zollo and Winter 
(2002) and Verona and Ravasi (2003).  Teece (2007) includes learning in his micro 
foundations where the organisation may learn to adjust its routines over time. 
Organisational learning is also included in the explanations proffered by Rosenbloom 
(2000) and Pablo et al (2007) in their consideration of how leaders were able to 
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leverage existing organisational knowledge and in the work of Blyler and Coff (2003) 
where it is clear that individuals may learn from their social network. 
 
The micro foundations proposed by Teece (2007) relate substantially to the sensing 
and seizing of opportunities in a multi-national organisational context.  This concept 
can be re-framed as absorptive capacity defined as the capacity of the firm to identify, 
assimilate and exploit new knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Similarly, it is 
possible to identify aspects of absorptive capacity in the work of Verona and Ravasi 
(2003) in terms of how new knowledge is created or identified and then made of use 
to the firm.  
 
The owner-manager is central to developments in strategic direction and decision 
making in an SME (Jones and Macpherson 2006, Hambrick and Mason 1984, Child 
1972).  Consequently, the role of leadership identified in the work of Rosenbloom 
(2000) and Pablo et al (2007) in larger organisations is likely to be amplified in the 
SME context. Finally, the influence or impact of the owner-manager’s network of 
contacts, identified by Blyler and Coff (2003) is also likely to be relevant.  
 
The extant literature suggest that the following factors are central to an explanation of 
how dynamic capabilities emerge in SMEs: (i) developments in organisational 
learning, (ii) developments in the firm’s capacity to identify, assimilate and exploit 
new knowledge, (iii) the role of the leader and (iv) the influence of the owner-
manager’s network of social contacts. The following section discusses these factors  in 
the context of the outcomes of the Perigord case data. 
 
7.2.2 The Perigord Case  
The Perigord case data revealed five themes relating to the emergence of dynamic 
capability in that firm. These themes were (i) the focus on performance of the CEO, 
(ii) capacity building in relation to people and technology, (iii) the transition to higher 
order learning in the firm, (iv) the role of managerial purposefulness and (v) the use of 
third parties.  The critical realist analysis suggested that these themes relate to the 
strata of the Empirical and the Actual and that the underlying mechanisms (Lawson 
1997, Easton 2010) in the strata of the Real which give rise to these themes relate to 
the tacit knowledge of the CEO, his capacity to identify, assimilate and exploit new 
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knowledge and the use of his network of contacts.  In summary, the analysis of the 
data suggests that the drivers of, and explanations for, the emergence of dynamic 
capabilities in the case are as follows: (i) the impact of learning, (ii) the impact of the 
capacity to identify, assimilate and exploit new knowledge, (iii) the impact of the role 
of the leader and (iv) the impact of the owner-manager’s network of contacts. 
 
The impact of learning: 
The commonality of the impact of learning at one level is self-evident.  The 
investments in learning made in Perigord allowed a substantial enhancement of the 
skills base of the organisation to be developed. The substantial use which was made of 
key internal staff to train other staff reflects the knowledge articulation and 
codification practices stipulated by Zollo and Winter (2002).  The preparation of 
training material and its subsequent use meant that the practices which the firm 
wished to embed were subject to these processes of articulation and codification.  
Similarly, it is possible to see similarities with the research of Verona and Ravasi 
(2003) and their proposition of three knowledge elements, namely, knowledge 
creation and absorption, knowledge integration and knowledge reconfiguration.  
Perigord engaged in a wide variety of processes to capture knowledge and to ensure 
its integration into the business.  Key executives attended relevant conferences and 
exhibitions.  Executives attended a number of formal training programmes related to 
developing areas.  The firm engaged in a series of interactions with clients and third 
parties, as described above, which brought considerable new knowledge to the firm.  
The integration of this knowledge led to re-configurations internally on a number of 
occasions as the transition from traditional pre-press services to a more digitised 
service evolved.  Similarly, the re-configuration of resources which was required in 
the development and management of the software solutions was substantial.  
 
What is less explicit in the extant literature is the impact of the transition to higher 
order learning in relation to the emergence of dynamic capabilities.  In dealing with 
knowledge articulation and codification, Zollo and Winter (2002) are effectively 
dealing with lower order learning issues which lend themselves to codification.  
However, their analysis also discusses the opportunity to challenge some elements of 
experiential learning which can be ill-founded in reality or which may have ceased to 
be relevant as a result of changed circumstances.  Verona and Ravasi (2003 p. 
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601)referred to “the higher order knowledge-related processes that are performed 
through these combinations” of various resources as being foundational to dynamic 
capabilities. This analysis recognises the importance of knowledge related processes 
in re-combining the resources of the firm.  The Perigord case study revealed a 
demonstrable transition in the nature of learning from lower to a higher order where 
the CEO is now significantly better equipped to question the assumptions and business 
models employed by the firm. 
 
The impact of the capacity to identify, assimilate and exploit new knowledge: 
The literature described the importance of the firm’s capacity to identify, assimilate 
and exploit new knowledge in facilitating the emergence of dynamic capabilities.  
Termed absorptive capacity by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) this factor includes an 
aspect of organisational learning and also capacity building to develop the ability to 
assimilate and exploit the new knowledge identified.  The literature on absorptive 
capacity has established that it is a cumulative phenomenon (Cohen and Levinthal 
1990, Zahra and George 2002, Easterby-Smith, et al. 2008) in that firms which add to 
their absorptive capacity further increase their capacity to identify, assimilate and 
exploit more new knowledge.  In addition, the literature has also established that as 
firms add to their absorptive capacity they differentiate themselves more and more 
from firms with lower levels of absorptive capacity (Van Den Bosch, Volberda and 
De Boer 1999, Giuliani and Bell 2005).  The case data demonstrated that the 
absorptive capacity of the Perigord Group developed considerably over the period of 
this research.  This was influenced by a combination of learning processes as well as 
the engagement with suppliers and a range of third parties.  It was also influenced by 
the strategic decisions which were taken to invest in developing technologies at an 
early stage.  This allowed the accumulation of knowledge and experience which the 
firm was able to translate to client oriented services.  Perigord’s capacity building in 
relation to its people and its technology was central to the development of its 
absorptive capacity. 
 
The impact of the role of the leader: 
The literature on leadership discusses the importance of the management coalition 
(Child 1972) or senior management team (Hambrick and Mason 1984)in setting the 
strategic agenda for the firm.  It is also established that in the SME case the 
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management coalition is very small and, in effect, may only include the owner-
manager (Jones and Macpherson 2006).  In the Perigord case data the central 
influence of Alan Leamy is evident.  From his own description of how key decisions 
were made and from others descriptions of the evolution of the firm, it is clear that he 
was involved in all decisions of significance in the firm.  These decisions included 
others at key stages.  For example, Anne Cooke was heavily involved in the decision 
to purchase the new printing machine and also in the re-location project for the 
businesses.  Similarly, Paul Leamy was centrally involved in the technical aspects of 
what the new software solutions might achieve.  Michael Fleming played a critical 
role in determining the training requirements of staff and in identifying appropriate 
solutions.  Yet, in each case, Alan Leamy was closely involved in the evolving project 
and was the ultimate decision maker in each case. Alan Leamy was the central 
Perigord manager involved in all discussions with Enterprise Ireland in relation to 
funding applications.  In his interview, Alan identified a significant shift in how he 
had approached the development of the business plan for the Precise Data subsidiary 
as a result of the engagement with me acting as a consultant to the firm.  This 
demonstrated a shift in his own view of the firm and the potential for it which resulted 
in the pursuit of additional opportunities.   In this way the case data supports the 
findings of literature in relation the importance of the image which the entrepreneur 
holds of the firm in relation to the development opportunities which are identified 
(Penrose 1959, Hilliard 2004).  As Alan Leamy’s view of what Perigord had become 
evolved, the opportunities which he was capable of identifying and which he was 
prepared to pursue changed substantially.  The enhancement of managerial 
purposefulness in the Perigord case echoes the role of leadership as described in the 
extant literature on the emergence of dynamic capabilities. 
 
The impact of the owner-manager’s network of contacts: 
The literature on social capital, in the context of explaining the emergence of dynamic 
capabilities, explored the use which can be made of the network of contacts of an 
individual to his or her benefit (Bourdieu 1986, Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998, Blyler 
and Coff 2003).  This literature suggests that an entrepreneur may be able to leverage 
his or her network of contacts to make resources available to the firm which might not 
otherwise be available to it.  The Perigord case data has a number of examples where 
Alan Leamy was able to do just this.  He was able to identify individuals who might 
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be of assistance to the firm in a professional relationship, for example using my 
services to develop the relationship with Enterprise Ireland, using a pharmaceutical 
industry executive to develop business opportunities in the UK and Europe and 
developing a relationship with a USA based organisation who now represent Perigord 
in that jurisdiction.  Similarly, Alan Leamy was able to work with others in an un-
formalised manner to develop his business, for example, the initial relationship with 
Enda Casey, the pharmaceutical market insights gained from a close friend who 
worked in the sector and the continuing market intelligence gathered from his circle of 
friends and acquaintances relating to software, gaming and pharmaceutical markets.   
 
The extant literature on the emergence of dynamic capabilities includes the themes of 
organisational learning, developments in the firm’s capacity to identify, assimilate and 
exploit new knowledge, the role of leadership and the influence of the network of 
contacts of the CEO.There are clear parallels between these themes and the findings 
from the case data of the Perigord Group.  However, there remain some unanswered 
questions in relation to the nature of the interaction, if any, between these underlying 
or foundational elements of dynamic capability of organisational learning, absorptive 
capacity, leadership and social capital.  The following sections discuss this issue. 
 
7.2.3 The interaction between learning, social capital and absorptive capacity 
There is insufficient discussion in the extant literature on how these factors that 
explain the emergence of dynamic capabilities interact.  The literature has explored 
each of these concepts in detail in their own right.  This involves some explanation of 
how these concepts relate.  For example, the literature on absorptive capacity 
examines its relationship with organisational learning but the interaction between all 
three is not explored in any depth, though for example, the relationship between social 
capital, absorptive capacity and learning has been explored theoretically in relation to 
the development of strategic space and managerial reflection (Jones, Macpherson and 
Thorpe 2010). The following section describes the relationships between learning, 
social capital and absorptive capacity in the context of how they may feed into the 
development of dynamic capability in an SME. 
 
There is considerable authoritative literature in the area of organisational learning on 
how learning may occur (Jones and Macpherson 2006, Huber 1991, Crossan, Lane 
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and White 1999).  The 4-I model was described in Chapter 3 in relation to the stages 
which must be followed for learning to take effect (intuiting, interpreting, integrating 
and institutionalising).  However, there are also orders of learning (Fiol and Lyles 
1985, Argyris 1976, Senge 1990).  This term is used to describe the different nature of 
learning between for example learning a basic skill set to adequately execute a task 
and the learning which might allow an entrepreneur to see the benefit to consciously 
reflecting on the assumptions made in relation to their business in order to plan more 
strategically for the future. Organisational learning is made up of both types of 
learning.  It should be noted that in the discussion of the literature I have noted that for 
presentation purposes it is normal to present lower and higher order learning as a 
dichotomy whereas in reality the distinction is more like a continuum where the extent 
of reflection and originality in the learning varies. 
 
Some aspects of learning lend themselves to codification.  Zollo and Winter(2002) 
held that the process of codification could be a useful means by which to clarify that 
which is known and that the process of writing could be an aid to learning.  This will 
be easier in matters of lower order learning which lend themselves to standard 
operating procedures which describe the task in hand, the result required and the 
preferred (or required) method of achieving that task.  As a consequence of this 
relative ease of codification and as a result of the nature of the learning involved, there 
can be a strong relationship between lower order learning and the development and 
sustenance of the routines and processes of the organisation (Nelson and Winter 
1982).  The practice of routines reinforces them in the organisation as the organisation 
“remembers by doing” (Nelson and Winter (1982 p. 99).  
 
The development of higher order learning will also lead to a change in the resource 
base of the firm.  At a minimum, the management capability will have changed.  This 
allows for the possible re-configuration of other resources which may result in new 
outcomes or capabilities within the firm.  The learning may also result in decisions to 
procure additional resources (or to discard certain resources).  Such resources could 
include the recruitment of new or additional skills sets or the acquisition of equipment 
or technology.  Changes to resources in this manner have the potential to require or 
cause changes to some of the organisational routines and processes.  Such changes to 
resources may also influence organisational learning.  For example, the recruitment of 
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a new employee with a particular skill set has the potential to influence the 
organisation as they use their experience to change the stock of organisational 
learning.   
 
An aspect of organisational learning which must also be included relates to tacit 
knowledge (Polanyi 1966).  The consistent practice of routines can result in the 
development of tacit knowledge as the practice becomes embedded in firm knowledge 
(Nelson and Winter 1982, Crossan, Lane and White 1999).  Changes in the resource 
base may also impact on the tacit knowledge within the firm.  The loss of an 
individual member of the team may result in some tacit knowledge exiting with the 
employee.  Similarly, the addition of resources is likely to lead to changes in the tacit 
knowledge of the firm as that which is known (Polanyi 1966) adjusts to the new 
configuration of resources. The impact of resource change and the influence of the 
practice of routines operate through organisational learning to build up the level of 
tacit knowledge in the firm.  This reflects the fact that what has become tacit has to be 
learned first. 
 
It should be noted that throughout the discussion of learning that there is no 
assumption in relation to the veracity of what is learned.  Huber (1991) defined 
learning in relation to the potential for changes in behaviour.  This definition makes 
no judgement that the learning engaged in results in accurate or objectively verifiable 
learning.  In the context of learning from experience, in particular, it is possible for the 
analysis of an event to make erroneous assumptions about the causal factors which 
both led to the situation and which led to the solution (Levinthal and March 1993).  A 
lack of genuine analysis, an inability to perceive certain assumptions or perhaps even 
a sub-conscious reluctance to face our own mistakes can all lead to the potential for 
changes in behaviour which may be completely misguided.   
 
Organisational learning explains how the practice of routines and the codification of 
knowledge may help to build capabilities and skills within the workforce. It also 
explains how the different orders of learning  may impact on the organisation and the 
role which tacit knowledge may play.  However, the case data suggests that this 
explanation is incomplete.  Two other factors, the impact of the firms capacity to 
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identify, assimilate and exploit new knowledge and the impact of the CEO’s network 
of social contacts, must also be considered.  
The addition of these factors to the explanation is useful as they are aids to the 
learning process as they may add a third party dimension which has greater potential 
to challenge assumptions and erroneous learning.  
 
The impact of the CEO’s network of contacts is defined in relation to the actual and 
potential resources embedded in the network of relationships of an individual or social 
unit (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). This has the potential to feed into the resource base 
of the firm as the entrepreneur may become aware of resources in his or her network 
which could be usefully employed within the firm.  What is less obvious is that social 
capital may also influence organisational learning.  This can be a negative influence as 
the pervading perspective of a social network may reinforce rather than challenge the 
entrepreneurs view.  This can lead to rigidities within the firm which are counter-
productive (Leonard-Barton 1992).  There may also be a substantial tacit knowledge 
element to the social network.  Networks often develop an agreed language and shared 
perspectives on issues which might not be apparent to a new member or non-member 
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998).  This can feed into the tacit knowledge of the 
organisation as the entrepreneur engages with his peers and develops his own stock of 
knowledge.  The aspect of peer interaction is important as the literature has 
established that the preferred method of learning for entrepreneurs is to engage with 
their peers in informal settings (Gibb 2000, Sadler-Smith, Down and Lean 2000, van 
Gelderen, van der Sluis and Jansen 2005). 
 
As described in the literature review in Chapter 5 the capacity to identify, assimilate 
and exploit new knowledge is related to organisational learning through its mediating 
role in searching for and bringing useful information to bear on organisational 
practices (Cohen and Levinthal 1990, Zahra and George 2002, Todorova and Durisin 
2007).  Absorptive capacity has the potential to feed its own development.  This is due 
to the reinforcing and cumulative nature of absorptive capacity where it can be shown 
that a firm which increases its level of absorptive capacity creates the capacity for 
even greater learning (Cohen and Levinthal 1990).  This accumulation is important as 
research has shown that firms with a higher level of absorptive capacity are likely to 
diverge competitively from firms with lower levels as the cumulative effect widens 
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the gap in absorptive capacity over time (Van Den Bosch, Volberda and De Boer 
1999). Absorptive capacity is related to social capital as each may influence the other 
over time.  An entrepreneur’s network may provide knowledge or indications of the 
potential for new and useful knowledge. Similarly, an entrepreneur make seek out new 
contacts as a result of knowledge gained or even in an effort to identify a resource to 
assist in the solution to an issue. Some developments in this relationship between 
social capital and absorptive capacity may be unplanned and result from little more 
than luck.  Others may be quite deliberate as solutions are sought or even awareness of 
potentially useful information is developed. 
 
It is in the interaction between the various components of organisational learning, the 
capacity to identify, assimilate and exploit new knowledge and the impact of the 
CEO’s network of contacts which feed into the capability to purposefully change the 
resources of the firm.  Changes in the firm’s dynamic capability have the potential to 
feedback into social capital and organisational learning as described.  Similarly, as the 
firm’s dynamic capabilities evolve, they have the potential to influence absorptive 
capacity in the nature and direction of searches for new knowledge. Critically, the 
interaction between the three elements has the potential to challenge organisation 
learning which has begun to suffer from the myopia described by Levinthal and 
March (1993) and Maskell and Malmberg (2007) . In doing so, this interaction has the 
potential to positively feed the development of the organisation by creating both the 
realisation of the need for a change in the firm’s resources base and also by providing 
some of the mechanisms by which such change might be purposefully achieved. 
 
This explanation also recognises that there is a temporal dimension to the evolution of 
dynamic capabilities.  There is no assumption of a linear path from organisation 
learning through to dynamic capabilities.  The explanation offered is intended to 
reveal the complex nature of the relationships which can influence the emergence of 
dynamic capability. The literature discusses the nature of critical incidents or crisis 
which might be required to cause the shift in learning for higher order learning to 
occur (Jones and Macpherson 2006, Fiol and Lyles 1985, Cope 2003).  These might 
be considered as external shocks to the relationships proposed.  However, the 
explanation proposed in my research, and supported by the experience of the Perigord 
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Group, describes the relationship between the factors for dynamic capabilities to 
emerge in the event of or absence of such an external shock. 
 
The temporal dimension has another aspect.  When considering or researching the 
emergence of dynamic capability in any period, one cannot ignore the existing 
resource base, routines and processes and tacit knowledge which exist, a priori, in the 
firm.  Even in a new firm, the individuals coming together to form the new venture 
have a range of experiences and prejudices as they enter the new firm (Penrose 1959, 
Child 1972).  The managers of an existing firm will have an image of their firm which 
may influence the perceived range of options (Penrose 1959, Hilliard 2004).  Whilst 
managers have the potential to influence the strategic choices of the firm (Jones, et al. 
2007, Child 1972), they can only do so in the context of their own learning and the 
choices which are apparent to them.  In this way, the explanation proposed recognises 
that existing resources and routines may need to be challenged for dynamic 
capabilities to emerge. 
 
7.2.4 The importance of interaction between the factors 
The explanation for the emergence of dynamic capabilities developed above 
emphasises the importance of the interaction of the factors of organisational learning, 
the capacity to identify, assimilate and exploit new knowledge and the use of the 
owner manager’s network of contacts. The importance of the interaction is supported 
by the Perigord case studyIt is important to emphasise this combination as the 
individual elements may not be sufficient in their own right to enable the emergence 
of dynamic capability.  An emphasis on individual aspects might even be counter-
productive. This section explores why relying on an individual factor may not lead to 
the emergence of dynamic capability and why the interaction of the factors may be 
required. 
 
Learning from experience is open to error as the linkage between decisions made and 
outcomes experienced may be misinterpreted (Levinthal and March 1993).  Managers 
may establish decision making rules based on insufficient samples of events which 
may lead to weak decision making as circumstances vary beyond what was initially 
experienced (Maskell and Malmberg 2007).  These types of myopia in relation to 
learning tend to be a result of insular thinking.  Through not exposing the thoughts 
 194 
 
processes to independent (although not necessarily external perspectives) the potential 
for misguided assumptions remains. 
 
One aspect of the concept of social capital is that the network of the individual has a 
range of real and potential resources within it.  This can be a powerful aid to an 
entrepreneur in terms of testing ideas and identifying resources which may assist in 
implementation.  It is also established in the literature that networks develop their own 
language and may develop commonly held interpretations of events or issues 
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998, Leonard-Barton 1992).  However, if a network is not 
sufficiently varied in membership or remains unchallenged, it is possible for this 
common perception to hinder new insights which challenge the status quo.  The 
learning within the network may be based on the erroneous assumption that other have 
done the work of validating the learning (Maskell and Malmberg 2007).  This may 
result in a consensus developing in relation to appropriate courses of action, which is 
ill-founded. 
 
Absorptive capacity is the process by which firms identify new information and then 
make use of that information in the firm over time.  As discussed in Chapter 5, it is 
linked to the learning processes of the firm and may allow for information which is 
not immediately useful but which has the potential for value in the future. However, 
the concept of absorptive capacity is predicated on two basic information related 
activities, exploration and exploitation (Cohen and Levinthal 1990).  A firm must 
perform some form of search for new information and then it must find a means of 
making use of that information now or in the future (Cohen and Levinthal 1990, Zahra 
and George 2002, Todorova and Durisin 2007).  How will a firm know where to seek 
new information?  How will it identify that potentially useful information is available 
but in a yet unrecognised area?  The use of the CEO’s network of contacts has the 
potential to bring aspects of information or potential fields of enquiry to the attention 
of the individual. This can add considerable value as it may substantially broaden the 
perspective of the entrepreneur (Giuliani and Bell 2005).  
 
I propose that the interaction of the three elements of learning, the impact of the 
CEO’s network of contacts and the capacity to identify, assimilate and exploit new 
knowledge has the potential to build a virtuous circle of robust learning which is well 
 195 
 
developed in terms of challenging its core assumptions.  It may be broader in context 
in terms of the elements considered.  It is less likely to suffer from the myopic view of 
the entrenched, under-analysed position. It is possible that the proactive development 
by the entrepreneur of his/her social capital in a conscious effort to build absorptive 
capacity will result in a development of higher order learning which may in turn lead 
to the development of dynamic capabilities.  The literature on lower and higher order 
learning was explored in Chapter 3.  The consensus in the literature is that some form 
of shock may be required in order for the thinking of the entrepreneur to be 
sufficiently challenged for higher order learning to occur (Jones and Macpherson 
2006, Fiol and Lyles 1985, Cope 2003).  The proactive development of the interaction 
of the elements of organisational learning, the CEO’s network of contacts and the 
capacityto identify, assimilate and exploit new knowledge may mean that the external 
shocks described in the literature as almost necessary catalysts for higher order 
learning might be avoided.  Given the potential for such shocks to have catastrophic 
impacts on the firm, including firm failure, it would be a preferable if firms could 
develop this capability proactively. 
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8. Conclusions 
This chapter summarises the contributions of this research.  The limitations of the 
research are identified and addressed.  Some suggestions for future research are made.  
Finally, some recommendations for public policy and professional practice are 
offered. 
 
8.1 Contributions 
This thesis explores the development of dynamic capabilities in SMEs.  Using a 
critical realist perspective and through an extensive examination of one firm over a 
nine year period, it has been established that a dynamic capability emerged in that 
firm.  The dynamic capability which emerged in the Perigord Group was the ability to 
assess its competitive position within the marketplace and to purposefully add to its 
resource base to address the competitive opportunities identified.  The development of 
the software solution in its present form is an instance of the manifestation of that 
dynamic capability. The explanation proposed is that a number of factors contributed 
to this emergence.  These factors can be described in relation to the critical realist 
ontological strata of the Real, the Actual and the Empirical (Bhaskar 1975).  Figure 3 
from Chapter 7 summarised the strata of reality as applied to the Perigord case data. 
 
Figure 3: Perigord strata of reality - the Real 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Empirical 
• Capacity Building - investments in technology and people (Theme 2) 
• Investments in Training (Theme 3) 
Actual 
• The focus on firm performance (Theme 1) 
• Transition to higher order learning (Theme 3) 
• The role of managerial purposefulness (Theme 4) 
• The use of third parties (Theme 5) 
Real 
• Tacit knowledge of CEO about the business and clients needs 
• The capacity of the CEO to identify, assimilate and exploit new 
knowledge 
• The social network (capital) of the CEO 
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The Empirical included the relatively high level of investment in learning and the 
extension of learning within the firm towards higher order learning which has added a 
strategic dimension to the CEO’s thinking.  There were also significant developments 
in capacity building related to people and technology.  The Actual included the 
purposeful addition of resources, driven by the focus on firm performance, 
exemplified by the use of third party intermediaries to address specific issues and to 
assist the CEO in the development of business plans.  More fundamentally, it is 
argued that the underlying mechanisms, the Real, which drove these changes, were the 
development of the CEO’s capacity to identify, assimilate and exploit new knowledge, 
his use of his network of contacts and the enhancement of his tacit knowledge over 
time. 
 
The literature on dynamic capability synthesise evolutionary theory, with its emphasis 
on routines and processes and organisational capabilities (Nelson and Winter 1982, 
Helfat and Peteraf 2003, Bender 2008)and the resource based view of the firm 
(Penrose 1959, Barney 1991, Peteraf 1993) in relation to how firms might develop a 
sustainable competitive advantage (Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997, Eisenhardt and 
Martin 2000). As a result, there is a strong emphasis on the routines and processes 
which are necessary to assimilate new knowledge within the firm.  The literature on 
dynamic capability tends to refer to larger firms (Teece 2007, Wang and Ahmed 2007, 
Barreto 2010) and tends not to consider the smaller firm where such routines and 
processes are less likely to exist (Jones and Macpherson 2006).  The dynamic 
capability literature also tends to discuss the existence or otherwise of such 
capabilities with only limited literature on exploring how such capabilities emerge in a 
small firm.  
 
There is considerable literature in the areas of social capital (Bourdieu 1986, Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal 1998, Portes 1998, Coleman 1994, Putnam 1995) and absorptive capacity 
(Cohen and Levinthal 1990, Zahra and George 2002, Todorova and Durisin 2007) 
generally, but little in terms of synthesising those literatures with learning, tacit 
knowledge and the development of dynamic capabilities. The absorptive capacity 
literature is closely linked with learning in terms of how new knowledge may be 
identified and made of value to the firm, however, the three areas of social capital, 
absorptive capacity and learning are not synthesised in the literature in a 
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developedway.  This thesis addresses those gaps by extending the dynamic 
capabilities literature to the context of the small firm, by examining the emergence of 
dynamic capabilities in an SME context and by incorporating explanations from the 
literature on social capital, absorptive capacity and learning (including tacit 
knowledge) into the explanations of how dynamic capabilities emerge in SMEs. 
 
The research question that this thesisaddresses is how do dynamic capabilities emerge 
in small firms?  This question was addressed by examining the Perigord Group and 
specifically, through seeking to answer the following questions: 
 
1) Did dynamic capabilities emerge in the Perigord Group? 
2) If so, what caused that emergence? 
3) Are there underlying mechanisms which were not empirically observable 
which facilitated that emergence? 
 
This research is based on a detailed single firm case study of the Perigord Group, a 
small Irish owned company which has transitioned in the period under review from 
being an internationally trading print company to a global provider of brand and 
artwork management services. The company was chosen as it was known, a priori, to 
have a higher than average level of investment in staff training and development. 
Access was made possible as a result of my relationship with the owner of the 
company in my capacity as a business consultant.  The data presented in this thesis 
relates to the period from 2002 to 2010.  Data was gathered from interviews with 
senior managers in the firm; from company records related to training plans and 
investment levels; from my records of 186 business meetings with the owner of the 
company over the period 2004 to 2010; and from business plans and grant 
applications to Enterprise Ireland which I coordinated on behalf of the owner. 
 
This data was initially explored in terms of the learning literature.  As this yielded 
relatively little in terms of insight other than the transition to higher order learning 
(Fiol and Lyles 1985, Argyris 1976, Senge 1990) the data was subsequently re-
interpreted in the light of the more useful dynamic capability literature.  The impact of 
the higher order learning allowed Alan Leamy to question his assumptions about the 
business, but it did not in its own right indicate or suggest the appropriate 
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development path.  The exploration of the dynamic capability literature revealed a 
number of theoretical streams of relevance to the Perigord case.  These included 
aspects of leadership in the SME context, tacit knowledge, social capital and 
absorptive capacity which allowed a more robust and defensible theoretical 
explanation of the data to be developed.  It was in the consideration of the interaction 
between this higher order learning and the utilisation of his social capital and the 
development of his absorptive capacity that this theoretical explanation emerged.   
 
The data revealed the existence of dynamic capabilities in the Perigord Group.  A 
dynamic capability existed prior to 2002 in the nature of the progressive manner in 
which the firm hired people of considerable capability and then invested relatively 
heavily in their skills and expertise. A dynamic capability emerged during the period 
2002-2010 as evidenced by the firm’s ability to specify and develop its software 
capabilities to meet and exceed client expectations. By re-defining itself as a brand 
and artwork management services company, Perigord has positioned itself to 
purposefully address market developments.  The dynamic capability is the ability to 
assess its competitive position within the marketplace and to purposefully add to or 
adjust its resource base to address the competitive opportunities identified. 
 
Critical realism calls on the researcher to reflect on the data in the context of the 
literature to ascertain what underlying mechanisms might be at play to explain the 
phenomenon studied.  In the Perigord case, it can be seen that the investment in 
learning during the period resulted in a development of higher order learning in 
addition to the continued investment in lower order learning related to skills and 
functional expertise.  This higher order learning facilitated a more strategic reflection 
on the part of the CEO.  His planned use of intermediaries purposefully added 
resources to the firm at key junctures.  The underlying mechanisms which gave rise to 
these factors are related to the CEO’s own tacit knowledge, his ability to use his social 
capital and the developments in his absorptive capacity. 
 
The data revealed a complex interaction between a number of factors which included 
organisational learning, tacit knowledge, the evolution of routines and processes, the 
development of the firm’s resource base and the influence of social capital and 
absorptive capacity in the development of dynamic capability within the firm.  The 
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extant literature has considered each of these factors in detail and has synthesised 
some.  This research has added to the literature significantly in identifying and 
offering a theoretical explanation for the interaction between learning, social capital 
and absorptive capacity in the context of dynamic capability. In addition, this research 
adds to the literature in proposing that developments in any of these factors in 
isolation from the others may not yield the developments in dynamic capability 
sought.  Indeed, there is the potential for negative consequences through a number of  
countervailing mechanisms such as myopic learning (Levinthal and March 1993), 
through invalid assumptions developed at a group level (Maskell and Malmberg 2007) 
or through inadequate searches for new, useful information (Zahra and George 2002).  
It is a central contribution of this research that the interaction of these factors may 
allow entrepreneurs to develop the capacity for reflection which might avoid the level 
of critical incidents often required to disturb the ineffective development path of the 
firm (Fiol and Lyles 1985, Cope and Watts 2000, Cope 2003). 
 
The emergence of dynamic capabilities within a firm is a process which has an 
indefinable starting point.  The complexity of the process revealed in this research 
demonstrates the importance of learning, tacit knowledge, routine and processes and 
the resources of the firm as key development blocks.  The historical development of 
the firm and the individuals within the firm influence the developmental paths and 
opportunities which may be pursued.  Even new firms will have employees with 
previous work and life experiences which will influence their choices (Penrose 1959, 
Child 1972).  The critical realism approach allows for the inclusion of such temporal 
developments in the description of the firm and its context in a manner that other 
approaches would not allow.  
 
I believe that adopting a critical realist perspective added to this research in a number 
of ways. First, is the potential to seek explanation without the requirement to postulate 
in advance what that explanation might be.  It has allowed an examination of the data 
in a reflective manner which has sought underlying mechanisms which were at play 
and which help to explain the phenomenon examined.  I believe that the richness of 
explanation offered here would not have been possible by an ex-ante consideration of 
what might have been present in the case.  Second, the critical realism approach has 
also yielded a case study of considerable depth.  The case reveals the context of the 
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firm both technologically and temporally. This depth of explanation will allow other 
researchers and practitioners to understand that context properly and so draw 
appropriate parallels to their own research or work situation.  It is in the richness of 
the description and explanation and the consideration of the data relative to the 
literature that the robustness of the research is established.  It is in this robustness that 
the generalisability of the research is founded.  Third, the structure of this thesis is 
unusual in that it is not presented in the structure which is more traditional in a 
doctoral thesis.  This is deliberate and an attempt to accurately describe the manner in 
which the research evolved and the impact of critical realism on that process. 
 
The principle contributions of this research relate to the core research question, how 
dynamic capabilities emerge in SMEs, and to the use of the critical realist perspective 
in research. In addition this research contributes to the literature on learning and on 
training.  The contributions are as follows. 
 
The emergence of Dynamic Capabilities in SMES 
This research extends the concept of dynamic capability into the context of small 
firms.  As noted, extant literature on dynamic capability tends to be based on 
empirical studies of very large firms.  The small firm represents a different context, in 
that typically the routines and processes that might explain the emergence of dynamic 
capabilities in larger firms, will not apply to the smaller firm.   
 
Specifically, this research suggests that the emergence of a dynamic capability in the 
Perigord case is explained by (i) the focus on firm performance, (ii) capacity building 
(people and technology), (iii) the evolution of higher order learning, (iv) managerial 
purposefulness, and (v) the use of third parties. This explanation is consistent with the 
limited extant literature on the emergence of dynamic capability which posits four 
factors which enable the emergence of dynamic capabilities.  These are (i) 
developments in organisational learning, (ii) developments in the firm’s capacity to 
identify, assimilate and exploit new knowledge, (iii) the role of the leader and (iv) the 
influence of the owner-manager’s network of social contacts.     
 
The research, following a critical realist methodology, suggests a mechanism (Bhaskar 
1975, Lawson 1997) by which dynamic capabilities emerge in the context of small 
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firms.  In addition to the existence of the five themes identified, it is argued that 
dynamic capabilities in SMEs emerge as a result of the interaction of three factors; the 
interaction of the CEO’s capacity to engage in higher order learning, the CEO’s 
knowledge and networks, and the ability of the CEO to identify, assimilate and exploit 
new knowledge.  The emphasis is on the interaction as it is argued that developments 
in any one factor in isolation from the others may result in the development of 
countervailing mechanisms (Tsoukas 1989) which may be counter-productive and not 
result in the emergence of dynamic capabilities.  
 
The critical realist perspective  
This research applies the framework of the critical realist strata of reality to the case 
data.  This is a contribution to critical realist methodology as the literature contains 
few empirical studies which explicitly follow a critical realist ontology or which apply 
the ontological strata to the data. The application of the framework highlights how, in 
practice, the presentation and segregation of the Empirical, the Actual and the Real 
can at times be arbitrary.  It also highlights the difficulty of presenting empirical data 
in the critical realist framework.  The retroductive process requires reflection on the 
data, in the context of continual engagement with literature to uncover underlying 
mechanisms.  This creates practical problems as how best to present the research in 
terms of the evolving research question, the multiple analysis of the data, and the 
constant engagement with the literature.  While this problem is not unique to the 
critical realist perspective, the essence of the critical realist perspective requires that 
the reader of such research understands how the researcher comes to the Real.  The 
use of critical realism in this research and the manner in which the research is 
presented is a contribution to knowledge as it reveals the process by which the 
research evolved and provides insight to the iterative and reflexive nature of that 
process. Specifically, by presenting the case data in the context of the initial literature 
and subsequently re-interpreting the data in the light of the second literature chapter 
the reality of the research process followed is revealed. 
 
The use of the critical realist perspective is also a contribution to the entrepreneurship 
and small business literature, in that it outlines how a critical realist perspective might 
offer an alternative way of studying aspects of small firms. 
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The triggers of higher order learning 
As suggested above, the transition to higher order learning is an important determinant 
of the emergence of dynamic capabilities in SMEs. Extant research on learning 
suggests that this transition is often triggered by a crisis. This research suggests that 
the trigger for the transition from lower to higher order learning may not occur in the 
context of a time compressed, single event.  A triggering crisis, like the transition, 
may emerge over an extended period of time.  The addition of this temporal 
perspective provides a more detailed specification of how the transition to higher 
order learning might be triggered in the context of an SME.  Related to this, it is also 
suggested that it might be possible for firms to avoid crisis-induced triggers.  This 
might be achieved in the context of an explicit effort by a CEO to develop new 
knowledge through enhancing and leveraging his network of contacts. 
 
The training debate 
This research began by trying to understand if, and how, investment in training might 
be related to firm performance. For researchers interested in understanding how 
investment in training and management development in smaller firms might impact on 
performance, this research suggests that attempts to establish direct causal links 
between training and developing capabilities and outcomes, such as firm performance, 
will not produce conclusive evidence either in favour, or against, the case for 
supporting training and management development in smaller firms.  This study 
suggests that such approaches fail to capture either (i) some important outcomes of 
training, e.g. the possible gradual transition towards higher order learning in an 
owner-manager, and (ii) the temporal and path dependent nature of how resources and 
capabilities emerge in smaller firms. 
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8.2 Limitations to the research 
As with all research, there are a number of limitations or constraints applicable. 
Empirically, this research relies on a single case study. It has been argued that the 
generalisability of such research suffers as a consequence.  While this might be the 
case with research from a positivist perspective, where the ambition is to make law 
like statements of near universal application, the purpose of this research is quite 
different.  My objective is to identify and then explain the emergence of the dynamic 
capabilities of the Perigord Group.  I have done this through revealing a depth of 
context which included the industry and the firm’s history as well as detailed evidence 
of the progression of the firm over a nine year period.  This depth of context and 
richness of data facilitates genuine comparison across different situations.  This is a 
significant aid to generalisability as research with more cases, but consequently less 
depth of context, impedes genuine detailed comparison.  This research is also 
generalisable to theory as it provides a specific case which offers a robust and 
defensible explanation of the emergence of dynamic capability in a small firm.  It 
proposes a theoretical explanation for that emergence which is capable of being tested 
farther. 
 
It is possible that my closeness to the industry and to the case firm could have 
influenced my judgment and independence as a researcher in a negative manner.  I 
have worked in the printing industry for over twenty years.  I have known Alan 
Leamy for over fifteen years.  I have worked with him as a business consultant for 
nine years in total and for the past seven years in earnest.  The insider researcher 
issues referred to in Chapter 2 are clearly relevant to this research.  It is certain that the 
closeness of my involvement to the industry and the firm and entrepreneur involved 
have been factors, indeed valuable factors, in this research.  They have allowed me 
bring my own experiences to the research in a manner which a researcher with less 
direct experience of the sector could not have done.  From a critical realist perspective 
this is methodologically and ontologically sound as the researcher is not expected to 
bracket themselves off in the way of other approaches.  I believe that the risk of bias 
was mitigated by a number of factors.  I was able to express views on the industry 
with independent data and data from the interview respondents.  Respondents were 
asked to clarify issues where I wished to ensure that I had ascertained their views or 
recollections of events instead of relying on my own. The extent of the data gathered 
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from the contemporaneous notes of my business meetings with the firm provided data 
which was in fact gathered prior to my status of a researcher being established at all. 
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8.3 Suggestions for future research 
This research proposes an explanation as to how the emergence of dynamic capability 
occurred in the Perigord Group.  The emergence happened as a result of the 
interaction of three factors; learning, social capital and absorptive capacity.  The 
development took place over a number of years and was not planned in any way by 
the owner-manager who was so central to it.  Future research which seeks to identify 
how an owner-manager could deliberately embark upon and sustain a journey towards 
a high level of interaction between these three underlying mechanisms would be 
worthwhile.  The foundational factor of facilitating a transition to higher order 
learning is likely to be a significant element of any such methodology as it is higher 
order learning which is required for the basic assumptions of the business model to be 
identified and challenged so that the search for and assimilation of new knowledge 
might begin in earnest. 
 
The literature posits that SMEs under-invest in training, especially in relation to 
management development, relative to larger companies.  Chapter 3 addresses this 
issue and argues that this conclusion is premature as the research which underpins it 
does not include all the relevant factors.  Future research could address the question of 
the appropriateness of the level of investment in training by SMEs.  Such research 
should begin by considering the context and the issues that face the SME.  The 
research should recognise that informal training is valuable, that owner-managers may 
not consider such informal activity to be training when asked and that owner-
managers have been shown to prefer to learn informally and from those whom they 
consider their peers.  If a comparison to the investment levels of larger companies is to 
be made, then the research should also consider the appropriateness and effectiveness 
of that training.  Such a consideration should begin with an assessment of the purpose 
of the training.  If the training is required for the purpose of coordination in the larger 
firm, then while this is valuable to the larger firm, it may have little relevance to an 
SME.  Therefore, in evaluating training investment, the focus should be on a 
comparison between purpose and desired outcomes and achieved outcomes.  If the 
higher level of investment in training by larger companies is ineffective, then SMEs 
should not be exhorted to emulate them. Through comprehensive research of this 
nature, a better understanding of the appropriateness of the investment levels in 
training by SMEs might emerge. 
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The final suggestion for future research relates to the critical realist perspective and 
methodology used in this research.  The approach of critical realism was central to 
revealing the underlying mechanisms of the Perigord Group’s development of 
dynamic capabilities.  The process of retroduction, which involved the constant 
movement between the data and the literature to reveal the underlying mechanisms 
which led to the development of the company, is a powerful research tool. A more 
widespread and explicit use of critical realism in this manner could be an aid to 
understanding other complex issues in entrepreneurship and small business research.  
However, researchers seeking to conduct critical realist researchwill face the 
challenge of how best to present their research.  While presenting the outcomes of 
such research is straightforward, providing transparency to the process through which 
the researcher developed these results and explanations offered is more challenging. 
Such transparency of process is also critical for other researchers who may wish to 
follow a similar methodology.   
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8.4 Implications for policy and practice 
Government policy supports investment in training in firms to enhance 
competitiveness and capability.  In relation to SMEs it has been shown that policy also 
advocates addressing the perceived under-investment in training by SMEs relative to 
larger companies.  I have argued above that this perceived under-investment may be a 
result of a misinterpretation of data on investment levels in training.  Larger 
companies may require higher levels of training for reasons of coordination or perhaps 
indoctrination in company culture.  This is not required in smaller companies to the 
same extent.  However, the data in this thesis has shown the impact of the transition to 
higher order learning in the Perigord Group.  Government policy would be better 
targeted at encouraging SMEs to engage in activities which could lead to a transition 
to higher order learning. While there is an emphasis in Government policy on 
increasing the level of management training in SMEs in Ireland, it is unclear that 
policymakers appreciate that there is a distinction between providing training in a 
range of management skills and encouraging and facilitating the development of 
higher order learning.  The latter requires reflection on the part of the learner in the 
context of their assumptions about their business.  This suggests that interventions 
must be more about engagement with the owner-manager to consider and discuss their 
firm’s circumstances and less about formal classroom learning. 
 
Encouraging owner-managers to engage in a process of genuine reflection on their 
business assumptions is not straightforward.  The literature generally suggests that 
some form of crisis is required for this to take place.  The Perigord Group data 
supports this general contention, although it reflects this crisis as being a more 
protracted event than a critical time constrained incident. For SME owner-managers to 
be encouraged to engage in such reflection prior to the occurrence of some form of 
crisis would be in the best interests of individual firms and the national economy as a 
whole.  
 
The literature on intermediaries proposes that it is through third party interactions 
which engage with the owner-manager in their contexts in a meaningful (meaningful 
to the owner-manager) way which are most likely to result in genuine engagement. 
Interventions by Government agencies promoting what is perceived as best practice to 
business owners who do not associate themselves with the issues being presented are 
 209 
 
futile.  The promotion of engagement on a one to one level with owner-managers on 
an issue of real concern to them is more likely to result in movement and an increase 
in receptiveness to the usefulness of third party interactions.  This approach would 
yield increases in social capital as the owner-manager could be facilitated in other 
networking opportunities.  The increase in absorptive capacity which such an 
interaction can facilitate, in turn promotes the likelihood of additional increases in 
absorptive capacity.  It should be noted that the transition to higher order learning in 
the Perigord Group took a number of years to occur. 
 
Policy increasingly requires evidence to support funding decisions.  It seems 
reasonable that the investment of funds, public or private, should be based on robust 
evidence rather than on perhaps prejudiced opinion.  The question of the return on 
investment in training is an example of this focus. There is a risk in this debate which 
relates to the nature of what is considered evidence and how it may be captured.   
Capturing the impact of training interventions is more difficult than measuring the 
impact of an investment in a piece of machinery.  Pre-intervention measures of 
productivity are relatively easy to capture.  Post-intervention measures then facilitate 
some comparison and some assessment of change which may be given a monetary 
value for the return on investment calculation.  However, measuring management 
capability or strategic awareness is more difficult.  It may also take a considerable 
period of time for any impact of learning to be identifiable.  Consequently, policy 
makers who do not recognise the different nature of certain types of learning risk 
deploying methodologies for evidence gathering which are entirely inappropriate.  
Given the previous recommendation for policy in relation to encouraging and 
facilitating the transition to higher order learning, it is critical that measures of 
efficacy are appropriate in order to ensure that worthwhile interventions are both 
allowed time to yield results and subject to measures which capture their full impact. 
 
The final recommendation relates to the need to develop the absorptive capacity of 
SMEs through their owner-managers.  For practitioners this requires openness to 
experience and to other views in terms of technology development, market 
opportunity and business practice.  The difficulty in this space is that the potential 
value of new knowledge may take some time to become apparent.  The literature 
suggests that in some cases knowledge will only become useful in some way when an 
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additional piece of new knowledge is identified which gives context or relevant 
meaning to that knowledge which already exists.  This suggests that patience and 
perseverance in continuously exposing oneself to knowledge opportunities through 
interactions with others is required.  Policy makers might encourage and support this 
process through the creation and dissemination of SME case studies, like the Perigord 
Group, where absorptive capacity has been expanded over time. 
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